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Abstract 
    Submitted by Kang Ma  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
and entitled Risk Assessment of Power Systems under a Corrective Control Paradigm 
    Date of Submission: 31st May 2011. 
Given the fact that the load is continuously growing as a sign of economic development and 
that renewable intermittent generation is growing rapidly driven by global climate change 
concerns and rising fuel costs, existing power systems need to be reinforced in order to 
accommodate the growing load and intermittent generation. Corrective control is a 
promising alternative solution to preventive control which, in this context, is represented by 
traditional system reinforcement of building more transmission facilities.  
The concept of reliability, existing reliability assessment methodologies and the latest 
development in this field were reviewed. The corrective control system was modelled as a 
common cause failure. New indices were derived and presented in the context of corrective 
control. They are Linear Weighed Reliability Index (LINWRI), Incremental Benefit of 
System Reinforcement (IBSR), Demand Response Incremental Cost Benefit (DRICB), and 
Voluntary Energy Curtailment Level (VECL). 
Three means of corrective control considered in this research are Demand Response (DR), 
Flexible AC Transmission Systems (FACTS) and Energy Storage (ES). One of the 
corrective control applications is the Active Management (AM) on distribution systems. 
The model of AM control system was developed and incorporated into chronological 
Monte Carlo simulation (CMCS). Different AM configurations and different reliability 
levels of AM with the same configuration have been proposed. Their impact on the ability 
to accommodate wind generation and on power system reliability was investigated. 
Economic assessment was also performed. A ‘win-win’ situation was achieved when a 
relatively reliable AM system is configured with Wind Generation Output Control 
(WGOC) function and the capacity of wind generation is adequate. 
DR models and the models of typical FACTS devices were reviewed and summarised. The 
Battery Energy Storage (BES) and Static Synchronous Compensator/BES 
(STATCOM/BES) models were developed based on the general structure of Energy 
Storage (ES) and a list of assumptions regarding their operation. Their models together with 
the model of the control system have been incorporated into CMCS which is applied as the 
reliability assessment methodology. The impact of DR, FACTS and ES on power system 
reliability was studied to a detailed level through test cases. The results have demonstrated 
the reliability improvement from corrective control compared to ‘doing nothing at all’ as 
well as the potential advantage of corrective control over traditional reinforcement in terms 
of cost effectiveness.    
The direction for future research related to this field was identified to be the investigation in 
network planning as an upstream project under a corrective control paradigm, the 
development of a more efficient and accurate nonlinear optimisation toolbox, the upgrade 
of DR models and FACTS models and the incorporation of transient analysis, etc. 
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Summary 
This chapter gives an overview of the background and motivation of this research 
highlighting two challenges facing today’s power systems namely continuous load 
growth and the increasing penetration of intermittent generation. The advantages 
and disadvantages of two fundamentally different solutions (corrective control and 
traditional reinforcement) that can be deployed to address the challenges are then 
summarised. The definition of corrective control as well as its scope in this project 
is clarified. The aim and the objectives of this research are then identified followed 
by a summary of the main contributions of this work and the thesis structure.  
 
1.1 Background of the Change towards Flexible Networks 
While current power systems in developed countries seem to function perfectly well 
without major disturbances or widespread public dissatisfaction, there are several 
factors that are driving the imperative for change to the way these power systems are 
presently planned and operated. The key drivers include the following:  
1) liberalisation of electricity markets; 
2) continuous load growth; 
3) increasing penetration of intermittent renewable generation; 
4) pressure to meet environmental targets; and  
5) economic, political and legal barriers to reinforcement of existing or 
construction of new power transmission infrastructure. 
These drivers can be grouped into three main areas which are elaborated further below:  
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1.1.1 The Liberalisation of Electricity Market 
 
Different countries in Europe have different agendas of transformation from a vertically 
monopolistic electricity company to a competitive multi-layer market with numerous 
private firms [1]. The UK government conducted a consultation on electricity market 
reform earlier this year (2011) [2]. Three key objectives of such a reform is the security 
of supply, decarbonisation and affordability [2]. To safeguard the security of electricity 
supply while pushing forward the reform towards a more competitive market, the UK 
needs to maintain a sufficient level of power system flexibility to balance supply and 
demand at any moment and avoid outages [2]. By sending the right signals to investors 
for an appropriate level of investment in flexible plants, interconnections, energy 
storage and demand response etc, the electricity market serves as one of the major 
drivers for these elements that form a flexible network [2, 3].  
 
  
1.1.2 The Pressure of Continued Load Growth and the Barriers to 
Traditional Reinforcement 
 
The pressure of continuous load growth should not be underestimated.  A 20% rise in 
demand was expected from 2007 to 2017 in North America, compared to only 10% rise 
in committed power supply over the same period [4]. Load growth is identified as one 
of the major challenges in Europe as well [5]. As part of decarbonisation agenda, it is 
expected that a substantial portion of energy consumption in the UK, for example 
heating and transport, is to be electrified in the long term [2]. As a result, the UK’s 
electricity demand is expected to increase, or even double by 2050 [2]. The continuous 
growth in peak demand is gradually ‘eating up’ existing system margins in both 
generation system and transmission system and is causing the power system to be more 
vulnerable to failure. The risk associated with load growth must be resolved without 
delay. And this is one of the major drivers for system reinforcement.  
From the power network point of view, there are two fundamentally different types of 
system reinforcement to address the issue mentioned above. One of them is traditional 
system reinforcement which normally entails building more transmission facilities [3]. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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This solution belongs to the preventive control domain which aims to provide sufficient 
system margin in advance. However, it is facing increasing barriers, both economic and 
political which can be summarised as follows: 
1) The cost of investing in a new power line is prohibitive, especially in countries 
with a shortage of land; 
2) The lead time on construction of new lines can be very long, depending on 
numerous factors including the length of the line; 
3) There are serious environmental issues and political barriers associated with 
construction of new power lines. The construction of new lines is likely to 
involve the alteration of natural habitats of wild life, e.g., chopping down a large 
area of forest. This significant environmental impact is likely to result in strong 
political objections; 
4) The legal process of acquiring the land permission for a large piece of land may 
be complicated and time-consuming. 
A less costly and less politically controversial alternative to construction of new power 
lines is the implementation of corrective control as a key feature of a flexible  network 
[3]. It represents a revolution in power system operation philosophy from preventive 
control to corrective control. The major advantages of corrective control are:  
1) It circumvents or at least delays the prohibitive investment cost of traditional 
reinforcement, i.e., building new transmission facilities; 
2) It requires a minimum area of land and hence causes much less environmental 
hassles than traditional reinforcement scenarios. In this way, it is much ‘greener’ 
than traditional reinforcement.  
In short, this solution can be defined as the investment in flexibility. Therefore, 
corrective control is a promising solution towards a flexible network driven by 
continuous load growth and other factors. 
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1.1.3 Pressure to meet Environmental Targets and Increasing Penetration 
of Intermittent Renewable Generation 
The increasing penetration of intermittent renewable generation is also the result of the 
liberalisation of electricity markets [6]. One of the key objectives of an efficient 
electricity market is decarbonisation, which is also a legally binding promise by the UK 
government. The UK government has set up ambitious low-carbon target: by 2020, the 
level of UK carbon emissions is expected to be 34% lower than that of 1990 [7, 8]. By 
2050, this level is  expected to reduce by 80%, relative to the level of 1990 [8]. This 
target inevitably requires a generation portfolio very different from that of today. The 
carbon-intensive coal generation is ageing and will be almost completely replaced by 
less carbon-intensive types of generation such as renewable generation and nuclear 
generation by 2050 [2]. At the same time, there is a need for flexible plants such as gas-
fire plants, which are necessary in maintaining the security of supply.     
In response to the pressure to meet environmental targets and sustainability criteria, 
renewable generation, which has been undergoing rapid development in Europe, is 
expected to constitute a substantial proportion in the UK’s generation portfolio by 2050 
[2]. At the same time, there is also pressure for change towards a flexible network 
which can cost effectively and securely accommodate increasing capacity of 
intermittent generation, such as wind generation and photovoltaic generation, or in 
short, the increasing penetration of intermittent generation [3].  
Although the trend towards a less carbon-intensive generation portfolio is clear, there 
are also unknown factors that potentially have a significant impact on this portfolio. For 
example, following the recent nuclear disaster in Japan, there is a worldwide public 
concern of the security of nuclear generation [7]. Public concerns have turned into 
political pressure in countries like Japan and Germany, and their long-term strategies of 
nuclear development are subject to an increased level of scrutiny, if not completely 
halted [7]. This pressure, in the long term, may lead to less percentage of nuclear 
generation and more percentage of intermittent renewable generation than previously 
proposed in the UK. However, it is difficult to predict the quantitative impact at this 
stage. The uncertainly in the future generation portfolio, coupled with the increased 
penetration of intermittent renewable generation, reinforces the requirement for future 
networks to be flexible. 
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1.1.4 Research Gaps and Introduction of Corrective Control 
 
With the implementation of corrective control, power systems are able to accommodate 
growing loads and increasing penetration of intermittent generation by utilising the 
system margin which should be reserved under traditional reinforcement. Rather than 
providing sufficient system margin in advance, corrective control aims to correct system 
violations in a reasonably short period of time after they occur. The prevailing ‘N-1’ or 
‘N-2’ rule is challenged under corrective control. For example, the power line may be 
pushed to its limit under corrective control: the power transmitted is right at the 
threshold where the line can operate in a stable mode, whereas, under preventive 
control, ‘N-m’ rule should be maintained which requires a large reserved capacity of the 
line. According to GB Seven Year Statement published by National Grid, for most 
power lines more than half of their capacity is reserved for security, despite the fact that 
their thermal ratings change in different seasons [3]. The implementation of corrective 
control corresponds to a more sophisticated way of power system management. It is a 
vital question whether such increased flexibility will bring extra risk to the power 
system, or in other words, whether a satisfactory system reliability level is guaranteed 
during the transition to a more sophisticated way of management. This question had not 
been answered before this research took place. More specifically, the following gaps 
have been identified:  
1) Although the classical framework of reliability assessment is well established, 
previous work paid little attention to the modelling of flexibility in reliability 
assessment. Previous publications mainly focus on generation re-dispatch, 
network reconfiguration and load shedding in reliability studies. Some papers 
investigate the Flexible AC Transmission Systems (FACTS), Demand Response 
(DR) and Energy Storage (ES) in contexts other than reliability assessment. The 
modelling of these means of corrective control in the context of reliability 
assessment is largely absent.       
2) The well-defined, widely applied existing indices have drawbacks of being 
‘partial-sighted’ and ‘non-representative’, i.e., each of them quantifies only one 
aspect of power system reliability and may not represent overall reliability. 
Furthermore, economic analysis considering risk-associated cost is necessary 
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under corrective control. However, indices that quantify overall system 
reliability as well as the economic aspect in the context of increased system 
flexibility are lacking. 
3) For the reason of simplicity, the assumption that different components are 
independent of each other is prevalent in reliability studies. However, apart from 
independent failures, corrective control devices are also subject to control 
system-originated failures. Previous work did not consider the impact of control 
system failure on power system reliability.  
4) Whether the investment in flexibility offers higher system reliability as well as 
better benefit/cost ratio compared with investment in transmission was a 
question unanswered in previous publications. This question is critical for 
network planners and policy-makers when deciding the network reinforcement 
strategy.  
In response to the trend towards a flexible network, the Supergen Flexnet (the ‘Flexnet’) 
research consortium was established in 2006, funded by Engineering and Physical 
Science Research Council (EPSRC), UK. This four-year research consortium (from 
2007 to 2011) is a £7m project with four workstreams under which there are numerous 
sub-projects investigating the technical issues, economic issues, public acceptance and 
the roadmap towards a flexible network [9]. The fundamental objective of the ‘Flexnet’ 
is to help realise a flexible network that delivers electricity to customers in a secure, 
environmental friendly and affordable way [9]. One of the key research issues under the 
‘Smart, Flexible Controls’ workstream is to study the impact of increased flexibility on 
power system reliability. And this thesis serves as the research output of this 
programme which is meaningful in practice: it demonstrates to policy-makers the power 
system risk level of investing in more flexibility rather than more transmission facilities; 
it also advises them about whether such risk associated with the transition is still 
manageable and whether more flexibility is economically favourable over traditional 
reinforcement.      
Corrective control brings flexibility to the system. Corrective control, in the broad 
scope, includes all means that aim to ‘correct’ the problem after it has occurred, e.g., 
generation re-dispatch, spinning reserve and load shedding etc [6]. Conventional 
generation has serious drawbacks as a candidate for corrective control: they incur an 
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expensive operation cost; the carbon emission is substantial; and their ramp-up time is 
not negligible. Renewable generation such as wind generation is not suitable for 
providing corrective control either, since it is far less flexible than gas-fire plants. Load 
shedding, which incurs a potentially huge social cost and customer dissatisfaction, is 
normally the least favourable corrective action. By being flexible, environmental 
friendly and potentially cost-effective, the Flexible AC Transmission Systems 
(FACTS), Demand Response (DR) and Energy Storage (ES) are three promising means 
of corrective control. Therefore, the term ‘corrective control’ refers to the above three 
means in this project.    
FACTS have become mature with the development of power electronics technology and 
have been widely deployed in real applications. They are expected to provide fast and 
robust control to system variables such as bus voltage and branch power flow. DR 
relieves system stress during peak time and under emergencies by serving as an 
alternative to spinning reserves. Installing a stand-alone ES device at load centre or 
integrating ES into intermittent generations may potentially be a cost-effective 
alternative to the investment of a new power line.  
  
 
1.2 Aim and Objectives of the Research 
Reliability is one of the critical criteria against which power system performance is 
assessed. It has rightly drawn much attention from system planners, network operators 
and researchers although it is taken for granted by ordinary customers in the developed 
world. A reliability issue is only recognised by the general public when there is an 
outage which has already triggered a serious social cost and widespread customer 
concern, even anger. Up till now, the prevailing ‘N-2’ rule in the UK has maintained a 
relatively reliable power system [1].  
It is vital that the impact of corrective control on power system reliability is thoroughly 
investigated before the decision to transit from preventive control to corrective control 
is made because:  
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1) The last thing decision-makers would like to see is the widespread customer 
dissatisfaction against ‘frequent’ (a subjective feeling relative to the current 
status) power outages and chaos under corrective control;  
2) It is critical to assess whether power system reliability is still in the acceptable 
range if corrective control replaces preventive control of building more 
transmission branches to maintain the system margin.  
The aim of this research is therefore to assess the impact of corrective control on power 
system reliability, or stated in another way, to assess the impact corrective control has 
on system risk.  
More specifically, this research has the following objectives:  
1) To implement Active Management model into distribution system reliability 
assessment 
Active Management (AM) is a promising solution in accommodating increasing 
penetration of intermittent renewable generation. The configuration of AM system 
directly affects its ability in accommodating intermittent renewable generation as 
well as power system reliability. Furthermore, for AM to be a sustainable solution in 
the long term, it is expected to provide economic benefits for both the network 
operator and the owner of renewable generation. These issues have to be thoroughly 
investigated before the decision to adopt AM is made. Although existing 
publications paid some attention to AM, they left a vast space for further 
exploration. As a comprehensive corrective control application, AM deserves 
substantial research effort in this project. Therefore, the first objective of this 
research is to implement AM model into distribution system reliability assessment 
methodology and to assess the issues mentioned above.  The research in AM serves 
as a support tool for decision makers to determine whether AM is a feasible long-
term solution to accommodating increasing penetration of renewable generation.   
2) To incorporate representative DR models in reliability assessment 
methodology 
As an essential element in the future flexible network, DR has received much 
attention from researchers. Work in this area is still ongoing. Although numerous 
papers and reports mentioned that DR improves power system reliability, yet few 
have presented a comprehensive analysis of power system reliability in the context 
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of DR. As a means of corrective control, DR warrants the research effort in 
thoroughly investigating its effect on power system reliability. And it is vital to 
model different types of DR programmes and to incorporate their models into 
reliability assessment methodology. Although DR programmes differ from case to 
case, they can be represented by a combination of three basic models. Therefore, 
one of the objectives is to implement representative DR models into reliability 
assessment methodology and to assess the impact of different DR scenarios on 
system reliability. The research then validates the DR models through case study 
and presents a comprehensive picture on the effect DR has on system reliability.  
3) To develop reliability models of FACTS and ES devices  
Corrective control includes the application of FACTS and ES devices. In order to 
assess their impact on system reliability, it is necessary to develop their reliability 
models. FACTS and ES devices correspond to different behaviours in reliability 
studies and exhibit different characteristics in power flow studies. Therefore, their 
effects on system reliability are different. Previous work presented the state space 
models of SVC and STATCOM which are subject to scrutiny and modifications. 
Furthermore, the reliability models of BES and STATCOM/BES are lacking. 
Therefore, this objective is to model FACTS devices and ES devices, and 
implement these models into reliability assessment methodology to assess their 
impact on system reliability, and perform cost-benefit analysis considering risk-
associated cost. The validity of these models is demonstrated in case studies. 
4) To incorporate control system failure in reliability assessment of power 
systems under corrective control 
As is mentioned above, the assumption of independence is prevalent in reliability 
studies. It requires justification and should not be misused. In this project, local 
control devices including FACTS and ES devices are not independent of each other. 
Rather, they are subject to common cause failure (CCF) arising from corrective 
control system failure. This type of failure may affect system reliability. However, 
previous publications left a gap on this issue. Therefore, it is an objective to model 
control system failure, to implement it into reliability assessment methodology and 
to assess its impact on system reliability.  The research considers the AM control 
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system, FACTS control system and ES control system in three different chapters 
and quantifies their impact on system reliability through sensitivity analysis.  
5) To develop new user friendly fit for purpose reliability indices 
Having identified the drawbacks of existing reliability indices, the aim of objective 
is to develop a new reliability index which represents overall system reliability by 
taking into account various aspects, and to visualise this index in a clear, friendly 
way. This research has achieved this objective and has demonstrated this index in 
case studies. Furthermore, economic analysis considering risk-associated cost is a 
necessary step in the study of corrective control as a type of network reinforcement. 
This requires new indices that take into account the economic aspect, and it is where 
previous work left a gap. Therefore, another objective is to develop indices that 
quantify the system reliability benefits of different types of network reinforcement. 
This research has tested these indices in case studies and demonstrated their value as 
an indispensable element in a comprehensive economic assessment of corrective 
control. 
 
1.3 Main Thesis Contributions 
This research has made substantial contributions and innovations in the area of 
reliability assessment of power systems under corrective control. They are summarised 
briefly below: 
1) A comprehensive literature survey on reliability assessment of power systems 
A comprehensive literature survey on reliability assessment of power systems has 
been undertaken and is presented in Chapter 2. The review also appears in later 
chapters as well.  The review covers the major existing reliability assessment 
methodologies, the constraint optimisation issues, and the background of AM, 
FACTS, DR and ES. Based on this review, the gaps have been identified, some of 
which have been bridged in this thesis.  
2) The development of new indices 
Linear Weighted Reliability Index (LINWRI) as a composite index represents the 
overall system reliability considering multiple aspects.  Demand Response 
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Incremental Cost Benefit (DRICB) represents the incremental monetary benefit in 
system reliability when one more unit of DR (expressed in MWh/year) is 
implemented. Incremental Benefit of Corrective Control (IBCC) represents the 
incremental benefit in reliability from incremental implementation of corrective 
control, whereas Incremental Benefit of System Reinforcement (IBSR) quantifies 
the incremental reliability benefit from incremental system reinforcement; 
Voluntary Energy Curtailment Level (VECL) represents annual voluntary energy 
curtailed as a percentage of annual total energy curtailed under emergency 
circumstances. The validity of these indices has been demonstrated in case studies. 
These indices are an indispensable element in reliability assessment under corrective 
control.  
3) The modelling of control system failures 
The control system failure is modelled as a common mode failure (CCF).  
All FACTS and ES devices are subject to CCF, apart from their independent 
failures. The CCF model is implemented into chronological Monte Carlo simulation 
(CMCS) as the reliability assessment methodology. By varying the failure rate of 
the CCF, the impact of control system failure on system reliability has been 
investigated.    
4) The development of state space models of BES and STATCOM/BES  
Based on physical configurations, full state space models as well as simplified 
models of BES and STATCOM/BES have been developed. Although these models 
depend on a list of assumptions, the procedure of deriving these models is 
applicable under a general circumstance. These models have been implemented into 
the reliability assessment methodology.    
5) The incorporation of risk-associated cost into the economic assessment under 
AM 
An existing formula that was used for calculating the net benefit for Distribution 
Network Operator (DNO) has been updated with risk-associated cost implemented 
when performing economic assessment under AM. This formula takes into account 
the connection and AM service charges imposed on the owner of wind generation, 
the risk-associated cost, and AM investment cost, thus serving as the core of a 
comprehensive economic analysis.  
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6) The modelling of post-contingency behaviours of a distribution system  
The post-contingency reactions of a typical distribution system have been modelled. 
These include the tripping of an upstream circuit breaker, the identification and 
isolation of the faulted component, and the network reconfiguration process. An 
algorithm that performs network reconfiguration has been developed. It is highly 
efficient for radial network. However, as a trade-off, it does not guarantee the 
optimal switching scenario where the number of affected load points reaches the 
minimum.   
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
The thesis structure corresponds to the objectives mentioned above. It is summarised as 
follows:  
Chapter 1 gives a brief overview of the research background, the comparison of 
traditional reinforcement and corrective control scenarios and the scope of corrective 
control in this project. The aim and objectives of this research are then identified 
followed by a brief summary of the contributions and the thesis structure.   
Chapter 2 gives an in-depth review of existing work in the field of power system 
reliability. Established reliability assessment methodologies including State 
Enumeration Method (SEM), Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) and Genetic Algorithm 
(GA) are reviewed in this chapter with their pros and cons summarised. The concept 
and methodology of constraint optimisation have also been reviewed followed by a 
summary of several toolboxes in Matlab for solving nonlinear optimisation problems.   
Chapter 3 reviews the features of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
system and the configurations of corrective control system. The reliability model of 
corrective control system is then proposed after introducing the definition of CCF.  
Chapter 4 proposes five new indices after a brief review of existing reliability indices. 
These new indices are LINWRI, DRICB, IBCC, IBSR and VECL. Their definitions are 
presented in detail in this chapter.    
Chapter 5 quantifies the reliability of distribution network under AM with Distributed 
Generations (DG). The concept and purpose of AM as well as its control system model 
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are introduced. Both the wind generation and AM control system model are integrated 
into the reliability assessment algorithm. The impact of AM control system failure on 
the overall reliability is quantified in the case study. The net benefits for both the owner 
of the wind generation units and the DNO are calculated.  
Chapter 6 introduces the background of DR. Three typical models, the load shifting 
model, load reduction model and emergency interruptible load model are summarised 
and incorporated into the reliability assessment methodology. The LINWRI results for 
all scenarios are calculated with detailed discussions. DRICB and VECL results are also 
calculated for the test case. The impact of DR on power system reliability is then 
concluded from the case study. 
Chapter 7 introduces the reliability model of FACTS devices as a means of corrective 
control and performs reliability assessment of a transmission network incorporating 
FACTS in the context of load growth. The LINWRI results for all scenarios are 
visualised on a reliability bar followed by detailed discussions. IBSR results are 
calculated as a critical part of the economic assessment. The impact of FACTS on 
power system reliability is concluded from the test case. 
Chapter 8 starts by summarising the potential benefits and possible applications of ES 
through literature survey. Different ES technologies are then compared. This chapter 
also reviews the general configuration of ES which consists of the central storage, 
power transformation system and Charge-Discharge Control System (CDCS).  The 
assumptions and full state space models of BES and STATCOM/BES are proposed. 
They are then simplified and applied in the reliability assessment of the power system. 
The LINWRI results and IBSR results are calculated for corrective control scenarios, 
the traditional reinforcement scenario and the reference scenario. The impact of ES on 
power system reliability is concluded from the test cases. 
Chapter 9 gives an overview of the project followed by a summary of contributions 
and achievements of this research. Future work is also suggested in this chapter.  
Appendix A presents the input data for the 16-bus test case used in chapter 5. These 
include the data of the network and corrective control devices, the load profile, and the 
reliability data of the central control unit. The results of economic analysis and the 
reliability results of the traditional reinforcement scenario are also given in Appendix A. 
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Appendix B presents the input data including the composite customer damage cost for 
the 16-bus test case used in chapter 6.  
Appendix C presents the input data for the IEEE 24-bus Reliability Test System (RTS) 
used in chapter 7. These include the network data, the data of FACTS devices and the 
input data for economic analysis.    
Appendix D gives the network data, the data of FACTS devices and the central control 
unit, and the load profile for Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS) used in chapter 8. 
Appendix E gives the network data and the data of the STATCOM/BES and the central 
control unit for the Modified IEEE 24-bus Reliability Test System (MRTS) studied in 
chapter 8. 
 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has summarised five major drivers for this research and identified the gaps 
from previous work in this area. The broad definition of corrective control has been 
introduced. However, its scope in this project has been clarified as including FACTS, 
Demand Response and Energy Storage. A brief introduction of the ‘Flexnet’ research 
consortium to which this project belongs has been given. The objective of the ‘Flexnet’, 
as its name suggests, is to investigate research issues associated with the transition 
towards a flexible network which is an essential element of a future smart grid. Based 
on this background and the gaps, the aim and objectives have been outlined. A summary 
of the main contributions of this work and the thesis structure were also given. 
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Summary 
This chapter reviews the concept of reliability, the basic assumption, different types of 
reliability criteria, and the division of power system reliability for a structured 
calculation purpose. Established reliability assessment methodologies including State 
Enumeration Method (SEM), Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) and Genetic Algorithm 
(GA) are reviewed in this chapter with their pros and cons summarised. The concept 
and methodology of constraint optimisation are also reviewed followed by a summary 
of several toolboxes in Matlab for solving nonlinear optimisation problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Concept of Reliability 
Reliability is ‘the ability of a component or a system to fulfil its expected functions for a 
specific period of time under the condition which it is designed to function’ [10]. When 
applied to power systems, reliability is the ability to serve customers with the required 
amount of energy of required power quality [11].  
Various probability distributions can be used in modelling random behaviours in 
reliability evaluation. These include Poisson distribution, normal distribution, 
exponential distribution, Weibull distribution and uniform distribution etc. Before 
further discussion, it is necessary to clarify the fundamental assumption adopted 
throughout this project: all components in power systems are in their normal operating 
life when the hazard rates are assumed to be constant [12]. Regular maintenance is 
conducted so that the above assumption remains valid: components are replaced before 
they enter the wear-out period when their hazard rates grow significantly through time. 
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Under this assumption, the exponential distribution is applicable. The justification is 
presented as follows [12]. 
1) Exponential distribution with constant failure rate provides necessary simplification 
of a problem which may be highly complicated by its nature; 
2) Historical reliability data may be limited, from which it is not possible to determine 
the distribution. Therefore, using a more complicated distribution model is not justified 
by the availability of data; and 
3) Different types of distributions make no difference if only system probability values 
are considered.  
A key characteristic of exponential distribution is memory-less, i.e., the probability of 
failure in any given time interval is only dependent on the length of that period without 
being affected by prior operating status [12]. In other words, its history does not 
influence its present and future in any way. 
 
2.2 Adequacy and Security 
Reliability assessment is divided into two categories for a structured calculation 
purpose: adequacy assessment and security assessment [11].  Adequacy is defined as 
having sufficient generation, transmission and distribution capacities to supply 
customers with the amount of electrical energy they require without causing any 
violations to system constraints. This concept is in the steady state domain. Adequacy 
assessment is concerned about whether an adequate state exists or not. Whether such a 
state is accessible in the transitions is of no concern in adequacy assessment [11].  
On the other hand, the concept of security focuses on whether a power system is capable 
of riding through dynamic disturbances, or in other words, whether a dynamic path to 
the final steady state exists following a disturbance [11]. 
 
2.3 Deterministic and Probabilistic Criteria 
The deterministic reliability criteria have been applied in utility companies up till now. 
They are straightforward and clear enough for practice in the real world. Sufficient 
margin in generation and transmission capacity is reserved according to deterministic 
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criteria. Typical deterministic criteria in generation and network capacity are given 
below [11]. 
1) Generation capacity: installed capacity equals the maximum expected load plus a 
percentage of the peak load as margin. 
2) Network capacity: ‘N-m’ (normally m=1 or 2) where the system can survive with up 
to m lines out of service at the same time.  
In the UK, ‘N-2’ has been adopted in the transmission system [13]: the system can 
survive contingencies where up to two branches fail simultaneously without any system 
violations. 
However, deterministic criteria are unable to account for the stochastic nature of system 
behaviours. According to [11], deterministic criteria arbitrarily assume certain hazard 
events and suggest precautions against them. It does not take into account the 
probability of these hazards. Nor does it ensure that all hazard events that contribute 
much (above a certain threshold) to the true risk are considered. They are not likely to 
result in an optimal solution where the total cost reaches the minimum. Overinvestment 
or underinvestment is likely under deterministic criteria. In short, they are not consistent 
in terms of risk evaluation. On the other hand, probabilistic criteria take into account the 
stochastic nature of power systems. They not only reveal the true risk by considering the 
probability of hazard events, but also enable a robust economic assessment which 
requires the computation of mathematical expectation.  
There are still barriers that prevent decision-makers from adopting probabilistic criteria 
in practice.  One of them is the lack of a comprehensive set of data [11]. A credible 
probabilistic assessment requires a large volume of data from which the means and 
standard deviations can be calculated. Historical records may not exist, or may not be of 
a credible sample, or may be confidential. However, this barrier is no longer true in 
some utility companies where a sufficient volume of applicable data exists for 
probabilistic evaluation. 
Another barrier is the lack of incentive to transit from deterministic to probabilistic 
criteria. As far as the current criteria work perfectly well with no major disturbances or 
public pressure, network operators are prone to be conservative to changes. There is no 
incentive for them to replace the familiar, straightforward, well functioning 
deterministic criteria with the unfamiliar, complicated, ‘risky’ probabilistic criteria.  
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However, as power systems are expected to undergo revolutionary changes with the 
adoption of corrective control, the importance of probabilistic reliability assessment is 
greater than ever. A credible reliability level in the context of corrective control can 
only be evaluated with probabilistic methods. Furthermore, the question how corrective 
control affects power system reliability can only be answered through a comprehensive, 
credible probabilistic-based evaluation.   
 
2.4 Hierarchy Levels of Power Systems 
Because of the formidable physical size of power systems, it is almost impossible to 
conduct analysis on the generation, transmission and distribution system as a whole. As 
a simplification which enables a structured calculation, a power system is divided into 
three hierarchy levels according to their functioning zones. They are the generation 
system (Hierarchy level I or HLI), the composite generation and transmission system 
(HLII), and the whole system including the generation, transmission and distribution 
system (HLIII) [11].  
When performing reliability calculations on HLI, the ability of the generation system to 
supply the demand is evaluated. All generation units are modelled as a bulk supply 
without considering the network [11].  
On HLII, the ability to generate and the ability to pass the electrical energy through the 
network to load points are of the same importance. The network modelling is essential 
in HLII [11].  
A distribution system is the ‘zoom-in’ image at the load point of the transmission 
system. On the distribution level, the interface between the distribution and the 
transmission system is the bulk supply point. It is a main concern whether each load can 
be supplied by the bulk supply or distributed generation (DG) through the distribution 
network.    
 
2.5 Reliability Indices 
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This section briefly summarises existing reliability indices. A detailed revision is given 
in Chapter 4. These indices are categorised according to the hierarchy level to which 
they are normally applied, as presented in Table 2.1 [11].  
Table 2.1: Typical reliability indices [11]. 
Name of index Definition  Hierarchy level which it 
is normally applied in 
LOLP (loss of load 
probability) 
The probability that the load 
exceeds the available generation 
capacity 
HLI 
LOLE (loss of load 
expectation) 
The expected number of days (or 
hours) in a given period of time 
when daily (or hourly) peak load 
exceeds the available generation 
capacity 
HLI 
LOEE (Loss of 
Energy Expected) 
The total energy curtailed within a 
given period of time 
HLI 
EENS (Expected 
Energy Not 
Served) 
The same as above HLII 
EIC (Expected 
Interruption Cost) 
The interruption cost resulted from 
load losses 
HLI & HLII 
SAIFI (System 
Average 
Interruption 
Frequency Index) 
The average number of outages a 
customer experiences within a 
period of time 
Distribution systems 
SAIDI (System 
Average 
Interruption 
Duration Index) 
The average outage duration a 
customer experiences within a 
period of time 
Distribution systems 
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Each existing index has its limitations. It reveals one facade of system reliability only. 
The ranking of an individual reliability index does not always correspond to the ranking 
of overall system reliability. In response to this problem, a new index called Linear 
Weighed Reliability Index (LINWRI) is proposed in this project. A detailed discussion 
is given in Chapter 4. 
A few more indices are proposed in this research. They are Demand Response 
Incremental Cost Benefit (DRICB), Incremental Benefit of System Reinforcement 
(IBSR) and Voluntary Energy Curtailment Level (VECL). The former two focus on the 
economic aspect. DRICB and VECL are applied in the context of demand response 
(DR), whereas IBSR can be used in a general context of system reinforcement. These 
indices are demonstrated in detail in Chapter 4.  
 
2.6 Reliability Assessment Methodologies 
 
Methodologies for assessing the reliability of power systems can be put into two 
categories, analytical methods and simulation methods [11]. Three representative 
methodologies reviewed in this chapter are the state enumeration method (SEM), Monte 
Carlo simulation (MCS), and Generic Algorithm (GA). The first one is an analytical 
method, and the latter two are simulation methods. 
 
2.6.1 State Enumeration 
 
Analytical methods create mathematical models of a system based on the mechanism of 
the system. A commonly used analytical method is the SEM, which enumerates 
possible system states, evaluates the consequence of each state and aggregates the 
results to form the risk profile of the system. All mutually exclusive system states 
should be enumerated for an accurate result. In other words, the enumeration should be 
exhaustive. The total number of possible states increases exponentially with the system 
size until it finally becomes too prohibitive to enumerate. This phenomenon is called 
combinatorial explosion [14]. Therefore, simplifications should be made that only a 
limited number of states are enumerated according to a predefined filtering rule. For 
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example, only the states whose probabilities are greater than a certain threshold are 
enumerated, or only the states up to the second order failure are considered where at 
most two components fail at the same time.  With a carefully chosen filtering rule, SEM 
can be faster than its alternative simulation method. However, the drawback is that 
some states with low probability but severe consequences may be ignored. There is no 
guarantee for 100% consistency for most filtering rules. A fast pre-screening technique 
was developed to promote consistency by ranking the states according to risk, but it is 
not free from misranking problems [15]. Moreover, SEM produces mathematical 
expectations only. It does not produce the shape of the distribution.  
The ideal criterion to filter system states is to consider only the states whose 
contribution to risk indices is greater than a predefined threshold. An ideal contingency 
selection technique ranks all system states according to their contribution to risk indices 
with a high level of efficiency. These two goals, accuracy and efficiency often 
contradict each other. Therefore, a balance is necessary. Several contingency selection 
approaches were developed based on conventional power flow.  
One of them is the Performance Index Method (PIM) where a representative index  is 
selected to describe the system [
J
16].  J  can be either the branch power flow index or 
the bus voltage index. J  is calculated under normal conditions. When contingency 
occurs,  is calculated again. The difference between pre-contingency J  and post-
contingency , or , is calculated for each contingency. The magnitude of 
J
J JΔ JΔ  is 
deemed to indicate the impact of the corresponding contingency on system operation 
conditions. A larger  corresponds to a larger impact the contingency state has on the 
risk of the power system. Therefore, the contingencies are ranked according to 
JΔ
JΔ . The 
threshold is specified to filter out the contingency states which make little contribution 
to risk indices.  
A highly efficient method called costate method was developed to calculate JΔ  [15]. 
The control variable u  is defined as a digital indicator: if component operates in normal 
state, ; otherwise . 1u = 0u =
The performance index  is a function of control variable u  and system state J x  [15].  
( , )J f x u=           (2.1) 
        
Taylor expansion is performed. The first order approximation of post-contingency J  is 
obtained. Therefore  can be calculated as illustrated in [JΔ 16]: 
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0 1u u u
dJJ J J
du= =
Δ = − = − 1=        (2.2) 
where  dJ
du
 is calculated by the costate method. 
However, this method is vulnerable to misranking because of the error in JΔ  caused by 
the linearisation. For extremely nonlinear cases, the error may be substantial enough 
that the ranking of  is completely distorted.  JΔ
A screening method is an alternative solution which is more accurate than PIM but less 
efficient [17]. This method is based on approximate power flow analysis technique such 
as Fast Decoupled Power Flow Solution. Because of the underlying assumption of the 
Fast Decoupled Power Flow Solution, its application is limited to high voltage 
transmission systems where the ratio of resistance to reactance is low.  
A hybrid method was proposed as a balance between accuracy and efficiency: first the 
PIM is applied to select a set of contingencies; then the screening method is used to 
rank the contingencies in the set [17]. It is expected that the hybrid method takes 
benefits from both the PIM and the screening method.  
 
2.6.2 Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
Simulation methods are conceptually similar to conducting experiments. When an 
actual system is of a complicated nature, simulation methods reveal their advantage 
since they circumvent the barriers faced by analytical methods. The barriers include 
having to understand the mechanism of the system and to establish mathematical 
description accordingly. A typical simulation method is MCS. Its potential merit is 
revealed when dealing with large systems since it does not discriminate any system 
state. Therefore, it is consistent in risk assessment. Unlike the analytical method, those 
states with extremely low probability but lead to complete system black-out also have 
the opportunity to show up in MCS. Furthermore, chronological MCS (CMCS) provides 
a more informative set of indices than analytical methods: time-related indices and the 
distribution of indices through years can be obtained by CMCS. However, MCS may 
impose greater computational burden than filtered SEM since a sufficiently large 
number of experiments have to be conducted before the result converges. MCS may not 
be able to reach the same accuracy level as the analytical method since the result varies 
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with each sampling. One more sampling does not guarantee a more accurate result due 
to the stochastic nature of this methodology. 
Three types of MCS are introduced in [11]. They are state sampling, state duration 
(CMCS), and state transition sampling. State sampling approach samples system states 
by their probabilities. A system state is the combination of the state of each component. 
Unlike CMCS, state sampling does not consider chronological behaviour of 
components. Because any two samplings are independent of each other, state sampling 
does not store results of previous samplings so that disc space can be saved. Instead, it 
merely updates risk indices in this process. Therefore, it does not produce frequency or 
duration-related results.   
To the contrary, the CMCS approach provides comprehensive results including the 
frequency and duration-related results but requires more disc space than state sampling. 
In CMCS, the chronological behaviour of each component is simulated and sampled. 
The system sequential behaviour is the combination of the behaviour of each 
component. System analysis is performed for system behaviour over the entire time 
sequence, and risk indices are updated in the process. The CMCS approach is explained 
in detail below: 
Random numbers are generated to simulate the sequential behaviour of every 
component. Suppose that a component represented by the two-state model is residing in 
the up state initially. A random number  is generated, and the time to failure (TTF) is 
expressed below [
1U
11]. 
 1
1TTF ln U
λ
= −                   (2.3) 
When t=TTF, the component enters the down state. The second random number   is 
generated, and the time to repair (TTR) is calculated:  
2U
2
1TTR ln U
μ
= −             (2.4) 
When t=TTF+TTR, the component returns to the up state. The third random number is 
generated, and the whole process repeats until a sufficiently long sequence of 
behaviours is simulated.  
A similar technique can be applied to components with a multi-state model. A 
component represented by the three-state model has a normal state, a derated state and 
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an outage state. Suppose that its initial state is the normal state. Two random numbers, 
 and  are generated. TTF and the time to derated state (TTDS) are given below. 1U 2U
1
1
1TTF ln U
λ
= −                                     (2.5) 
2
2
1TTDS ln U
λ
= −                                  (2.6) 
 
If TTF<TTDS, the component enters the failure state when t=TTF. Otherwise the 
component enters the derated state when t=TTDS. Then another two random numbers 
are generated, and the process repeats until a sufficiently long sequence of component 
behaviours is simulated.  
The system behaviour is obtained by convolving the behaviour of each component. At 
any given time, the snapshot of the system state is the aggregation of each component 
state. An optimisation with a customised objective function is then performed on the 
system state at every hour. Reliability indices are updated based on the results of the 
optimisation. After passing the threshold hour in the simulation, a convergence check is 
performed by comparing the standard deviation of a series of results with the predefined 
threshold. If the former is less than the latter, the results are deemed converged, and the 
algorithm outputs all results; otherwise, the algorithm goes back and continues the 
simulation until the results later converge or the algorithm reaches the maximum 
number of hours. 
 
 
 
2.6.3 Genetic Algorithm 
 
 
 
As a reliability assessment methodology, Genetic Algorithm (GA) simulates the nature 
of evolution where adaptive chromosomes (individuals) survive through generations 
[18]. Chromosomes experience crossovers and are subject to mutations. A fitness 
function is applied for selecting adaptive individuals.  GA traces the failure states where 
load curtailment is most likely to occur. In this context, the term ‘adaptive’ means the 
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ability to lead to load curtailment which contributes to risk indices. Later generations 
are expected to have more chromosomes that are adaptive. This method circumvents the 
enumeration of prohibitive number of system states. It is applied in [18] where DC 
optimal power flow method calculates the load curtailment of each selected state. GA is 
found to be superior over MCS due to its intelligent search ability in [18].    
Chromosomes bearing different genes fit the environment to different degrees. The fitter 
ones have greater chances to survive and crossover (or ‘mate’), thus to pass on their 
adaptive gene series to the next generation, which is subject to random but often minor 
‘mistakes’ in the reproduction process (this phenomenon is called ‘mutation’). Mutation 
may either improve or degrade the fitness of a chromosome. However, ‘weak’ 
chromosomes with a small fitness value are not without a change to survive. They may 
have some ‘fit’ gene coding that is potentially beneficial to future generations. This is 
the reason for not completely eliminating the survival chance of the ‘weak’ 
chromosomes.  
A basic GA algorithm consists of the following steps [18]: 
1) Initialisation: an initial population of chromosomes are randomly generated. The 
status of each component is indicated by the chromosome; 
2) Selection: fitness is normally defined as the product of the probability and the 
amount of active load curtailment. The probability and the fitness value of each 
chromosome are assessed. Chromosomes are randomly selected to survive based on 
their fitness values. The resulting population is the parent generation; 
3) Crossover: chromosomes are randomly paired. They crossover with each other. The 
resulting population is the child generation; 
4) Mutation: a number of chromosomes from the child generation are randomly chosen. 
A random gene of each selected chromosome is altered; 
5) The parent generation and the child generation form a single population. The process 
then goes back to step 2 until the stopping criteria is met; 
6)  During the above steps, the probability and the fitness value of each chromosome 
ever appeared are stored in a matrix. The fitness values are summed up, and the result is 
the ‘fitness’ of the power system (The fitness result is EENS, if the fitness for individual 
chromosome is defined as the amount of active load curtailment).  
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There are several selection approaches that can be used in step 2 [19]. The roulette 
wheel approach is one of the stochastic selection approaches. Each time the wheel is 
spun, a chromosome is selected for crossover [19]. This process repeats until a 
sufficient number (pre-specified) of chromosomes are selected. The fitter chromosomes 
have a larger share of the wheel, so that the ‘ball’ is more likely to fall into this share. 
‘Weak’ chromosomes still have a small positive share: there is still a chance for them to 
survive.  
The tournament approach is an alternative stochastic selection approach: it runs several 
‘tournaments’ among a few randomly chosen chromosomes. The fitter ones win the 
‘tournaments’ and are selected for crossover. Weak chromosomes have a small chance 
to win when the tournament size is large enough [20].  
Various crossover techniques exist, e.g., the one-point crossover, two-point crossover 
and “cut and splice” crossover [19]. A series of data between the parents is swapped to 
produce two new offspring. The techniques mentioned above are different ways to 
determine which part of data to be swapped. For example, the two-point crossover 
technique randomly chooses two points between which all data are swapped. This 
technique does not change the length (number of genes) of the chromosome. Crossover 
allows the fitter gene series to be passed on to the offspring. Thus, the overall fitness of 
the next generation improves.  
There are different stopping criteria [18]. One of the simplest ways is to define the 
maximum number of generations: when reaching this number, the iteration 
automatically terminates.  Another stopping criterion is explained as follows: when the 
change in EENS brought by an incremental generation of chromosomes is below a 
threshold, EENS is deemed converged and GA iteration ends. In practice, the above two 
criteria can be mixed: after a certain number of iterations, the EENS result is checked 
for convergence. If the EENS result converges, GA process then terminates. 
 
 
2.7 Optimisation 
2.7.1 Optimisation for State Analysis 
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Table 2.2: 
Table 2.2: Pros and cons of AC load flow and DC load flow. 
After the system state is obtained, the state is then analysed with an optimisation 
algorithm.  
Load flow analysis is performed on the system state, and violations are checked. If a 
violation occurs, an optimisation to minimise the consequence of load curtailment is 
often called.  Load flow analysis and the optimisation can be based on either DC or AC 
load flow [21]. AC load flow produces more accurate results than DC does, whereas DC 
load flow is more efficient because it considers real power only. Normally, DC load 
flow analysis and DC optimisation are sufficient for system planning [11]. Because the 
bottleneck to achieving a high level of accuracy is load uncertainty, it is rather 
meaningless to run AC load flow for accuracy improvement which is largely 
compromised by load uncertainty. Furthermore, AC load flow is subject to non-
convergence problem because of the nonlinear nature. On the other hand, DC load flow 
is more robust in the sense that it always yields a result with no convergence problem. 
However, DC load flow is incapable of dealing with FACTS devices that regulate the 
voltage, since the voltage is assumed to be 1.0 per unit under DC load flow. Under this 
circumstance, AC load flow is necessary.  
A summary of the pros and cons of AC and DC load flow is given in  
 Pros Cons 
AC load flow 
evices 
 voltages  
) may not converge. 
 
1) more accurate, if data 
uncertainty is not considered 
2) capable of dealing with 
voltages and network d
that regulate
1) slow; 
2
DC load flow 
2) no convergence problem 
or devices that regulate 
voltages 
1) efficient 1) less accurate 
2) not capable of dealing with 
voltages 
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ment or the minimum cost of load curtailment while satisfying 
power balance and physical lim odel is 
presented below [21]. 
          (2.7) 
subject to 
                                    (2.8) 
The optimisations under DC and AC are the same in concept: to achieve the minimum 
amount of load curtail
its of system components. The DC optimisation m
n iC∑mi
 
              ( )= − +g lT(S) A(S) P P C
               gi iP C li+ =∑ ∑ ∑
              
P                                          (2.9)  
 min maxgi gi gi  P P P≤ ≤                                                 (2.10) 
C P≤ ≤ (2.11)              li                                                                   
                
 0 i
max( )k kT S                                          (2.12) 
where iC and C  are the load curtailment at bus i and the load curtailment vector, 
g l
matrix, the real power generation vector and the load vector, respectively. 
T≤             
respec ly. ,  and  are the real power flow vector, the relationship tive  T(S) , A(S) P P
giP  and liP  
are the real power generation and the load at bus i. ( )kT S and 
max
kT  are the er f
2). 
The AC optim er 
factor remains constant when load curtailment is performed [21].  
         (2.13) 
subject to 
 
                           (2.14) 
− +  
pow low 
and the maximum power flow in branch k.  The power balance is expressed by (2.9). 
The component and load constraints are expressed by (2.10) – (2.1
isation model is expressed below with the assumption that the pow
n iC∑mi
( , )gi li i iP P C P− + = V θ
( , )Q= V θ                                   (2.15) gi li qi iQ Q C
i
qi li
li
CC
P
= Q
i                                                          (2.17) 
                                                        (2.16)  
0 i lC P≤ ≤
min max
gi gi giP P P≤ ≤                                                 (2.18) 
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min max
gi gi giQ Q Q≤ ≤
θ
i
                                               (2.19) 
max( , )k kT≤V                                                    (2.20) 
max
i iV V V≤ ≤                                                   (2.21) 
where iC ,  
T
min
gP  and  kT  are th as tho  in the DC optimisation model. e same se defined giQ ,  
liQ  and qiC  are the reactive power generation, the reactive load and the reactive load 
curtailment, respectively. ( , )P V θ  and ( , )Q V θ  are the real i i and reactiv
c ectively.  and are the voltage magnitude and angle vector, 
the best outcom m
t to a set of constraints. A maximisation 
problem can be converted to a minimisation problem, which is represented by the 
following general uality 
constraints [22]:   
( )f x     
For linear optimisation, the objective function and constraints are all linear. For 
Typical analytical solutions to constraint optimisations are the branch and bound 
subset of non-optimal (‘fruitless’) candidate solutions by branching, bounding and 
e power 
inje tion at bus i, resp V θ  
respectively. The power balance is expressed by (2.14) and (2.15) 
 
2.7.2 Constraint Optimisation: Concept and Methodology 
 
Before discussing the algorithms for solving optimisation problems, it is necessary to 
review the concept of constraint optimisation. 
Constraint optimisation aims to achieve e (the maxi isation or 
minimisation of the objective function) subjec
 model consisting of n  equality constraints and m  ineq
min                   (2.22) 
subject to       ( )         1,...,i ig c i n= =x      (2.23) 
           ( )        1,...,h d j m≤ =x      (2.24) j j
nonlinear optimisation, either the objective function or at least one of the constraints is 
nonlinear.  
solution, simplex algorithm, interior point and active set, etc. There are also simulation-
based solutions such as GA, simulated annealing and particle swarm. 
The branch and bound solution is an enumeration approach which discards a large 
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ion is found when the subset 
 of solving 
ation model (SLOM). Non-
standard linear models can be converted 
surplus variables [22
  
  
ere
pruning [23]. This approach is only applicable when a problem has limited number of 
feasible solutions. For a general constrained minimisation problem, this method 
searches within the feasible solution set (the ‘feasible set’). The ‘feasible set’ is 
continually divided into smaller subsets (the ‘branching’ process). The upper and lower 
bounds of each subset are calculated. This is a recursive process. Those subsets of 
which the lower bound is greater than the upper bound of another subset are ‘fruitless’ 
and are discarded (the ‘pruning’ process). In this way, the number of subsets that should 
be considered is significantly reduced.  The optimal solut
reaches a ‘single’ value, i.e., a set where the difference between the upper bound and the 
lower bound is lower than a pre-specified threshold [22].  
Matlab provides a number of optimisation toolboxes which are capable
linear/nonlinear/integer optimisation problems. For linear optimisation, two algorithms 
used in Matlab are the simplex algorithm and interior point algorithm [24].  
The simplex algorithm considers the standard linear optimis
to SLOM by introducing slack variables and 
]. The SLOM is presented below [22]: 
Tmin                =z c x         (2.25) 
subject       (2.26)  to      Ax = b
                      (2.27)       0≥x
 T1 2( , ,..., )nx x x=xwh        
        
 A A
he rig
determ
d di
aint 
(2.28) 
T
1 2( , ,..., )nc c c=c (2.29) 
( m na m n×= ≤    (2.30) 
 T1 2( , ,..., )          ( 0    1, 2,..., )m ib b b b i m= ≥ =b    (2.31) 
)          ( ;  has a full row rank)ij
x , c , A  and b  are the decision vector with decision variables, the coefficient vector, 
the equality constraint matrix and t ht hand nonnegative vector, respectively. 
The feasible solution space is ined by the equality constraint and the nonnegative 
inequality constraint in SLOM. If m n= , the feasible solution can be calculate rectly 
from the equality constr Ax = b . In a more general circumstance where m n< , a 
group of solutions may be found (or no feasible solution exists) by solving Ax = b  after 
assigning the values of n m−  decision variables (in all possible combinations) as zero. 
This group of solutions is called basic solutions. Any basic solution is a basic feasible 
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objective function 
This project does not involve large-scale problems and does not apply 
ratic optimisation and linear 
optimisation. Define a quadratic problem as follow ]: 
solution which is at least a local minimum if it is a feasible solution to the SLOM. The 
global optimal solution can be found by comparing the values of the 
where each basic feasible solution is substituted for x  in (2.25) [22]. 
The interior point algorithm is used in Matlab for linear optimisation of large-scale 
problems. As an iterative process, it approaches the optimal solution from within the 
feasible region. It has an advantage in speed for large-scale problems with millions of 
variables [22]. 
the algorithm.  
The active set algorithm is used in Matlab for both quad
s [22
T T1min   ( )
2
f = +x x Hx c x
        (2.33) 
       (2.32) 
subject to     b≤Ax
 
The active set at x  is the set of constr t are active. Equality constra lways 
active, whereas inequality constraint ( ) 0ig x ≥  is only active at 
aints tha int is a
x  when ( ) 0ig x = . The 
active set method searches for Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) point of the quadratic 
problem through an iterative process. Details can be found in [22, 25]. Its basic 
]. 
r
n  is found by solving 
ing active set 
3) If
procedure is illustrated below [22, 25
1) First sta t from a feasible point; 
2) In the k th iteration with solution kx , the iterative increme t dk
the equality problem defined by the correspond k .  
 0kd ≠ , determine αk  ( 0 α 1k
J
≤ ≤ ) and let αk k k k+1 = +x x d . If α 1k = 1k kJ J+ = , and  
1k+x  is a feasible solution. Otherwise if kp J∉  which satisfies 1α p k p+ =x b ,  there is p  
should be added to the active set, i.e., 1 { }k k+J J p= ∪ . In this case go back to step 2;  
4) If 0kd = , kx  is the KKT point of the equality problem. If all Lagrange multipliers of 
the equality problem are nonnegative kx is the KKT point of the quadratic problem, and 
the iteration terminates. Otherwise kx  is not the KKT point of the quadratic problem, 
, 
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nonlinear problem is converted into a quadratic 
the active set method. The SQP consists of three 
) Determine the formula used in iteration. 
Table 2.3 [22]. 
 
Table 2.3: a summary of some optim
Function name Problem type 
and the procedure goes back to step 2 after deleting the equality constraint(s) of which 
the Lagrange multiplier(s) is (are) negative.  
Sequential quadratic programming (SQP) is an optional algorithm that Matlab provides 
for small/medium scale nonlinear optimisation. By approximating the Lagrange 
function with a quadratic function, the 
problem which can be solved using 
steps. Details can be found in [22, 26]. 
1) Solve the quadratic sub-problem; 
2) Calculate the step length using linear search; 
3
Some of the optimis in Matlab ar  in  ation functions e summarised
 
isation functions in Matlab 
Annotation 
Linprog Linear optimisation orithms, i.e. the 
scale problem only. 
Three options of alg
simplex algorithm, active set 
algorithm and interior point. The first 
two are for small and medium scale 
problem. The last one is for large 
Quadprog Quadratic optimisation 
oblem. Trusted 
region method for large scale 
problem.  
Active set method for small and 
medium scale pr
Fmincon Nonlinear optimisation SQP for small or medium scale 
problem. Trusted region method for 
large scale problem. 
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methods because the former 
um by evaluating the gradient.  
value. A closer initial value to the global minimum is likely to enhance the chance of 
n 
o be the same as that obtained by Newton-Raphson 
.  
can be applied for different types of 
Analytical methods are generally faster than simulation 
have the ability to find the direction towards the minim
The ‘fmincon’ function is applicable to nonlinear problems whose objective function, 
constraints, and first derivatives are all continuous [27]. It does not always find the 
global minimum because of the nonlinear nature of the problem, unless  
i) the global minimum is the only minimum; and 
ii) the objective function is continuous [27].  
Oscillatory objective function prohibits ‘fmincon’ from finding the global minimum 
[27].  For other types of problems with more than one ‘valleys’ but only one ‘global 
valley’, ‘fmincon’ function may be trapped in the ‘local valley’, depending on the initial 
finding the global minimum. The ‘fmincon’ function may sometimes output ‘no feasible 
result’, if the initial value provided by the user is far from reasonable. For example, let 
the bus voltage be 1.5 pu. This highly unrealistic value may result in ‘fmincon’ reaching 
the maximum number of iterations with an output of ‘no feasible result’. Whe
‘fmincon’ is applied for optimisation of the power flow, a flat start, i.e., 1.0 pu bus 
voltage magnitude and o0  voltage angle yields a minimum (at least a local minimum 
but global minimum is not guaranteed) in practice.  For basic load flow analysis, the 
result from ‘fmincon’ is proved t
method. In this way, the ‘fmincon’ function is validated.  
Apart from analytical methods, there are also simulation methods for optimisation 
problems. GA is one of them. In previous sections, GA was presented as a reliability 
assessment methodology. When GA is applied for optimisation, the basic procedure is 
similar to that mentioned before
GA is applied to various types of problems including linear optimisation, nonlinear 
optimisation and mix-integer/pure integer optimisation. When solving different types of 
optimisation problems, a general GA function 
problems. Compared with using a number of toolboxes, a general GA function reduces 
the workload of programming. 
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GA does not evaluate the gradient which may be hard to calculate in nonlinear 
problems. On the other hand, GA has disadva  with 
other methodologies. 
um.  
ntages, some of which are shared
1) There is no guarantee that GA always finds the global minim  It depends on the
initial range of chromosomes [28]. If the range is far from the global minimum point, it 
may not be possible for GA to find the global minimum. An example showing the effect 
of the initial range is presented in [28] and is also presented below:     
2(
( )
x
f x
⎧⎪= ⎨ exp( ) )                        for x 2020
exp( 1) ( 20)( 22)     for x>20x x
− − ≤
⎪− − + − −
    (2.34) 
⎩
which has a local minimum at 0x =  and a global minimum at 21x = . 
Given the initial range of [0, 1] which is far from 21x = , the experiment conducted by 
Mathworks clearly shows that GA fails to get anywhere near 21x = , although the 
mutation function allows GA to explore beyond the initial range [28]. 
here is no ‘hill’ to climb [28].  
 users to specify the mutation rate and the crossover fraction. However, this 
f its slow speed. In reliability 
assessment where GA for optimisation runs for hundreds of thousands of times, the 
The “fmincon” function is used as the optimisation tool in this project for the following 
However, if the initial range is set as [0, 15], GA successfully finds the global minimum 
point at 21x = .  
2) GA approaches the minimum slower than analytical methods that use 
analytical/numerical gradients. Tens or hundreds of iterations are required before the 
result converges, whereas analytical methods may converge in several iterations.  
3) More iterations in GA do not guarantee a better result because of the stochastic 
nature of GA. 
4) GA cannot simulate digital (0 or 1) variables. This results in non-convergence 
because t
Matlab offers a GA toolbox which allows users to scale down the fitness function. It 
also allows
toolbox is not used in this project mainly because o
computational burden becomes intolerable.  
reasons: 
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rden than GA; and  
) it may sometimes yield local minimum, but this is a common weak point shared by 
nonlinear optimisation toolboxes.  
Trying with different initial values improves the chance of finding the global minimum. 
al minimum is at least a feasible solution. A ‘perfect’ 
This section gives a brief review of the progress in the field of power system reliability 
A bibliography of papers before 1999 is presented [29].  According to [29], most papers 
tegories of 
omposite generation-transmission system reliability evaluation’ and ‘Transmission 
ventional Power System Reliability Assessment
1) it deals with nonlinear optimisation which is necessary when considering network 
voltages;   
2) it imposes less computational bu
3
However, it increases the computational burden, yet the finding of global minimum is 
still not guaranteed. A loc
optimisation tool with high efficiency and the capability of always getting the global 
minimum is still to be developed.  
 
 
2.8 Existing Literatures on Power System Reliability 
based on literature survey.  
(39 out of 42 papers and 2 out of 19 papers, respectively) in the ca
‘C
and distribution system reliability evaluation’ are in the scope of conventional reliability 
assessment. They consider traditional facilities including generation, branches, 
protection devices, HVDC and shunt capacitors.   
In this section, existing publications are categorised in a different way from that in [29]. 
Representative papers are summarised as follows:  
 
Category 1: Con  
A review of a general integrated structure for assessing power system reliability is 
presented in [30]. However, there is no consensus on which approach is the best for 
each hierarchy level. This paper specifically emphasises the importance of defining the 
time frame which ranges from milliseconds to a number of years [30]. Static reliability 
assessment is concerned about a time frame from a couple of hours to years, whereas 
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dynamic assessment is concerned about the dynamic transition period ranging from a 
cycle to minutes.  
The basic framework for reliability assessment is presented in Figure 2.1 [30]:  
 
Figure 2.1: the basic framework for reliability assessment [30]. 
 
 
of concern, the type of causes 
 lack of a 
ation needs to be 
efers to analytical approaches, MCS, or a hybrid of the two. 
distributions are of the same importance under the circumstance where variations of 
dices over a long period need to be considered. For example, delivery point indices, 
epending on network topology and operating philosophy are defined, and their 
 
Detailed explanations of the terms in Figure 2.1 are presented below [30]: 
1) Objective: this includes the hierarchy level that is 
that result in failures, the consequences, and the time frame.  
2) Data: they include issues such as data accuracy, data age, and the
sufficiently large data sample for rare events, etc. 
3) Model: this refers to state space models where crucial inform
captured while restraining the complexity within a manageable level. 
4) Simulation: this r
5) Analysis: this refers to reliability indices as simulation results. 
6) Reliability criteria: include cost/benefit criteria, loss of load/energy, and legally 
binding criteria. 
Not only the expected values of reliability indices are of concern, the probability 
in
d
probability distribution is obtained through CMCS [31].  
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Category 2: Power System Reliability incorporating Renewable Generation 
and Active Management 
tput characteristic of wind turbines. It also reviews indices in the 
ind Generation Interruption Cost 
Benefit (WGICB).  
hey are summarised below. 
at different locations: this phenomenon is 
, wind farms across the UK 
are not independent of each other. 
3) Effect of wind turbine parameters: parameters such as the rated power, cut-in 
4) Effect of the total wind generation capacity installed in the grid. 
neration is performed in [33, 34]. The 
died in [37],  
based on a three-state model of the wind turbine. It demonstrates that different 
 
A number of papers focus on renewable generation and their impact on power system 
reliability.   
A review is presented in [32]. This paper summarises the wind speed model (by Weibull 
function) and the ou
context of wind generation. They include Load Carrying Capacity Benefit Ratio 
(LCCBR), Equivalent Capacity Rate (ECR) and W
Compared with traditional generation, wind generation has special effects on power 
systems reliability [32]. T
1) The wake effect (the shadowing effect): wind generation units placed upstream 
of the wind direction affect the wind speed received by downstream wind 
generation units. 
2) The correlation of wind speeds 
obvious in countries like the UK of which the geographical size is not large 
enough to justify uncorrelated wind speed. Therefore
speed and cut-out speed all affect system reliability. 
5) Effect of the environment: the environment will affect the reliability of wind 
turbines, thus affecting power system reliability. 
Generation adequacy assessment with wind ge
state space models of wind turbine generation are core innovations in these papers. The 
battery energy storage (BES) is integrated into wind generation, and generation 
adequacy assessment is performed in [35, 36].  
The impact of wind generation on distribution network reliability is stu
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mum wind capacity that can be connected to the 
stem is determined, and network reinforcement scenarios are proposed to 
ccommodate more wind generation. 
capacities of wind generation are needed at different locations, so that the same 
reliability level as that with traditional generation only can be maintained. 
Reliability assessment of composite generation and transmission system with wind 
farms is performed in [38]. The maxi
sy
a
 
 
Category 3: Power System Reliability incorporating FACTS 
 
There are relatively few publications on reliability assessment with FACTS devices. A 
reliability assessment methodology that incorporates FACTS devices is proposed in 
ows [40]:  
ice will 
 credible contingencies; 
f FACTS will introduce some risks, it is still better than 
n, the implementation of 
ACTS, and the implementation of Energy Storage. In short, it is a trend to assess 
power system reliability in the context of a flexible network.  
 
[39]..Unified Power Flow Controller (UPFC) is modelled by a three-state model, and 
the system is analysed with DC load flow.  
The impact of FACTS devices on system security is summarised in [40]. The rules for 
the security purpose are listed as foll
1) ‘N-1’ criteria for FACTS devices, i.e., the loss of a single FACTS dev
not lead to system collapse; 
2) FACTS devices should be able to function upon
3) FACTS devices should be designed in the way that there is no undesirable 
interaction with other devices in local vicinity. 
Although the implementation o
the ‘doing nothing at all’ scenario which leaves the transmission system at risk in the 
context of load growth [40].    
It is not possible to enumerate all relevant publications in this thesis. The above 
publications represent a clear trend: power system reliability assessment in a new 
context with increasing penetration of renewable generatio
F
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reviewed in this 
chapter are State Enumeration Method (SEM), Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) and 
flow is essentially a nonlinear optimisation 
problem. A summary of several toolboxes in Matlab for solving nonlinear optimisation 
problems was presented in this chapter. 
2.9 Conclusion 
This chapter gave an in-depth review of existing work in the field of power system 
reliability. Three representative reliability assessment methodologies 
Genetic Algorithm (GA). Their pros and cons have been summarised.  
The concept and methodology of constraint optimisation have also been reviewed. 
System contingency analysis under AC load 
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Summary 
This chapter reviews the definition of control systems and introduces the Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. Different configurations of control 
systems are summarised. The corrective control system is modelled by Common Cause 
Failure (CCF) to which all local control devices are subject.   
 
 
 
 
3.1 Concepts of control systems and SCADA 
 
A control system is defined as a device or a group of devices that monitor and command 
other devices. A closed loop control system where information is transmitted through a 
real-time network consists of four parts, categorised by their functions [41]: 
1) sensors or measurement devices with the function to collect local information;  
2) a central control unit, analogous to the ‘brain’ that analyses local information and 
suggests a control decision (Alternatively, the control decision can be made by man);  
3) local control devices which execute the command from the central control unit; and 
4) a communication system through which all information is transmitted.  
In power systems, the type of control system is specifically called Supervisory Control 
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. Its definition, as is given by IEEE, emphasises 
remote monitoring and control [42, 43].  
A SCADA system consists of the following subsystems [42]: 
1) a human interface; 
2) a supervisory system; 
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3) remote terminal units (RTU); 
4) programmable logic controllers (PLC); and 
5) a communication system. 
A brief structure of the SCADA system is presented in Figure 3.1 [42]. 
 
[Author’s compilation] 
Figure 3.1: Structure of the SCADA system [42]. 
 
In this structure, RTU serves as the ‘eyes’ and ‘hands’ of the central control unit (or the 
‘master station’). It converts the analogue data collected from local sensors to digital 
data which is then sent to the supervisory system. It also passes the command from the 
central control unit down to local devices. In most applications, RTU serves as the slave 
of the central control unit, i.e., it does not have the ability to make control decisions 
[42]. However, under some circumstances, optimisation functions can be implemented 
into RTU which will then be able to reach a control decision [42].  
Not all devices are controlled by the central control unit. Some devices exercise 
autonomous control with a local control target. For example, a Static Var Compensator 
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(SVC) configured to operate independently of the central control aims to keep the local 
bus voltage magnitude at 1.0 pu. RTU is not necessary under this circumstance.   
As a critical part of the SCADA system, the communication system is the media for all 
data flows. Its performance largely affects the software/hardware configuration of RTUs 
and the central control unit. It is a potential bottleneck in the SCADA system because of 
the constraint factors such as data transfer speed and noise [42]. Communication can be 
conducted via radio, microwave, telephone line, power line carrier system and fibre 
optics, etc [42].  
 
 
3.2 SCADA serving as a Corrective Control System with FACTS 
 
3.2.1 Corrective Control System Configurations 
 
FACTS devices, implemented in power systems as a means of corrective control, serve 
as a part of the corrective control system (CCS). Four types of CCS configurations are 
introduced in this chapter.  
1) One-on-one configuration [42]:  
 
Figure 3.2: One-on-one configuration. 
 
This is a decentralised configuration where each control unit corresponds to an RTU 
and achieves its own control target. However, this is not consistent with a transmission 
network where the central control room performs coordinated control in practice. 
 
2) Star configuration [42]: 
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Figure 3.3: star configuration. 
 
A central control unit controls all RTUs. Each RTU is connected to the central control 
unit with a dedicated communication channel. The failure of one communication 
channel does not affect other channels.  
 
3) Party-line configuration [42]:  
 
 
Figure 3.4: Party-line configuration. 
 
 
A central control unit controls all RTUs which are connected to the central control unit 
with a common communication channel. Compared to ‘star’ configuration, this 
configuration may save investment cost in cables but at the price of poorer reliability. 
The failure of an upstream channel leaves all downstream RTUs out of control.  
The communication channel may be combined with the failure of the central control 
unit, thus forming a single component which disables all RTUs when it fails. This 
simplification is applicable when the communication is conducted via radio.      
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4) Mixed ‘star’ and ‘party-line’ configuration [42]: 
 
Figure 3.5: Mixed ‘star’ and ‘party-line’ configuration. 
 
A central control unit controls all RTUs. Some of the RTUs are on the same 
communication channel whereas others are on different channels.  
 
 
3.2.2 Reliability Model of CCS 
 
 
Before introducing the CCS model, it is necessary to review the concept of dependent 
failure. Contrary to independent failure where probabilities can be multiplied, dependent 
failure is where a correlation exists among individual failures of which the probabilities 
cannot be multiplied. Dependent failure can be put into two categories as shown in 
Figure 3.6. 
 
[Author’s compilation] 
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Figure 3.6: Gategories under dependent failure [44]. 
 
Common cause failure (CCF) is a type of dependent failure where multiple components 
fail due to a single common cause [44]. As a subset of CCF, Common mode failure 
emphasises that all components fail in the same mode.  
Cascade failure is another type of dependent failure where the failure of one or some 
components triggers the failure of some other components. Their failure may further 
trigger the failure of more components. There is no common cause for cascade failure. 
To distinguish CCF from cascade failure, it is critical to ensure that the failures of 
multiple components are not consequences of each other in CCF. 
The beta factor method is a straightforward approach for CCF modelling. It detaches 
CCF from independent failures. A β  factor ( 0 β 1≤ ≤ ) is estimated from historical data: 
(percentage) of the failure rate is attributed to CCF and (1β β)−  to the independent 
failure [45, 46].  
The multi-beta factor method is derived from the basic beta factor method. The 
multi0beta factor method corresponds to a triple redundant or higher system where there 
are combinations of failures. For example, a common cause trips only some of the 
components, whereas another common cause trips all. Each common cause is assigned a 
beta factor under this circumstance [45].   
Previous literatures normally assume that all components (generation, lines and FACTS 
devices) of a power system are independent of each other. However, this is not true in 
this research, since FACTS devices are subject to CCF.  
When the SCADA system is in a ‘party-line’ configuration, all FACTS devices are 
subject to CCF, i.e., the failure of the central control unit or the communication system. 
The outage of FACTS devices is the result of any one of the three types of failure, i.e., 
the independent failure, the central control unit failure and upstream communication 
channel failure.  
The following assumptions have been adopted:  
1) communication channels are independent of the central control unit; and 
2) different communication channels are independent from each other. 
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Based on the configuration and the above assumptions, FACTS devices are not subject 
to the same CCF event as the upstream communication channel is relative to each 
FACTS device.   
Figure 3.7 shows a party-line configuration where communication channels are 
numbered from 1 to 4.  
 
Figure 3.7: A ‘party-line’ example. 
 
It is obvious from the example that the central control unit failure will disable all 
FACTS devices. As communication channel 1(‘channel 1’) is the upstream channel of 
FACTS device 1-4 (‘device 1-4’), its failure disables all FACTS devices. The failure of 
channel 2 only disables device 2-4 since channel 2 is the upstream channel of all 
FACTS devices except device 1. Similarly, the failure of channel 3 disables device 3 
and 4, and the failure of channel 4 disables device 4 only. In general, the failure of a 
channel may not be the CCF for all FACTS devices but only some of them. In other 
words, FACTS devices are not completely coupled with each other.    
The calculation of failure rates in a radial distribution system is demonstrated in [11]. 
The ‘party-line’ configuration is radial, and failure rates can be calculated in a similar 
way to that introduced in [11]. The failure rate of the end load point is simply the 
summation of the failure rates of all contributing failures, given that no auto-
reconfiguration or protection failure is considered. However, there is a difference in the 
contributing failures: the assumption for the radial distribution network in [11] is that all 
failures trip the only circuit breaker upstream of all components, thus affecting all load 
points in the network. However, in this project, the above assumption is not valid, and 
the communication channel failure does not necessarily affect all ‘terminals’, i.e., 
FACTS devices.  Take the same network topology shown in Figure 3.7 as an example. 
According to [11], the failure of line 4 will trip the circuit breaker on line 1, thus 
affecting all four ‘terminals’. However, in this research, the failure of channel 4 does 
not affect FACTS device 1 – 3 but FACTS device 4 only.      
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The failure rate of a FACTS device is calculated below. 
      (3.1) FACTS Self CCF Self Con UCommλ =λ +λ =λ +λ +λ
 
where  is the failure rate of the independent failure (self-originated) of a FACTS 
device. ,   and  denote the failure rate of CCF, the central control unit 
failure rate, and the upstream communication channel failure rate, respectively.  
Selfλ
CCFλ Conλ UCommλ
A fault tree is given in Figure 3.8 regarding the outage of a FACTS device. 
 
Figure 3.8: The fault tree for a ‘party-line’ system. 
 
Take the same example as shown in Figure 3.7. The fault tree for the failure of FACTS 
device 3 is given in Figure 3.9. 
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Figure 3.9: The fault tree for the failure of FACTS device No.3. 
 
The upstream communication channel failures are different for each FACTS device. 
Instead of using a single beta factor, multiple beta factors are applied in this example. 
 indicates the percentage that attributes to the central control unit failure; , ,  
and  correspond to the percentage that attribute to the failure of channel 1, 2, 3 and 4, 
respectively. The following equations hold true: 
0β 1β 2β 3β
4β
FACTS1 Con CH1 Self 1
0 FACTS1 1 FACTS1 Self 1
λ =λ +λ +λ
           =β λ β λ λ+ +       (3.2) 
FACTS2 Con CH1 CH2 Self 2
0 FACTS1 1 FACTS1 2 FACTS2 Self 2
λ =λ +λ +λ +λ
           =β λ +β λ +β λ +λ
     (3.3) 
FACTS3 Con CH1 CH2 CH3 Self 3
0 FACTS1 1 FACTS1 2 FACTS2 3 FACTS3 Self 3
λ =λ +λ +λ +λ +λ
           =β λ +β λ +β λ +β λ +λ
   (3.4) 
FACTS4 Con CH1 CH2 CH3 CH4 Self 4
0 FACTS1 1 FACTS1 2 FACTS2 3 FACTS3 4 FACTS4 Self 4
λ =λ +λ +λ +λ +λ +λ
           =β λ +β λ +β λ +β λ +β λ +λ
  (3.5) 
 
where subscript Con, CH and Self denote the ‘central control unit’, ‘channel’ and 
‘independent (self-originated)’, respectively.  
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It is a different case when the communication system is combined with the failure of the 
central control unit. The failure of this single element disables all FACTS devices. This 
forms a single CCF, and a single beta factor is used to quantify this CCF.   
FACTSi Self i Con Comm
Self i FACTSi
λ =λ +(λ +λ )
          =λ βλ+        (3.6) 
The corresponding fault tree is given in Figure 3.10. 
  
Figure 3.10: The fault tree for the simplified ‘party-line’ configuration. 
 
When the control system is configured in a ‘star’ configuration, the difference is that the 
failure of a communication channel causes the outage of only one FACTS device that is 
connected to the channel. Under this circumstance, the CCF is the central control unit 
failure. Therefore, it is possible to combine the communication channel failure with the 
failure of the corresponding FACTS device. This forms a combined independent failure. 
The failure rate of a FACTS device is calculated by 
    (3.7) FACTS Self Comm CCFλ =(λ +λ )+λ
 
where denotes the corresponding failure rate of the communication channel 
failure.  
Commλ
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Its fault tree is presented in Figure 3.11. 
 
Figure 3.11: The fault tree for a ‘star’ configuration. 
 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the features of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) system and the configurations of corrective control system. Four 
configurations were reviewed including one-on-one configuration, ‘star’ configuration, 
‘party-line’ configuration, and mixed ‘star’ and ‘party-line’ configuration. A simplified 
‘party-line’ configuration was also presented. The definition of CCF and the beta factor 
method were introduced. The corrective control system was modelled as CCF. 
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Summary 
This chapter reviews existing reliability indices through literature survey. The 
drawbacks of existing reliability indices and gaps are identified. In response to these 
drawbacks and gaps, new indices are proposed with their definitions explained in 
detail. They are Linear Weighed Reliability Index (LINWRI), Incremental Benefit from 
System Reinforcement (IBSR), Demand Response Incremental Cost Benefit (DRICB) 
and Voluntary Energy Curtailment Level (VECL). 
 
 
 
4.1 Review of Existing Reliability Indices 
A number of reliability indices were reviewed in Chapter 2. Different indices focus on 
different aspects, e.g., the amount of load/energy loss, average outage duration, the cost 
of outages, and the number of outages caused by voltage violations only, etc. It is 
necessary to know the focus and limitations of an index before applying it to real cases.   
Indices in HLI can be put into two categories, i.e., loss-of-load indices and loss-of- 
energy indices [11]. Typical loss-of-load indices include Loss of Load Probability 
(LOLP) and Loss of Load Expectation (LOLE). LOLP represents the probability of  the 
load exceeding the available generation capacity. LOLE quantifies the expected number 
of days (or hours) when daily (or hourly) peak load exceeds the available generation 
capacity in a year [47]. 
The calculation of LOLP requires that the probabilities of all mutually exclusive failure 
states in which the load is greater than available capacity be summed up. Given the table 
of the capacity outage probability and the load duration curve, the formula for 
calculating LOLE is presented below [11]. 
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1
1
LOLE ( )
n
k k k
k
t t P−
=
= −∑        (4.1) 
where  denotes the cumulative outage probability for capacity state k.  is the 
number of time units that an outage magnitude of the k th state will result in load 
shedding.  
kP kt
Loss-of-load indices are concerned about whether load shedding occurs as well as the 
number of times it occurs, rather than how much the shortfall is in the available 
capacity. On the other hand, loss-of-energy indices are concerned about the shortfall in 
the available capacity. Loss of Energy Expected (LOEE) quantifies the total energy 
curtailed within a given period.  This index is useful for energy-limited systems [11]. 
However, LOLP may be more of a concern than LOEE from a customer point of view 
[11].  
Typical indices in HLII include Expected Energy Not Served (EENS) and Expected 
Interruption Cost (EIC). EENS is defined in a similar way to LOEE: the total energy 
curtailed within a period of time. EIC represents the cost of outages.  It depends on the 
operation scenario and the cost function.  A greater EENS of one system than that of 
another does not necessarily mean the former has poorer reliability, since EENS 
depends on the size (or the load level) of the system.   
Typical indices in distribution systems are System Average Interruption Frequency 
Index (SAIFI), System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), Momentary 
Average Interruption Frequency Index (MAIFI), Customer Average Interruption 
Frequency Index (CAIFI), and the Average Service Availability Index (ASAI), etc [11]. 
SAIFI is the average number of outages a customer experiences within a year [11]. 
SAIDI is the average duration of outages a customer experiences within a year. MAIFI 
is defined in a similar way to SAIFI except that only momentary interruptions are 
counted.  CAIFI is different from SAIFI in the way that only customers affected by 
interruptions are counted in the denominator. ASAI represents total customer hours 
when loads are served as a percentage of total customer hours when there is load [11].  
λ
SAIFI i i
i
N
N
= ∑∑         (4.2) 
SAIDI i i
i
U N
N
= ∑∑                   (4.3) 
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λ
MAIFI
m
i i
i
N
N
= ∑∑         (4.4) 
λ
CAIFI i iA
i
N
N
= ∑∑         (4.5) 
8760
ASAI=
8760
i i
i
N U
N
−∑ ∑ iN∑        (4.6) 
where , , ,  and λi λ
m
i iU iN
A
iN  denote the permanent failure rate of load point i, the 
momentary failure rate of load point i, the annual outage duration of load point i, the 
number of customers at load point i, and the number of customers affected by 
interruption at load point i, respectively.  
The merit of the above indices is that they can be directly compared with each other. 
Take SAIFI as an example. Suppose and 
where subscript A and B denote system A and B, respectively. 
This clearly shows that an average customer of system B experiences twice as many 
times of outages as that of system A, although the two systems may have completely 
different topologies and network data.   
ASAIFI 0.02 occ/year=
BSAIFI 0.04 occ/year=
However, each of the above indices reflects only one aspect of system reliability. The 
full spectrum of system reliability can only be revealed when different aspects are taken 
into account. For example, a small SAIFI value may be due to the result of a large 
number of customers in the system.  Although the system seems reliable given SAIFI 
alone, this may not be true if other aspects are considered [11]. The explanation is given 
below. 
1) There may be a small minority of customers who experience frequent outages, 
whereas the majority never experience any interruption at all. SAIFI fails to 
reveal this, whereas CAIFI can. 
2) The momentary outage in the system may occur frequently – this is a problem 
that should not be neglected. SAIFI does not take this aspect into account. 
3) The outage duration for an average customer in a year may be unacceptable, 
although the number of outages is small. Therefore, SAIDI is needed as a 
supplement to SAIFI. 
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B
Furthermore, different indices for two power systems may not show the same reliability 
ranking. Therefore, it is not sufficient to judge which system is more reliable merely 
from existing indices. Suppose  and A BSAIFI SAIFI> ASAIDI SAIDI< , where 
subscript  and denote system A and system B, respectively. It is not possible to 
judge merely from the two indices which system is more reliable than the other. In order 
to reach a conclusion it is necessary to specify how much each aspect of reliability is 
weighted. In other words, a clear mathematical definition of the term ‘reliability’ is 
required. Nonetheless, ‘reliability’ results are not directly comparable unless their 
mathematical definitions are the same.   
A B
 
 
4.2 New Reliability Indices 
 
 
4.2.1 Linear Weighed Reliability Index 
 
Traditional indices, e.g., SAIFI, SAIDI, MAIFI and EENS etc, have the drawback of 
being ‘partial-sighted’ and ‘non-representative’. Linear Weighed Reliability Index 
(LINWRI) overcomes the drawbacks. Analogous to a stock market index that represents 
the stock market, LINWRI represents overall system reliability. 
The following conditions are applied in this project. 
1) LINWRI results are compared for different scenarios applied to the same 
system; 
2) All scenarios are implemented in the same year, i.e., year 1; 
3) Load is growing year by year.     
Under the above assumptions, LINWRI can be interpreted as follows:   
1) Given a future year, the LINWRI ranking shows which scenario results in better 
system reliability and the quantitative differences among the scenarios. 
2) Given a LINWRI level in the future, LINWRI results show, under each scenario, 
how many years it takes for system reliability to degrade to that level. A larger 
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number of years indicates more reliability improvement a scenario brings to the 
system.  
Although the mathematical definition of LINWRI may vary in different contexts, the 
fundamental idea is the same. It represents overall system reliability by calculating the 
weighted sum of component indices where each of them quantifies an aspect of system 
reliability.   
1 2
1 2
1ref 2ref nref
INDEX INDEX INDEXLINWRI=1 (ρ +ρ +...+ρ )
INDEX INDEX INDEXn
− n
1ref
  (4.7) 
where . Subscript “n” and “ref” denote the nth index and the reference 
case, respectively. 
1 2ρ ρ ρ... 1n+ + + =
A key assumption applies to (4.7): a greater value of a component index corresponds to 
poorer reliability in terms of that particular aspect. For example, the fact that 
 indicates that the reliability of the former scenario is poorer than 
that of the reference case in terms of the aspect represented by .  
1INDEX INDEX>
1INDEX
According to (4.7), the reference case has a LINWRI value equal to zero. For a given 
case, a positive value corresponds to an improvement in reliability from the reference 
case, whereas a negative value corresponds to degradation. A greater LINWRI value 
represents higher overall system reliability.  
The reference level is normally defined as the current status without any system 
reinforcement. The unacceptable level of which the reliability is right at the edge of 
being ‘unacceptable’ also needs to be defined.  Arbitrariness is often unavoidable in 
practice: the unacceptable level may be determined through experience rather than 
through a rigorous mathematical process. For example, the unacceptable level can be 
defined as the extreme point where network investment in branches and other facilities 
should be immediately put into practice. Once the unacceptable level is defined, 
LINWRI can be visualised on the reliability bar as shown in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1: the reliability bar.  
 
This bar, similar to the ‘green-orange-red’ alert system, contains three zones as shown 
in Figure 4.1:  
Zone I: reliability improvement zone; 
Zone II: moderate degradation zone; 
Zone III: significant degradation zone.  
The boundary of Zone I/Zone II is the reference case and the boundary of Zone II/Zone 
III is the unacceptable level.  
 
 
 
 
4.2.2 Demand Response Incremental Cost Benefit 
 
Demand Response Incremental Cost Benefit (DRICB) index and Incremental Benefit of 
Corrective Control (IBCC) index are similar since they both quantify the incremental 
monetary benefit in reliability brought by incremental implementation of corrective 
control. DRICB works in the context of demand response (DR). It is derived from EIC 
which quantifies the cost of outages.  
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b aEIC -EICDRICB
Incremental DR implementation
=      (4.8) 
 
where subscript b and a represent ‘before’ (the incremental implementation of DR) and 
‘after’ (the incremental implementation of DR), respectively. The incremental DR 
implementation value can be defined as the difference in annual energy consumption 
between the two cases being compared, if only load reduction is implemented. If only 
load shifting is implemented, the incremental DR implementation can be represented by 
the difference in the amount of annual energy shifted. If different types of DR programs 
are implemented at the same time, the incremental DR implementation can be expressed 
by the difference in the weighted sum of energy reduced and energy shifted. Although 
DRICB focuses on the benefit in reliability only, it is an indispensable index when 
assessing the overall benefits of DR. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3 Voluntary Energy Curtailment Level 
 
Electric energy curtailed through voluntary programmes needs to be distinguished from 
that through force because  
1) they incur completely different costs;  
2) they correspond to completely different customer satisfaction levels; and 
3) their contibutions to reliability indices are different. 
As a result, there was a need for an index to quantify voluntary energy curtailment as a 
proportion of total energy curtailment. This research has bridged the gap by defining 
Voluntary Energy Curtailment Level (VECL) as annual voluntary energy curtailment 
over annual total energy curtailment in percentage under emergencies. In the context of 
DR, the voluntary energy curtailment is the energy curtailed through Emergency 
Interruptible Load Programme (EILP) in which the participation is on a voluntary basis. 
The mathematical expression of VECL is 
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VEC VECVECL
Total Energy Curtailed VEC+FEC
= =     (4.9) 
 
where VEC and FE  denote Voluntary Energy Curtailment and Forced Energy 
Curtailment, respectively. VECL quantifies the implementation level of EILP. A greater 
VECL value indicates a higher implementation level of EILP.  
C
 
 
4.2.4 Incremental Benefit of Corrective Control and Incremental Benefit of 
System Reinforcement 
 
 
Incremental Benefit of Corrective Control (IBCC) is defined as follows: 
b aEIC -EICIBCC
ICCI
=        (4.10) 
 
where subscript a and b stand for ‘after’ (after incremental investment in corrective 
control) and ‘before’ (before incremental investment in corrective control)”, 
respectively. ICCI stands for ‘Incremental Corrective Control Implementation’ which 
can be expressed in either capacity (MW) or in £.  
IBCC represents the reduction in risk associated cost resulting from the incremental 
investment in corrective control. This index is similar to DRICB in that it quantifies the 
benefit in reliability. It is an indispensable index when quantifying the overall benefits 
brought by corrective control.    
The three costs, , aEIC bEIC  and  are all present values.  ICCI
tb
b
0
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where subscript ‘a’ and ‘b’ denote ‘after’ (after incremental investment) and ‘before’ 
(before incremental investment). m and i denote the economic life and the interest rate, 
respectively.  denotes the expected interruption cost in year t. IC  and  denote 
the investment cost and operation cost, respectively.  If IBCC>0 and ICCI>0, the 
incremental investment has a positive effect in reducing risk (or the risk associated cost).   
tEIC OC
The concept of incremental benefit can be extended to traditional reinforcement 
scenarios. Incremental Benefit of System Reinforcement (IBSR) quantifies the 
incremental benefit in reliability brought by both corrective control scenarios and 
traditional reinforcement scenarios. It is calculated in a similar way to :  IBCC
b aEIC -EICIBSR    
ISRI
=        (4.14)  
 
where  denotes Incremental System Reinforcement Investment which is defined in 
a similar way to ICCI. Other variables are defined the same as in previous formulas.   
ISRI
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
After presenting a brief review of existing reliability indices, this chapter proposed five 
new indices: LINWRI, DRICB, IBCC, IBSR and VECL. Linear Weighted Reliability 
Index (LINWRI) as a composite index represents the overall system reliability 
considering multiple aspects. Demand Response Incremental Cost Benefit (DRICB) 
represents the incremental monetary benefit in system reliability when one more unit of 
DR (expressed in MWh/year) is implemented. Incremental Benefit of Corrective Control 
(IBCC) represents the incremental benefit in reliability from incremental implementation 
of corrective control, whereas Incremental Benefit of System Reinforcement (IBSR) 
quantifies the incremental reliability benefit from incremental system reinforcement; 
Voluntary Energy Curtailment Level (VECL) represents the percentage of annual 
voluntary energy curtailed over annual total energy curtailed under emergency 
circumstances. Their mathematical definitions were introduced. These indices are 
applied in case studies in later chapters. 
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Summary 
The commitment to fulfilling carbon emission reduction targets requires more 
distributed generation (DG) to be connected to a network that offers potential economic 
benefits to both the owners of the DG units and the network operator. However, 
accommodating increasing DG capacity is a challenging endeavour. In response to this 
challenge, existing distribution networks are expected to undergo a revolutionary 
change from passive to active management (AM). This chapter reviews the 
characteristics of AM, as well as its benefits, based on a literature survey. One of the 
most important features of AM is that it allows for coordinated control. An AM system 
consists of the central control unit and the communication system, as well as local 
control devices. Its model has been incorporated into reliability assessments that are 
based on chronological Monte Carlo simulation (CMCS). 
A 16-bus network is used as the test case. Different scenarios are proposed and 
compared in terms of three factors: the capability to accommodate wind generation, the 
impact on system reliability, and economic benefits.  
 
5.1 The benefits and challenges associated with DG 
 
The global drive to mitigate the now widely recognised negative effects of CO2 on the 
world’s climate has led to the formulation of the Kyoto Protocol, which establishes CO2 
reduction targets for member nations. To fulfil its obligations under the EU Kyoto 
targets, the UK government has set very ambitious goals that require the installation of 
8 – 10 GW of renewable generation capacity and implementation of schemes for 
achieving 10 GW of combined heat and power (CHP) capacity by 2010 [48]. The UK 
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has committed to a legally binding agreement with the EU to have 15% of its energy 
consumption generated from renewable sources by 2020 [49]. 
The importance of a more decentralised energy supply system in satisfying low carbon 
emission targets is illustrated in terms of the following perspectives [38]:  
1) The electrical energy losses in power lines can be reduced by supplying more 
electricity from local sources. 
2) Customer awareness can be raised, more household or community-based energy 
sources can be applied, and policy change can reflect carbon emissions in the energy 
price. 
DG is one of the indispensable elements of a decentralised energy supply system. The 
definition of DG, however, is ambiguous [50]. It is characterised by the features 
outlined below, but these descriptions may be subjective and qualitative.  
1) Compared with conventional generation units with capacities of tens or 
hundreds of megawatts, DG is small in scale, with a capacity ranging from a few 
kilowatts to several megawatts. 
2) It is connected to medium- or low-voltage networks, i.e., distribution systems. 
3) It is located near a load centre. 
DG is expected to offer advantages in terms of value in the wholesale electricity market, 
concordance with the EU emission trading scheme, and issuance of the renewable 
obligation and levy exemption certificates, etc [51]. 
A few published works focus on the economic aspects of DG. Rodriguez advocates the 
consideration of externalities as part of the economic assessment during the selection of 
generation technologies [52]. He proposes a method for quantifying not only the 
economic benefit that DG provides its owner but also its effect on environments 
(externalities). The externalities of emission damages can be a decisive element in 
determining which type of generation system is the best choice. 
A DG business model is proposed in [53]. It has been applied to cases in Spain, 
Norway, the Netherlands, and the UK. Results have shown that DG is a potentially 
economical approach, and is a promising means to address environmental concerns.  
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DG relieves system stress and reduces generation costs by decreasing output from 
generation systems with high marginal costs (peak generation). It also effectively 
minimises the dependence on central grids and reduces the costs of load curtailments 
[54].  
The challenges associated with increasing DG should not be underestimated. The 
intermittent and unpredictable nature of wind generation proves to be a major challenge 
given that it exacerbates the worst cases: i) when load level is low and wind generation 
reaches its peak, the bus where wind generation units are connected may experience a 
serious voltage rise; ii) when wind speed falls below the cut-in speed and load reaches 
its peak, the system may suffer from undervoltage problems [55, 56]. Apart from this, 
power quality management and fault level management also pose difficulties [57]. Two 
fundamentally different solutions have been proposed in response to the aforementioned 
issues:  
One is to reinforce the network by building new branches. This solution, however, 
comes with prohibitive costs and political barriers, i.e., the costs of land, materials, and 
labour, political impediments arising from environmental issues, and the legal process 
governing land permissions, etc. These barriers are anticipated to be even more 
prohibitive with the increasing scarcity of land, rising labour costs, and increasing 
public concern for the environment.  
An alternative solution is to completely change the operational philosophy of 
distribution networks. This approach is expected to incur less cost and raise fewer 
environmental issues. Historically, as part of a centralised power system, a passively 
managed distribution network merely passes electricity from bulk supply points to 
customers. The role of the distribution system as a passive medium is expected to 
undergo radical changes [58]. The fundamentally upgraded distribution network is 
envisioned to demonstrate the following features:  
1) It must coordinate different control measures (DG output control, shunt 
compensation, series compensation, etc.) at the system level to allow for sufficient 
flexibility which is essential to accommodating a large amount of DG. 
2) It must provide sufficiently detailed real-time knowledge of the system through 
pervasive measurement devices. 
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3) It must transmit data among the measurement devices, control centre, and local 
control devices via the communication system in a reliable and efficient manner. 
4) It must enable the analysis of large volumes of data and provide a control decision in 
real-time. 
5) It is open to an accumulative upgrade process, that is, it is not merely a one-off 
construction.   
This revolutionised philosophy for operating distribution systems is referred to as active 
management (AM).  
 
5.2 Active Management 
 
 
5.2.1 Overview of AM 
 
AM is a promising solution to the challenges mentioned in the previous sections. 
Compared with traditional network reinforcement, which adopts the passive operational 
philosophy (also referred to as the ‘fit-and-forget’ approach), AM enables the avoidance 
of prohibitive investment costs as well as political barriers in building new branches and 
associated infrastructure.  
According to [59], AM is characterised by the following features: 
  i) wide-area, coordinated, active control; 
  ii) adaptive and integrated protection/control systems;  
  iii) power electronic-based network management devices; 
  iv) real-time network simulation and performance analysis; 
  v) advance sensors and measurement; 
  vi) highly distributed and pervasive communications; and 
  vii) data interpretation through the use of intelligent systems. 
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The effect of AM on the level of DG penetration is studied in [60]. Through various 
sensitivity analyses, the paper concludes that the increase in network flexibility brought 
about by AM enables the system to accommodate more DG [60]. Different AM control 
strategies, including coordinated and uncoordinated voltage control, are introduced in 
[60]. The control variables, i.e., the tap setting of the on-load tap changer and the output 
of wind generation, are simultaneously considered and optimised under coordinated 
control [60]. Unlike uncoordinated control, the former requires highly penetrated 
sensors that can monitor the system to a detailed level, a fast central processing unit that 
can process a large volume of information, and a robust communication system.  
The technical and economic effects of AM are investigated in [56] from various 
perspectives, i.e., the voltage profile, line losses, power generation, and net benefit.  AM 
reduces line losses, improves voltage profile, and promotes DG penetration [56]. AM 
and traditional network reinforcement are not mutually exclusive. The transition from a 
traditional passive network to AM is not a one-off construction but rather an 
accumulative process with a gradual increase in network flexibility.  
An AM system consists of four essential components [57]:  
1) a measurement and data analysis component;  
2) a decision-making module that formulates real-time decisions based on feedback 
from the measurement and data analysis unit; 
3) a communication unit that transmits information among different components; and 
4) local control devices which execute the decision formulated by the decision-making 
module. Examples of decisions include adjusting the set points of the transformer tap 
and reactive compensation devices, changing the output of DG, and performing other 
corrective actions if required [57]. 
Previous works assume that the control system for AM is 100% reliable. Given that this 
assumption does not hold true in practice, such an assumption may lead to overly 
optimistic decisions regarding the benefits of AM. This chapter presents a thorough 
investigation of whether AM is preferable to traditional network reinforcement schemes 
in terms of cost benefits. Such an examination is necessary before deciding on a final 
system development strategy. 
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5.2.2 AM Model 
 
As previously mentioned, AM is a comprehensive control system that encompasses a 
decision-making unit, communication system, sensors, and local control devices. It 
operates under corrective control, which aims to correct system violations at the post-
contingency stage; when system violations occur (such as bus overvoltage or line 
overflow), protection devices react to the contingency. Information on the actions of the 
protection devices and abnormalities in the network variables is detected by the 
measuring devices, and sent to the decision-making unit. On the basis of such 
information, corrective control decisions are generated by the decision-making unit, 
transmitted via the communication system, and executed by the local control devices to 
eliminate violations. The measured local variables are then sent back to the decision-
making unit, forming a negative feedback loop.  
Varied types of corrective actions are prioritised differently based on the costs they 
present and the time they take to respond. The following actions are listed in decreasing 
priority: shunt and series compensation; discharge from the energy storage (ES) device; 
DG output curtailment; and load curtailment. Shunt and series compensation is the 
fastest type of corrective action, with a response time far below 1 second for power 
electronic-based devices. ES devices, which support the system for a limited duration, 
take longer to respond. DG output curtailment exhibits a relatively short response time, 
but it is uneconomical because of the potentially large opportunity cost incurred from 
ungenerated energy. The least favourable action is to curtail load, which imposes 
substantial social costs and results in customer dissatisfaction.  
The operational process of an AM control system is presented in Figure 5.1. It 
represents a compilation of the information taken from [55].  
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[Author’s compilation] 
Figure 5.1: AM control system structure [55]. 
 
A simplified ‘party-line’ model is adopted to simulate AM control system failure, using 
the following assumptions as bases:  
i) The data on communication system failure are integrated with the failure of the 
central control unit (decision-making unit) on the assumption that communication is 
done via radio. 
ii) The self-originated (independent) failure of any local control device does not affect 
the operational status of the central control unit; by way of analogy, this means that a 
disabled ‘hand’ does not affect the functionality of the ‘brain’.  
iii) The self-originated failure of any local control device does not affect other local 
control devices.  
iv) All devices cease to operate when the central control unit fails.  
v) The failures of other components such as branches and transformers are not 
considered, so that the effect of control system unreliability can be identified without it 
being distorted by other components.  
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The local control devices are not independent of each other because a malfunction in the 
central control disables all local control devices. The failures of local control devices are 
therefore classified into two types: self-originated failure (independent failure), which 
originates from itself, and system-originated failure, which stems from the central 
control. System-originated failure in the context of this study is the common cause 
failure (CCF). A coordinated control strategy is adopted in this project. All corrective 
control measures are coordinated for a global control target.  
 
5.2.3 Optimisation Model under AM 
 
When the central control and all local control devices are in a normal state, corrective 
control decisions are determined by an optimisation based on AC load flow: 
- 98 - 
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where 
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1 2 3, ,ϕ ϕ ϕ    Coefficient corresponding to priority level 
,Li LiP Q      Active and reactive load at bus i 
,Gi GiP Q      Active and reactive generation at bus i 
Cur
GiP            Active generation curtailment at bus i 
,Cur CurLi LiP Q   Active and reactive load curtailment at bus i 
,inj inji iP Q     Active and reactive power injection at bus i 
min max,pf pf      Min and max power factor allowed 
SVCX               Equivalent reactance of SVC 
   Load flows at branch ij ijS
,i iV θ                  Voltage magnitude and angle at bus i    
ESiP ,      Power discharged and maximum power from Energy Storage 
device, respectively.  
max
ESiP
 
SVC is installed at wind generation site in compliance with the grid code.  
A large ϕ  implies low priority assigned to a particular term. This context is represented 
by (5.1) in which 1 20 3ϕ ϕ ϕ< < <  corresponds to a decreasing order of preference, 
described as follows: reactive compensation over ES adjustment, DG curtailment, and 
load curtailment. Loads are subject to curtailment when the system exhausts all other 
means of control. When the central control fails, corrective control is disabled: reactive 
compensation and ES adjustment are bypassed in the model and DG is completely 
disconnected.  
When the SVC or ES is down, the optimisation algorithm is altered: the corresponding 
element in (5.1) and corresponding constraints are excluded. When the central control is 
down, load curtailment becomes the only means available, and all constraints involving 
the SVC, ES, or wind generation output control are excluded.  
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5.3 Wind Generation Model 
As a major type of renewable energy source in the UK, wind generation (especially 
offshore wind farms) has been increasing rapidly in recent years [49].  
The Weibull distribution is normally used as the wind speed probability density 
function in generating random wind speeds [61].  
The Weibull function is expressed as follows [61]: 
1( ) ( ) exp[ ( ) ]kk v vf v
c c c
−= − k        (5.12) 
where 
  shape parameter k
c   scale parameter 
v   wind speed 
 
A special case of the Weibull distribution is called the Rayleigh distribution, in which 
parameter  is applied to the probability density function. This distribution is 
suitable for theoretical study when a credible wind speed record is unavailable [61]. In 
the Rayleigh distribution, the ‘good’ high-speed wind under which wind turbines 
generate the rated power occurs most frequently, followed by relatively low-speed wind 
and extremely high-speed wind. 
2k =
The Rayleigh distribution is given by: 
2
2
2( ) exp[ ( ) ]v vf v
c c
= −         (5.13) 
 
The Weibull function is suitable for non-sequential analysis, in which the correlation 
among wind speeds over time is disregarded. In other words, it does not model time-
dependent wind speeds.   
A method that accounts for time dependence is the Markov chain method, which 
generates a wind speed time series [62]. A couple of approximations are made for the 
Markov chain method to be valid: 
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1) The seasonal effect is disregarded to keep transition rates between states 
constant. This approach is justified if the amount of data is sufficiently large 
[62].  
2) Wind speeds are discretised at a step of 1 m/s, which is sufficiently accurate 
under most circumstances [62]. 
3) The residence time in each state is assumed to follow an exponential distribution. 
When only long-term expected values are considered, using exponential 
distribution or other distributions makes little difference [62]. 
The transition rates from state i to state j is given by: 
λ ijij
i
N
D
=          (5.14)  
where  is the number of transitions from states i to j, and ijN iD  is the duration of state i, 
normally in years. All transition rates can be calculated from a sufficiently long wind 
speed record using (5.14). 
Given the wind speed, the function for calculating the power output of a single wind 
turbine is given by [21, 61]: 
rated
0                   
K b           
( ) P            
0                    
c
c
r f
f
v v
v v v
p v v v v
v v
≤⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪+ ≤⎪ ⎪= ⎨ ≤ ≤⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪≥⎩ ⎭
rv≤ ⎬       (5.15) 
where ( )p v , , , ,  and ratedP v cv rv fv are the power output of a wind turbine, the rated 
power of the turbine, wind speed, cut-in wind speed, rated wind speed and cut-out wind 
speed, respectively. In the function,  
ratedK P /( )r cv v= −         (5.16) 
b K cv= −          (5.17) 
when the wind speed falls between the cut-in and the rated speeds, the power output is 
linearised as an approximation [21, 61]. 
A wind farm is a cluster of wind turbines. The disturbance caused by upstream wind 
turbines changes the speed at which wind is received by downstream wind turbines, 
thereby affecting their power output. A parameter called array efficiency is therefore 
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applied in quantifying the effect of wind turbine interference on wind farm output. The 
power output of a wind farm is given by [21, 61] 
Farm turbine ep np k=         (5.18) 
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where Farmp , , , and  ( 0 ) are the power output of a wind farm, power 
output of a single turbine, number of turbines, and array efficiency, respectively. 
turbinep n ek 1ek≤ ≤
 
 
5.4 Economic Assessment 
 
The purpose of AM is to facilitate DG penetration. The business concept applied to a 
distribution network operator (DNO) involves charging DG owners for AM services, 
enabling DG owners to increase the wind generation capacity and the electricity that can 
be generated [56]. A few assumptions are adopted prior to the calculation of the net 
benefits for a DNO [56, 63]: 
1) The operation and management (O&M) charge for AM services imposed on a 
DG owner is proportional to the total energy generated by that DG. 
2) The connection charge imposed on the DG owner is proportional to DG 
capacity. 
3) All types of charges/costs, excluding the wind generation connection charge, 
wind generation investment cost, and AM investment cost, are spread over the 
time frame at equal intervals (a year). The amount of cash flow remains the 
same over the time frame. 
On the basis of these assumptions, the connection charge (£) for wind generation is 
calculated as [56] 
connection WindCapacity     (£)C CON= i       (5.19) 
where  denotes the wind generation capacity. This charge is assumed to be 
a one-off charge imposed on the DG owner at the beginning of their investment.  
WindCapacity
The annual O&M cost for wind generation (£) is calculated as [56] 
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    (5.20) O&MWind fixed Wind perMWCapacity     (£/year)C C C= + i
where  and fixedC perMWC  represent the fixed part of the O&M cost and the variable part 
per MW of wind generation capacity, respectively. 
The annual charge imposed on the DG owner for AM services is [56] 
O&MAM AM WindGen     (£/year)C OM W= i       (5.21) 
where  denotes the effective energy (in MWh) generated by a wind generation 
farm throughout a year. 
WindGenW
The annual revenue for wind generation is computed as follows: 
Wind WindGen     (£/year)R pW=        (5.22) 
pwhere  is the average electricity price. 
The present values of all charges/costs, except those of the connection charge , 
wind generation investment and AM investment , are calculated 
using the following formula: 
connectionC
WindInvestPV AMInvestPV
1[1 ]     (£)
(1 )n
CPV
dis dis
= − +       (5.23) 
where  is the periodic charge/cost. C
Given the lack of actual data on cash flow, the calculation of  and is 
described as follows.  
WindInvestPV AMInvestPV
The present value of wind generation investment cost is assumed to be proportional to 
wind capacity [64]: 
WindInvest WindCoef Capacity      (£)PV = i      (5.24) 
 
The AM investment cost is assumed to be the same for all scenarios with AM for the 
following reasons:   
1) Practical data on the actual cost structure of AM investment are lacking. 
2) The purpose of the case study is to demonstrate the methodology, and the 
assumption that the AM investment cost remains the same for all scenarios does 
not affect the demonstration of methodology.  
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The original formula for calculating the net benefit for DNO has been modified to take 
into account risk-associated cost. The new formula is expressed as: 
DNO &
DG
NB λ λ
     con λW omc λ      (£)
Con O MAM R IAM
DG AM R IAM
C C C C
IC C C
= + − −
= + − −i i     (5.25) 
where , , , and  are the net benefit for DNO, wind generation 
connection charge, O&M charge for AM services, and investment cost of AM, 
respectively. 
DNONB ConC &O MAMC IAMC
DGIC , , , and om  represent the installed wind generation 
capacity, connection charge per unit capacity (£/kW), total effective energy generated 
by wind (kWh), and O&M charge for AM services per kWh of effective energy 
generated, respectively. λ  is a binary value: λ  when AM is implemented; λ  
otherwise.  is the risk-associated cost, i.e., the cost of load curtailment.  
con DGW cAM
=1 =0
RC
The net benefit for DNO is calculated by 
DNO Con AMServ Risk AMInvestNB λ λ      (£)PV PV PV PV= + − −i i    (5.26) 
 
ConPV              present value of connection charge against the wind generation owner 
         present value of AM service charge against the wind generation owner AMServPV
RiskPV              present value of risk associated cost   
AMInvestPV         present value of AM investment cost 
λ                     defined the same as in (5.25).  
The net benefit for the owner of the wind generation is calculated using the following 
formula: 
Wind WindRev WindInvest WindO&M Con AMServNB λ     (£)PV PV PV PV PV= − − − − i  (5.27) 
 
WindRevPV      present value of wind generation revenue 
WindInvestPV    present value of wind generation investment cost 
WindO&MPV    present value of wind generation O&M cost 
Other variables are defined in the same manner as in previous equations. 
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5.5 Case Study and Results 
 
The case study presented in this chapter is based on the test case reported in [65], with 
slight modifications. In the original version, the 33 kV network is supplied by three 
separate 132 kV bulk supply points, whereas in the current study, the network is fed by 
a single 132 kV bulk supply point at bus 1. 
The network topology is shown in Figure 5.2. Full sets of data that include the network 
data, load profile, wind profile, and reliability data are given in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 5.2: Network diagram of the 16-bus test case [65]. 
 
All loads are assumed to be fully correlated. A total of 48 discretised load levels as a 
combination of a typical winter and summer day are used.   
The wind generation site is at bus 7. The cut-in, rated, and cut-out wind speeds for the 1 
MW wind turbine are 3, 12, and 20 m/s, respectively. The hourly wind speed series is 
created and discretised at a step of 1 m/s. The hourly wind speed and wind generation 
output are plotted in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4, respectively. 
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Figure 5.3: Hourly wind speed profile over a year. 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Wind generation output over a year. 
 
The AM system in the test case consists of an SVC connected to the same bus as the 
wind generation, i.e., bus 7; an ES device at bus 12; and a central control unit with an 
optional function of wind generation output control (WGOC). The discharge and charge 
rates of ES are assumed to be constant at 200 and 100 kW, respectively. The maximum 
discharge duration is 2.5 hours. The charging and discharging efficiencies of the ES 
device are both 90%. The dynamic behaviours of ES are not considered.  
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The failures of the SVC, ES device, and central control unit are modelled. The failure 
rates for local control devices in Appendix A correspond to self-originated failures.  
CMCS is applied in the reliability assessment. 
Four scenarios are defined: 
1) no AM; 
2) AM with SVC and ES, but without WGOC; the AM system, including all its 
components, is assumed to be 100% reliable;  
3) AM with SVC, ES and WGOC; the AM system, including all its components, is 
assumed to be 100% reliable; 
4) AM with SVC, ES, and WGOC; the failure rate of the AM central control unit, SVC, 
and ES is 2 occurrences/year (occ/year).   
 
The EENS for different wind capacities in the four scenarios are depicted in Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.5: EENS results for the four scenarios. 
 
The actual results that significantly exceed 100 MWh/year are not shown in Figure 5.5 
to avoid excessively stretching the vertical scale. Instead, a ‘>100’ annotation is placed 
above the corresponding bar results. 
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Figure 5.5 shows that the EENS results exceed 100 MWh/year for scenarios 1 and 2 
when the wind generation capacity is greater or equal to 10 MW. If the unacceptable 
reliability level is defined as EENS=70 MWh/year, the reliability becomes unacceptable 
for scenarios 1 and 2 when the installed wind capacity is 8 MW or higher. In other 
words, the wind generation capacity that these two scenarios can accommodate is less 
than 8 MW. The maximum wind capacity that can be accommodated in scenario 4 is 
less than 20 MW, whereas scenario 3 appears to exhibit limitless capability of 
accommodating wind generation (EENS remains constant despite the increase in wind 
generation capacity). This result is attributed to the fact that in scenario 3, curtailing 
wind generation is always applicable because the AM system is assumed to be 100% 
reliable. However, this scenario and its results exist only in theory. 
1) A 100% reliable AM control system is an ideal case, but non-existent in 
practice.   
2) The cost barrier encountered by the owner of the wind generation farm is not 
represented in Figure 5.5, but in reality, this barrier constrains wind generation 
capacity. Regardless of wind generation capacity, the actual wind energy 
generated over a year is limited because of the necessity of wind output 
curtailment that arises from reliability requirements. An infinite wind generation 
capacity therefore corresponds to capped revenue from effective wind energy 
generation, infinite investment cost, and infinite connection charge proportional 
to wind capacity. This situation is clearly economically infeasible.  
Figure 5.5 also shows that even at a small wind generation capacity (<8 MW), the 
EENS results remain positive for all the four scenarios. The energy curtailment in these 
cases stems from ‘bad’ days, during which the load is high and wind speed is low; 
voltage drop problems occur at buses far from the bulk supply point. The increase in 
wind capacity does not reduce EENS to zero because of the intermittent nature of wind 
generation, i.e., the wind output is zero when the wind speed is below the cut-in speed, 
regardless of wind generation capacity.  
With the increase in wind generation capacity, however, the increase in the EENS 
results is contributed by a different instance of ‘bad’ days, during which the system is 
subject to voltage rise caused by low load and high wind generation.  
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Furthermore, according to Figure 5.5, the AM system failure does not have a significant 
effect on system reliability at low wind capacity. However, its effect grows rapidly with 
the increase in wind capacity. Even a low probability of failure significantly increases 
EENS when wind capacity is high because AM failure indicates that the DNO loses 
control over wind generation. The wind output is then purely determined by the 
capacity and wind speed at that moment. Under scenario 4, voltage rise occurs only 
when the failure of the AM system coincides with an ‘appropriate’ wind speed (falls 
between the cut-in and cut-out speeds) and above a ‘troublesome’ threshold. With the 
increasing capacity of wind generation, the ‘troublesome’’ threshold tends to decrease 
towards the cut-in speed, and the system experiences more days when system violations 
occur. An extreme theoretical circumstance is that with infinite wind generation 
capacity, the system experiences blackouts whenever the AM system fails and the wind 
speed is ‘appropriate’. The ‘troublesome’ threshold drops to the cut-in speed under such 
circumstance.  
The DG penetration levels for the four scenarios are shown in Figure 5.6, Figure 5.7 and 
Figure 5.8. 
 
Figure 5.6: Wind energy that can be accommodated in scenarios 1 and 2. 
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Figure 5.7: Wind energy that can be accommodated in scenario 3. 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Wind energy that can be accommodated in scenario 4. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 is consistent with Figure 5.5. Wind energy can be fully accommodated at a 
wind capacity of less than 8 MW under scenarios 1 and 2. The restricting factor is 
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system reliability represented by EENS in Figure 5.5. Wind energy beyond the 
maximum capacity causes serious problems for system reliability.  
Compared with Figure 5.6, Figure 5.7 shows that more wind energy can be 
accommodated under scenario 3. The maximum wind energy that can be accommodated 
is slightly above 30,000 MWh per year at a wind generation capacity of 20 MW.  
Unlike Figure 5.7, Figure 5.8 shows that the AM system failure reduces the maximum 
wind energy that can be accommodated. This result is consistent with that in Figure 5.5, 
which clearly shows that AM system failure has an obvious adverse effect on system 
reliability when wind capacity is high.     
By implementing AM, wind penetration may be increased significantly. Furthermore, 
the case study has shown that the crucial factor that improves the system capability of 
accommodating more wind energy is the WGOC. Without the WGOC, the effectiveness 
of AM in terms of accommodating wind energy is largely compromised. Although the 
‘bad’ days during which excessive wind generation is reflected do not usually occur, 
these days severely limit the amount of wind energy that can be accommodated. The 
WGOC ability helps the system survive such days by curtailing excessive wind energy 
generation. In this way the bottleneck is relieved and the AM capability of 
accommodating wind generation significantly improves. 
On the basis of the data given in [64, 66, 67], the parameters for economic assessment 
are given below: 
£50,000 / MWhCON =   Connection charge rate:  
AM £10 / MWhOM =O&M charge for AM services per MWh:  
Economic life of wind generation (years):  25n =
Discount rate for calculating present value:  5%dis =
Electricity price:  13.5 p/kWh=£135 /MWhp =
In this test case,  and fixed £200,000C = perMW £50,000 /MWC = . 
 
25 yearsn = . In the test case, the economic life of wind generation 
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According to the data in [64], the coefficient for calculating wind generation investment 
cost is C . oef £1.2m /MW=
The present value of AM investment is assigned a constant value, expressed as 
. AMInvest £2mPV =
The risk-associated cost is assumed to be proportional to EENS with a multiplier of 
£2,000 /MWh.  
The net benefits for the owner of the wind generation unit and the DNO are expressed in 
Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10, respectively. 
 
Figure 5.9: Net benefit for the DG owner. 
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Figure 5.10: Net benefit for the DNO. 
 
 
Because of reliability restrictions, it is not possible to accommodate wind generation 
capacity of more than 6, 6, and 18 MW for scenarios 1, 2, and 4, respectively. Scenario 1 
yields a net loss for the DNO regardless of wind generation capacity, because the risk-
associated cost outweighs the DG connection charge. A similar phenomenon is observed 
in scenario 2. The reason scenario 2 yields more loss for the DNO than does scenario 1 is 
because the AM investment cost outweighs the income earned from providing AM 
services in scenario 2. The uneconomical AM investment without the WGOC function 
contributes to losses for the DNO. For these two scenarios, no ‘win-win’ situation is 
observed. 
The net benefit of scenario 4 for both the wind generation unit owner and the DNO 
seems to monotonically increase with rising wind capacity. However, this is a 
misconception that neglects the wind capacity limit. Because of reliability restrictions, 
the maximum wind capacity for scenario 4 is 18 MW. That the net benefit does not 
show a ‘marginal benefit decrease’ trend within the limited range is a reasonable result. 
This confirms that for scenario 4, the bottleneck in increasing wind generation capacity 
is system reliability. In other words, the realisation of the theoretical optimal point of 
maximum net benefit is impeded by the reliability constraint. 
Scenario 3 is an ideal scenario that exists only in theory. For this scenario, system 
reliability is not a barrier to connected wind capacity. However, the maximum wind 
capacity is limited by economic barriers. The net benefit for the owner of the wind 
generation unit decreases with an increase in wind capacity of more than 20 MW. An 
incredibly high wind generation capacity yields a significant connection charge, as well 
as DG investment and O&M costs for the DG owner, whereas the revenue from selling 
electricity is capped because excessive wind energy is curtailed by the AM system. For 
these reasons, the net benefit for wind generation inevitably decreases.     
A ‘win-win’ situation is achieved in scenarios 3 and 4 at wind capacities of 16 to 18 
MW. This occurs when both the DNO and the wind farm owner earn a profit.  
 
5.5.1 Traditional Reinforcement Scheme (TRS) 
 
Chapter 5: Reliability assessment incorporating Active Management 
- 114 - 
A TRS is proposed as an alternative solution to AM. Reinforcing the network with new 
branches is expected to alleviate constraints. Determining the best reinforcement plan is 
a network planning problem, whose methodology is beyond the scope of this project. 
For the test case in this chapter, identifying the best location for reinforcement by 
enumerating all possible plans and comparing them with one another is practical. The 
best ‘one duplicated line’ plan adds a duplicated line between buses 9 and 12.  
The present value of the TRS investment is £500,000, and the EENS and net benefit of 
the DNO under the TRS are provided in Appendix A.  
The maximum wind generation capacity is 6 MW. In the test case, although the TRS 
reduces EENS by around 8% to 15% (promoting reliability) compared with the ‘doing 
nothing at all’ base case, it neither increases the maximum wind generation capacity nor 
produces a positive net benefit for the DNO. Therefore, adopting the TRS to facilitate 
the penetration of wind generation is not a favourable approach for this test case.    
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the structure and reliability of the AM system has been modelled. Its 
effect on wind generation penetration and system reliability, as well as on the net 
benefit for the owner of the wind generation unit and the DNO has been investigated.  
The case study confirms that the system can accommodate more wind power through 
the implementation of AM. Such an increase is significant when AM includes the 
WGOC function. Without this function, the ability of AM to accommodate wind 
generation is largely compromised. The reliability of AM does not have a noticeable 
effect on system reliability when the wind capacity is low. However, this effect grows 
with the increase in wind capacity. Therefore, ensuring reliable AM at a high wind 
capacity is critical. 
 
The following conclusions can also be drawn from the case study:  
1) Maintaining a certain level of wind penetration is necessary for DNO to earn a 
profit. When the wind generation capacity is within an appropriate range, a win-
win situation is possible for a properly planned system where wind generation 
units are located at places with abundant wind resource. For such a system, the 
profit for DNO comes from charging connection fee from wind generation 
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owners and AM service fee less the investment and O&M costs; the profit for 
wind generation owner comes from the revenue of selling electricity less 
connection fee, AM service charge, investment cost and O&M cost. However, 
there is no win-win when the wind generation capacity is too low, because the 
DNO fails to recover its investment and O&M costs. On the other hand, the 
maximum wind generation capacity is limited by reliability constraints. 
2) The theoretical economic optimal point may not be achievable because of the 
bottleneck, i.e., system reliability. Within zero to maximum wind capacity 
determined by the reliability restriction, the net benefit does not necessarily 
show a ‘marginal benefit decrease’ trend.  
For the test case, although the TRS improves system reliability, it is not a favourable 
solution because it neither promotes wind penetration nor produces a profit for the 
DNO.  
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Summary 
Demand response (DR) is one of the key means of corrective control. This chapter 
quantifies the reliability improvement brought by DR. First, the background of DR is 
introduced. The definition of DR, the benefits of DR and the classification of different 
types of DR programmes are reviewed from existing publications. The gap is then 
identified based on the review, and it is followed by a summary of the major research 
work. The following section introduces the methodology. Three typical DR models are 
summarised. The system reliability assessment algorithm capable of simulating post-
contingency system behaviours in a distribution network is proposed. The programme 
identifies islanding parts and performs network re-configuration at the post-
contingency stage.  A 16-bus distribution network is used as the test case. The 
conclusion is drawn from the test case regarding the key research question:  DR slows 
down the degradation of system reliability in the context of continued load growth. The 
marginal benefit in reliability inevitably decreases with the incremental implementation 
of DR.   
 
6.1 The Background of Demand Response 
 
Measures must be taken as the grid is getting more and more stressed with the growing 
load. Compared with traditional network reinforcement, DR is a solution which incurs 
less cost and is more environmental friendly than the former. For most power systems, 
the vulnerable period when extreme load spikes occur lasts for only a couple of hours in 
a year. This is the moment when power systems are most vulnerable. It may be 
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uneconomical to accommodate the growing spikes by installing peak generation units 
which remain idling for most time in a year. Alternatively, DR, which can be used as a 
form of spinning reserve, is a cheap resource in tackling the growing peak load.  
As an ongoing and fast developing application, DR brings significant potential benefits 
to various parties [68-70]. In the broad scope, all intentional modifications of electricity 
consumption pattern can be classified as DR. DR brings potential benefits to various 
parties by directing customer ‘behaviour’ through incentive signals. These benefits 
include 
1) save electricity bills for customers;  
2) reduce wholesale market prices since the cost of DR is expected to be lower than the 
costly peak generation units;  
3) reduce or delay the investment of peak facilities; 
4) improve system reliability by relieving system stress under peak demand;  
5) provide environmental benefits including saved lands, saved natural resources and 
reduced emission; and 
6) facilitate intermittent renewable generation [68]. 
DR can be classified into two broad categories, the price-based programs (PBP) and the 
incentive-based programs (IBP) [68, 71]. In some IBPs, participants are given 
incentives according to contracts to change their electricity consumption pattern: 
compensations are paid if participants fulfil the contract and penalties may be imposed 
if not. Typically, participants have to reduce their loads when requested by the network 
operator for either reliability purpose or to avoid high electricity price. In direct load 
control programmes, utilities have the power to shut down loads remotely upon giving a 
short notice to the customer [68]. As another form of IBP, demand bidding programme 
allows participants (large customers in practice) to ‘buy back’ electricity from the 
wholesale market. Under such programme, each participant bids for load reduction 
offers. If a bid is lower than the market clearing price, the participant has to curtail the 
specified amount of load or a penalty will be imposed [68].  
Compared with IBP, PBP encourages participation in DR by sending price signals to 
participants. Instead of facing a flat price which leads to inefficiency, customers are 
subject to varying price depending on the time when they consume, or directly on the 
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market bidding, with the help of advanced metering [5]. Typical PBPs are Time-of-Use 
(TOU) Tariffs, Critical Peak Pricing and Real-time Pricing (RTP) programs. The 
ultimate objective of PBP is to smooth the load curve by charging a high price at peak 
hours and a low price at off-peak hours. Over the past 20 years, EU member states have 
adopted various kinds of PBP, most of which are based on discrete timing and pricing 
for interruption [5].  
In the UK, three of the ongoing DR applications are pre-agreed load shedding, real-time 
pricing and direct emergency load control. They are mainly for large industrial 
customers [5, 72]. At the other end of the scale, ‘Economy 7’ has been implemented on 
a voluntary basis for residential customers in the UK. ‘Economy 7’ programme offers 
two prices to customers: the normal price (at daytime) and the off-peak price (which 
lasts for 7 hours at night) [73]. In this way, customers are encouraged to shift their 
demand from peak time to off-peak time.  
The implementation of DR incurs different kinds of costs to various parties. The costs 
can be classified as initial costs and running costs [5]. For participants, the initial costs 
resulting from the installation of smart meter and on-site generation units, etc [5]. The 
running costs include the fuel cost of on-site generation units and some indirect cost of 
inconvenience and plan rescheduling etc [5].  
For utilities, the investment cost of smart metering and communication devices, the 
marketing cost and the cost of customer education should all be taken into account [5].  
A brief summary of existing publications involving DR is given below:  
European policies on DR are summarised in [5]. Under the most moderate scenario, EU-
wide benefits of DR will include 100 TWh of annual energy saving, an annual reduction 
of 30 million tons of CO2, and tens of billions of Euros saved from avoided/delayed 
network investment and customer bills by 2020. The main obstacles are identified as the 
inelasticity of demand and asymmetries in information.  
Interruptible loads and capacity market programmes are modelled in [74]. Customers 
participating in the interruptible load programme agree either to curtail a certain amount 
of electric load, or to keep their load below a pre-specified level upon a short notice of 
less than an hour. In return, they receive payments from the network operator. The 
maximum number of times and hours that the programme can be triggered in a year is 
specified by the contract.  
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A survey of DR programmes in various electricity markets is presented in [75]. DR 
programmes are put into two categories, ‘reliability-based’ programmes which are 
triggered in response to system contingencies and ‘market-based’ programmes which 
are responsive to market prices. As one of the ‘market-based’ programmes, the 
Economic Load Response Programme produces two options: a day-ahead option and a 
real-time option. In the day-ahead option, participants submit their bids in the day-ahead 
market for load reductions and are paid at the day-ahead hourly electricity price if their 
bids are accepted. A penalty is imposed for failing to deliver accepted bids. The real 
time option allows participants to submit load reduction bids in the intraday market with 
one hour notice to the Pennsylvania – New Jersey – Maryland (PJM) system operator. 
Participants are paid at the real-time price for accepted bids. Contrary to the day-ahead 
option, no penalty is charged if participants fail to deliver [75]. 
The utilisation of DR resources in Great Britain on the transmission level is summarised 
in [76]. National Grid has been utilising DR in the form of balancing services, e.g., fast 
reserve, firm frequency response, frequency control by demand management of large 
industrial customers and standing reserve [76].  Furthermore, National Grid has the 
power to request a DNO for demand response.  
Some work has been undertaken regarding reliability issues in the context of DR. As a 
resource that substitutes for spinning reserves, emergency DR programme has been 
implemented into the reliability study, where only generation failure is considered [77]. 
The results indicate that DR has a positive impact on system reliability.   
A brief explanation is given in [76] where DR serves reliability purposes for power 
systems. DR serves contracted resources for real-time load balancing activated by 
network frequency or a disturbance of a system. However, as a brief review, this article 
does not present any detailed models, methodologies or case studies.  
DR is a suitable partner of renewable generation as well: with the increasing penetration 
of intermittent generation, DR can help maintain satisfactory system reliability by 
providing flexibility to the system [4].   
According to [78], retail loads serving reliability purposes can participate in the day-
ahead market or intraday market. The reliability of bulk systems can be improved by 
including retail loads into the market [78]. However, this article presents qualitative 
conclusions only without presenting methodology or case study.  
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Reference [79] demonstrates that by serving as a form of spinning reserve, aggregated 
demand side resources are able to improve power system reliability. This report focuses 
mainly on the technical feasibility and operational details of demand side resources 
rather than on the reliability assessment of power systems.   
Two more articles give brief, qualitative introductions on the impact of DR on system 
reliability [80, 81]. Their main ideas largely overlap those reviewed above.   
A couple of more papers on reliability assessment of distribution system are 
summarised as follows: 
The failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is applied in [82] for reliability 
assessment on a radial distribution network. However, this method does not account for 
chronological loads, which are essential when modelling DR. The Monte Carlo 
simulation (MCS) approach applied to the reliability assessment of distribution systems 
is reviewed in [83]. An enhanced sampling method, which increases the speed of MCS, 
is applied in this paper [83]. In another paper, a CMCS approach is proposed for 
evaluating the probability distributions of reliability indices [84]. However, neither of 
them involves DR or system auto-reconfiguration at the post-contingency stage.   
Fuzzy multi-objective approach is applied for auto-reconfiguration of distribution 
systems in [85]. Although this method yields highly optimal results, it is not suitable for 
application in this research because of its low efficiency. High efficiency is a critical 
requirement when the system reconfiguration algorithm has to be called for tens of 
thousands of times in CMCS.  
Although numerous papers and reports mentioned that DR improves power system 
reliability, yet few have presented a comprehensive analysis of power system reliability 
in the context of DR. Below is a brief summary of the work that has been done and the 
gaps that this project has bridged. 
1) Three representative models of DR for application in the reliability assessment are 
summarised. They are the load shifting model, the load reduction model and the 
emergency interruptible load model. These three models represent a wide range of 
existing DR programmes. 
2) A composite reliability index and two new indices are applied in this chapter. 
LINWRI quantifies the overall system reliability considering multiple aspects. DRICB 
quantifies the incremental benefit in reliability brought by DR. It is particularly useful 
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to Distribution Network Operator (DNO) in assessing the benefits of DR. VECL 
distinguishes the voluntary load curtailment from the forced load curtailment by 
quantifying the implementation level of Emergency Interruptible Load Program (EILP). 
3) A flexible algorithm capable of simulating actual system behaviour in a distribution 
network at the post-contingency stage is proposed. The algorithm performs network re-
configuration and identifies islanding parts at the post-contingency stage, based on AC 
power flow. 
 
6.2 DR Models 
Three typical DR models, i.e., the load shifting model, the load reduction model and the 
emergency interruptible load model are introduced below.  
The load shifting model curtails the electricity demand during the peak hour and 
replaces it in the off-peak hour. When the electricity price exceeds a price threshold, the 
load is curtailed by a certain percentage. When the electricity price falls below the price 
threshold, customers start to make up their electricity demand over the next few hours. 
This is modelled by a percentage increase from the original load spread over the off-
peak period. The annual energy consumption under DR can be set either greater than 
that without DR, which means that the electricity demand increases considerably after 
being shaved at the peak hour, or less than the latter representing a moderate or slight 
increase in electricity demand after DR, or equal to the latter. This model simulates the 
load feature under the PBP where customers adjust their behaviour according to price 
signals. For example, households may postpone their use of washing machines from 
peak to off-peak hours.  The model is flexible in that the signal to which customers 
respond is adjustable. It can be real-time prices or discrete prices.  
Unlike the load shifting model, the overall load reduction model reduces the electricity 
demand at peak hours without making it up later. This model also simulates the 
response of some types of demand under the PBP. Lighting is a typical example: it 
automatically dims following the corresponding price signal sent in by the smart meter 
or a decrease in frequency, and will not be brighter than normal at a later off-peak hour 
since it is not necessary [86].   
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Emergency interruptible load programme (EILP) corresponds to a typical IBP where 
participants are likely to be large industrial customers. The contract can be as follows: 
the customer agrees to curtail its load or start its own on-site generation upon request 
from the DNO in hours of emergency when the system is highly stressed or the 
electricity price experiences spikes [87, 88]. In return, the customer gets compensation 
from the DNO. Such curtailment serves the function of spinning reserves [75, 89]. A 
typical example is an “Emergency Load Response Program” which stipulates a two-
hour notification period prior to curtailment, a total duration of curtailment of up to six 
hours (historical average of fewer than four hours), and events occurring no more than 
ten times a year [88]. In the UK, the response time could be down to minutes [76]. 
In practice, different types of customers participate in different DR programmes with 
varying extents. Therefore, different DR models can be implemented in the simulation 
at the same time, and the overall effect on system reliability can be identified. The DR 
models are flexible in the sense that, with slight alterations, they are able to respond to 
different ‘signals’ such as the real-time price signal, discrete price signal, as well as 
various incentive contracts.  
 
6.3 Reliability Assessment of Distribution Systems 
 
An efficient algorithm has been developed which models the behaviour of distribution 
systems at the post-contingency stage. A recursive search is conducted from the faulted 
component (either a branch or a bus). The purpose is to locate the nearest normally open 
switch which, if closed, will resume at least one affected load bus. Then the faulted 
component is isolated, and the normally open switch is closed.  
Although the algorithm is highly efficient and straightforward in a radial network, it has 
sacrificed optimality as a trade-off: the reconfiguration scenario generated by this 
algorithm may not be optimal in resuming the maximum number of load buses.  
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Figure 6.1: Recursive algorithm to determine network re-configuration actions. 
 
 
Before performing the reliability assessment of distribution systems, it is essential to 
have a profound understanding and a reasonable model of the post-contingency 
reactions of distribution systems, such as self-clearing of faults, minimising the impact 
of protection system operations and fast restoration of loads by reconfigurations.  The 
post-contingency reactions in distribution systems are illustrated as follows, in a 
chronological order: 
1) A fault occurs in the network. With a properly coordinated protection system, 
the nearest upstream circuit breaker with reclosing relay trips.  
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2) The opened circuit breaker makes several attempts to re-close. If the fault is 
temporary or transient, the circuit breaker successfully closes, and all 
downstream load points suffer only momentary outage. 
3) If the fault persists, the circuit breaker will “lock out” after several unsuccessful 
attempts to re-close. The operator receives warning and sends out crews to 
identify the fault location.  
4) After the identification of the fault location, the faulted component is 
sectionalised by either manual or automatic switching. It then awaits further 
repair. The aforementioned recursive search is then conducted to resume some 
or all of the affected loads by closing the normally open switch. This step is 
called network reconfiguration.  
5) The system is analysed for any voltage or power flow violations. In case of any 
violation, load curtailment is called to correct the problem.   
6) After the completion of the repair job, the network configuration is switched 
back to its original status.  
Chapter 6: The Impact of Demand Response on Power System Reliability 
- 126 - 
 
Figure 6.2: CMCS algorithm. 
 
The above procedure is implemented into CMCS where both momentary outage and 
sustained outage are taken into account. When a fault occurs in the system, the 
optimisation algorithm with the objective to minimise the total cost of load curtailment 
is called. Load curtailment triggered by EILP (or ‘voluntary curtailment’) is treated in a 
different way from the forced load curtailment (or ‘forced curtailment’): the forced 
curtailment is converted into risk-associated cost using composite customer damage 
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function (CCDF), whereas voluntary curtailment incurs a cost to DNO dictated by the 
contract.  
For a distribution system where branch resistance is comparable to its reactance, the 
assumption on which the DC load flow is based is not valid. Therefore, AC optimisation 
is applied in this chapter.  
The AC optimisation model is presented below. 
fCur vCurmin f( ) g( )+∑ P P        (6.1) 
subject to 
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where  
Function f(x)  composite customer damage function 
Function g(x)  cost function of EILP 
fCurP    real power forced curtailment vector 
fCuriP    real power forced curtailment at bus i  
max
vCuriP    maximum real power voluntary curtailment at bus i  
vCurP    real power voluntary curtailment vector 
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fCuriQ    reactive power forced curtailment at bus i  
vCuriP    real power voluntary curtailment at bus  i
vCuriQ    reactive power voluntary curtailment at bus  i
kT    branch power flow 
 
6.4 Case Study 
 
The test case is the 16-bus distribution system at 33kV level. The network diagram 
shown in Figure 6.3 is similar to that used in Chapter 5 with the following difference: 
three normally open switches are added to this version. 
 
Figure 6.3: Network diagram of the 16-bus test case. 
 
All network data are given in Appendix B. 
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The three types of customer considered in the study are domestic customers, 
commercial customers and industrial customers. Hourly load profile throughout a year 
is used [90].  
Both branch failure and bus failure are considered. Branches and buses are subject to 
two types of outages, i.e., the momentary outage and the sustained outage. Each bus is 
fitted with a circuit breaker and a reclosing relay (‘recloser’). The protection system is 
coordinated that the first-responsive circuit breaker is the one on the nearest bus 
upstream of the fault location.  
The load is growing at an annual rate of 2.5%, and there is no load shedding if no fault 
occurs in the system.  
The optimization algorithm aims to minimise the cost of load shedding. This cost is 
calculated as a function of the amount of load curtailed and the duration. The Composite 
Customer Damage Function (CCDF) is given in Appendix B.       
Five scenarios are defined. They are 
1) the reference scenario with no demand response; 
2) load shifting only, maintaining the total energy consumption over a year to be 
the same as that of the reference case; 
3) load reduction only; 
4) joint implementation of load shifting and load reduction; and 
5) EILP (for industrial customers only). 
For scenario 2, 3 and 4 in year 1, the load threshold above which DR is triggered is set 
as 87% of the peak load, or 25MW. Such threshold increases at the same rate with the 
annual load growth rate which is 2.5%. When the total load in the system exceeds the 
threshold, loads at all buses are cut by 10% through DR (load shifting and load 
reduction only). For scenario 2, loads at subsequent off-peak hours increase (by no more 
than 5% at each bus each hour) while maintaining the total energy consumption in a 
year to be the same as that of the reference scenario. However, the ‘bouncing’ of the 
load in off-peak hours immediately after load shifting may cause ‘the second peak’. No 
action is taken against “the second peak” in Scenario 2. In contrary, Scenario 4 has 
implemented both load shifting and load reduction. This eliminates ‘the second peak’.  
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SAIFI, SAIDI, MAIFI and LINWRI results are shown in Figure 6.4 – Figure 6.7, 
respectively. Each scenario is simulated for up to 10 years. 
     
 
Figure 6.4: SAIFI results for the five scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 6.5: SAIDI results for the five scenarios. 
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Figure 6.6: MAIFI results for the five scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 6.7: LINWRI results for the five scenarios. 
 
SAIFI, SAIDI and MAIFI are assumed equally important in forming the overall 
reliability picture. Therefore, the weighting factors are equal to each other and should 
sum up to 1. 
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1 2 3
ref ref ref
SAIFI SAIDI MAIFILINWRI ρ ρ ρ
SAIFI SAIDI MAIFI
= + +     (6.12) 
1 2 3 0.3333ρ ρ ρ= = =where  
 
Scenario 1 in year one is set as the reference case of which LINWRI is 0. As is 
mentioned in previous chapters, the unacceptable point is often determined through 
practical experience rather than through a rigorous mathematical process. In this case, it 
is defined as the point where LINWRI 0.2= − , i.e., the reliability level of the reference 
scenario at year six. This point is deemed as the extreme point where network 
investment in branches and related facilities should be put into practice immediately.  
The figures show that given the same year, the reference scenario (scenario 1) and the 
EILP scenario (scenario 5) yield approximately the same reliability results. Their SAIFI 
and SAIDI are higher (LINWRI are lower) than the corresponding indices of other 
scenarios, showing a poorer overall reliability level than other scenarios. According to 
LINWRI results, the scenario with the highest reliability level is the ‘load shifting and 
reduction’ scenario (scenario 4).  DR clearly slows down the reliability degradation in 
the context of load growth: although system reliability still degrades with the load 
growth, the slope of such degradation is reduced by DR. 
Unlike SAIFI, SAIDI or MAIFI, the absolute LINWRI value of a single case is not as 
meaningful as its relative value. The extensive meaning of LINWRI is only revealed 
when LINWRI results of different scenarios are compared with each other. One of the 
purposes of coining this new index is to derive the reliability ranking of different 
scenarios considering multiple aspects. Another purpose is to indicate clearly to which 
reliability zone each scenario belongs.  Take the LINWRI results in year 8 as an 
example (see Figure 6.7): LINWRI results clearly indicate the reliability ranking in 
increasing order: the reference scenario < the ‘emergency interruptible load’ scenario < 
the ‘peak shifting only’ scenario, the ‘load reduction only’ scenario < the ‘peak 
reduction and shifting’ scenario. The reference scenario and the ‘emergency 
interruptible load’ scenario are in the ‘significant degradation’ zone, whereas the other 
three belong to the ‘moderate degradation’ zone.  
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Figure 6.6 shows that all cases yield almost the same MAIFI results regardless of the 
year. This phenomenon is reasonable: a momentary outage occurs under either of the 
two circumstances:  
1) a momentary fault; or 
2) a permanent fault followed by the tripping of the circuit breaker and the network 
reconfiguration process. 
Under the first circumstance, all load points downstream of the nearest tripped circuit 
breaker (with recloser) suffers from momentary outage. The reason why they do not 
suffer from permanent outage is that the automatic re-closing operation will resume the 
power supply, given the momentary nature of the fault. Under this circumstance, 
whether a bus experiences a momentary outage following a fault depends on the 
network topology only.  
Under the second circumstance, all load points that is not at a faulted bus and are 
reachable through alternative routes (this requires a ‘connectivity’ study) to the power 
supply bus are likely to suffer from momentary outage, provided that no system 
violation (power flow study is involved) occurs which may cause further load shedding. 
However, the probability of voltage/branch flow violation is low.  
In reality as well as in the test system, momentary faults occur to network components 
much (in this case approximately 10 times) more frequently than do permanent faults in 
distribution systems. Therefore, MAIFI is mainly contributed by the first circumstance 
which is purely a ‘connectivity’ problem depending on the network topology. All 
scenarios have the same network topology which does not change over time. Therefore, 
DR programmes and the load level have little impact on MAIFI results.   
Expected years of network investment deferral can be directly calculated from Figure 
6.7. Take scenario 1 and scenario 3 as examples: LINWRI result of the former scenario 
reaches the ‘unacceptable level’ in year 6, whereas LINWRI of the latter degrades to the 
same level in year 10. Therefore, the network investment is deferred by 4 years under 
scenario 3. Similarly, network investments are deferred by 4 years and more than 4 
years under scenario 2 and 4, respectively.  
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6.4.1 The Effect of Different DR Implementation Levels  
 
Under Scenario 3 (‘load reduction only’), the effect of DR implementation level on 
power system reliability is studied for up to 10 years. Load is reduced when it is above 
the pre-specified threshold as is mentioned in the previous section. The amount of load 
reduction, as a percentage of the peak load (or the peak load reduction rate), represents 
the level of DR implementation level. The sensitivity analysis is performed by varying 
the percentage mentioned above. SAIFI, SAIDI, MAIFI and LINWRI results are 
expressed in Figure 6.8 – Figure 6.11, respectively. 
 
Figure 6.8: SAIFI results for different DR implementation levels of load reduction. 
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Figure 6.9: SAIDI results for different DR implementation levels of load reduction. 
 
 
Figure 6.10: MAIFI results for different DR implementation levels of load 
reduction. 
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Figure 6.11: LINWRI results for different DR implementation levels of load 
reduction. 
 
The reference case is the reference scenario in year one. SAIFI results remain almost the 
same in year one regardless of the peak load reduction rates. The same applies to other 
indices in year one. This phenomenon is justified by the load reduction model: loads are 
reduced when they are above the pre-specified threshold. Loads in year one are below 
the threshold for most of the time. Therefore, the increasing DR implementation has 
negligible effect on the reliability indices in year one. The DRICB index has also been 
calculated, and results are shown in Table 6.1 and Figure 6.12. 
Table 6.1: DRICB results for different years and different implementation levels of 
DR 
DRICB (£/MWh) Peak Load 
Reduction 
Rate (%) 
Year 1 Year 10 Year 20 Year 30 
0 0.13 4.34 5.99 7.92 
10 0.19 4.53 5.87 10.00 
20 0 1.51 6.70 7.51 
30 0 0.30 5.65 6.95 
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40 0 0 2.40 6.68 
50 0 0 1.12 5.24 
60 0 0 0 3.18 
 
 
Figure 6.12: DRICB results for different DR implementation level under scenario 
3. 
 
DRICB indicates the incremental benefit in reliability (in £) of incremental reduction in 
annual energy consumption.  
Figure 6.12 shows that the DRICB is close to zero under the load in year one. This 
result corresponds to that in Figure 6.11. This is because the system is already highly 
reliable in year one due to the light load, and further DR implementation has almost no 
impact on system reliability.   
DRICB does not monotonically decrease with the increase in the peak load reduction 
rate from the starting point where the peak load reduction rate is zero. However, it 
inevitably decreases after a certain point. For example, DRICB in year 30 decreases 
after the point where Peak Load Reduction Rate=10%. Although the turning point may 
be different, similar trends apply to DRICB results in other years. This phenomenon 
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confirms that: when DR implementation level is low, incremental implementation of 
DR may significantly improve system reliability. However, when DR implementation 
reaches a certain level, incremental benefit finally decreases.    
DRICB is not an all-inclusive index. Rather, it quantifies one of the key benefits of DR, 
i.e., the benefit in power system reliability. For a comprehensive analysis of DR 
benefits, it is necessary to take into account other types of benefits such as the reduction 
in generation costs, delayed network investments and environmental benefits, etc., 
which are not in the scope of this research.   
 
 
6.4.2 The Effect of Emergency Interruptible Load Programme  
 
When an outage becomes imminent as the result of a fault under scenario 5, EILP is 
triggered to alleviate the consequence. Only industrial loads participate in EILP.  
Industrial loads can be classified as large industrial loads (maximum load in a year 
greater or equal to 10 kW) and small industrial loads (maximum load in a year lower 
than 10 kW). The threshold of 10 kW does not change over years. For a large industrial 
load, EILP only curtails up to a percentage of the load under emergencies. Denote this 
percentage as p. For a small industrial load, EILP curtails the load completely. Scenario 
5 is investigated in this section with different levels of p: 1) p=10%; 2) p=20%; 3) 
p=30%. 
The VECL and expected interruption cost (EIC) indices for the three scenarios are 
expressed in Figure 6.13 and Figure 6.14, respectively. 
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Figure 6.13: VECL for different implementation levels of EILP. 
 
 
Figure 6.14: EIC for different implementation levels of EILP. 
 
A higher p value corresponds to a higher VECL result, which represents the 
implementation level of EILP. Figure 6.13 has shown that VECL slowly decreases over 
time. This is justified by the model: the model stipulates that EILP curtails small 
industrial loads completely. When the load level is low (in early years), small industrial 
Chapter 6: The Impact of Demand Response on Power System Reliability 
- 140 - 
loads curtailed completely through EILP appear more often than they do when the load 
level is high. This results in a higher voluntary energy curtailment percentage in early 
years than that in a later year. Such percentage finally reaches a stable value when the 
load growth eliminates all small industrial loads (< 10 kW). Take the ‘p=10%’ case as 
an example: VECL results show that, in year one, more than 17% of the annual total 
energy curtailment is curtailed on a voluntary basis through EILP. This percentage 
gradually decreases through time until finally reaches a stable value of around 14.5%.   
In any given year, a higher VECL value (or the implementation level of EILP) results in 
a lower EIC result and higher system reliability. However, other reliability indices such 
as SAIFI and SAIDI have small changes of no more than 5%. This is because SAIFI 
and SAIDI do not distinguish whether it is a partial load shedding or a complete load 
shedding as long as the system suffers load shedding, whereas EIC is directly affected 
by the amount of load curtailment. In other words, different amount of load shedding 
(as long as it is above zero) contributes the same to SAIFI and SAID but differently to 
EIC. EILP reduces the amount the load shedding once the system suffers contingency, 
but is unlikely to eliminate the load shedding completely. Therefore, EILP has a 
considerable impact on EIC but rather little on SAIFI and SAIDI.           
 
6.4.3 The Effect of Weighting Factors on LINWRI 
 
LINWRI is the weighted sum of indices considering different aspects of power system 
reliability. A greater weighting factor of an aspect represents a greater concern of that 
aspect. The LINWRI results for different scenarios are comparable only if the 
mathematical definitions of LINWRI are the same. In the previous study, the three 
component indices are treated equally, i.e., 1 2 3ρ ρ ρ 0.3333= = = . It is no longer the 
case in this section. This section investigates how changes in weighting factors affect 
LINWRI results. The study considers all scenarios in year 10 (similar effect can be 
observed for other years, but it is more obvious under a higher load level). To reduce the 
number of independent variables, LINWRI is defined as 
1 2 3
ref ref ref
SAIFI SAIDI MAIFILINWRI ρ ρ ρ
SAIFI SAIDI MAIFI
= + +  
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2
1 3
1 ρ
ρ ρ
2
−= =where  
Therefore,  is the only independent variable, whereas  and  are dependent on .  2ρ 1ρ 3ρ 2ρ
The combinations of weighting factors used for sensitivity analysis are presented in 
Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2: The combinations of weighting factors. 
 
Combination No. 1ρ  2ρ  3ρ  
1 0.5 0 0.5 
2 0.45 0.1 0.45 
3 0.4 0.2 0.4 
4 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 
5 0.3 0.4 0.3 
6 0.25 0.5 0.25 
7 0.2 0.6 0.2 
8 0.15 0.7 0.15 
9 0.1 0.8 0.1 
 
 
The sensitivity analysis is performed by varying . 2ρ
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Figure 6.15: LINWRI results under different combinations of weighting factors for 
the five scenarios. 
 
The above results prove that LINWRI is sensitive to : the differences in LINWRI 
results among different scenarios increase with the increase of . In other words, 
LINWRI is more ‘polarised’ when  is greater. The reason for this phenomenon is: 
SAIDI is the most ‘polarised’ component index (or ‘aspect’) among different scenarios 
in year 10, followed by SAIFI. MAIFI results are almost the same for all scenarios. 
SAIDI result for the ‘load shifting and reduction’ scenario (scenario 4) in year 10 is 
57.43% lower than that for the reference scenario. A ‘polarised’ aspect assigned a 
greater weighting factor results in a ‘polarised’ LINWRI value.   
2ρ
2ρ
2ρ
For any given , the LINWRI ranking for the five scenarios does not change. This is 
because 
2ρ
1) The SAIFI ranking for all scenarios is the same as the SAIDI ranking; and 
2) MAIFI remains almost constant regardless of the scenario.   
Theoretically, LINWRI ranking might be different for different values of  if SAIFI 
and SAIDI rankings were not the same. For example, scenario A is ‘better’ than 
2ρ
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scenario B in an aspect weighted by , whereas the former is ‘worse’ than the latter in 
another aspect weighted by . As an overall view, whether scenario A is ‘better’ than 
B depends on whether the ‘better’ aspect is weighted more than the ‘worse’ aspect. 
However, this phenomenon does not exist in the test case.  
1ρ
2ρ
 
In general, the choice of weighting factors has a key impact on LINWRI. When all 
component indices of LINWRI have the same ranking for different scenarios, the choice 
of weighting factors does not affect the ranking, but only affects the relative value. 
Under this circumstance, a polarised component index assigned a greater weighting 
factor results in LINWRI being polarised. When component indices have different 
rankings, the choice of weighting factors determines the LINWRI ranking. A 
component index which is weighted more than others tends to affect the LINWRI 
ranking more than others.  
 
 
 
6.5 Conclusions 
 
Demand response has been implemented in the reliability assessment of distribution 
systems. Three basic DR models and three new reliability indices have been 
implemented into the reliability assessment algorithm. 
The test case has been analysed in the context of load growth, and results show that DR 
slows down the degradation of system reliability. However, not all indices degrade over 
years. MAIFI depends on the network topology, and is rather insensitive to load growth. 
The sensitivity analysis shows that, with increasing implementation level of DR, power 
system reliability is improving. However, the marginal benefit in reliability is 
decreasing as is clearly indicated by DRICB results.  
The case study shows that EILP contributes to system reliability by reducing EIC. 
However, it does not have a significant impact on SAIFI, SAIDI and LINWRI indices. 
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The validity of VECL has also been demonstrated under EILP. A high VECL value 
corresponds to a high implementation level of EILP.  
Sensitivity analysis on the effect of the weighting factors proves that a ‘polarised’ 
component index assigned a large weighting factor results in LINWRI being 
‘polarised’. It is therefore necessary to decide the weighting factors with caution.  
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Summary 
As stated in previous chapters, corrective control is a solution of great potential for 
overcoming the economic and political barriers encountered in conventional network 
reinforcement, as well as an enabling technology for accommodating increasing 
penetration of intermittent generation. Flexible AC Transmission Systems (FACTS) are 
a key aspect in the field of corrective control. This chapter investigates the following 
issues in the context of FACTS: 1) how the implementation of FACTS affects power 
system reliability; 2) how the reliability of the FACTS control system influences power 
system reliability; 3) whether the implementation of FACTS is preferable over 
traditional reinforcement in terms of cost benefit.  
First, FACTS technology and its wide-area control are reviewed using existing 
publications as bases. The state space models of typical FACTS devices and the control 
system model are presented in succeeding sections. These models are then incorporated 
into CMCS, applied as the reliability assessment method. 
The Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS) and the IEEE Reliability Test System (RTS) are 
selected as test systems. Scenarios with FACTS devices and traditional reinforcement 
scenarios are proposed and investigated in relation to the above-mentioned research 
issues.  
 
 
7.1 Introduction to FACTS 
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According to the definition given by IEEE, FACTS is ‘a power electronic-based system 
and other static equipment that provide control of one or more AC transmission system 
parameters to enhance controllability and increase power transfer capability’ [91]. 
FACTS matured with the development of power electronics technologies such as 
thyristor valves, converters, and inverters. The latest application of insulated gate bipolar 
transistors in voltage converters provides high controllability to voltage with low 
harmonics [92].  
The basic applications of FACTS include power flow control, voltage control, system 
stability improvement, etc [93]. Through mechanically switched/power electronic 
controlled shunt/series compensation, FACTS devices provide fast control with a 
response time down to the level of milliseconds. Typical FACTS devices include the 
SVC, static synchronous compensator (STATCOM), thyristor controlled series 
compensator (TCSC), static synchronous series compensator (SSSC), and unified power 
flow controller (UPFC) [92]. 
FACTS can be classified into two categories: shunt compensation and series 
compensation. Typical shunt compensation devices include the SVC and STATCOM. 
An SVC regulates voltage and stabilises a system by providing reactive compensation. It 
is a dynamic reactive current source with a sub-cycle reaction time [91]. Typical 
examples of SVC applications are presented as follows.  
An SVC is installed in a 115 kV transmission system in Lower Southeastern 
Massachusetts to provide fast-responsive voltage support to the system in case two major 
generation sites simultaneously fail [94]. Under normal circumstances, the SVC remains 
on standby. Under emergency circumstances, it can provide reactive support at a rating 
of 115 kV, 0 – 225 Mvar capacitive output for 2 seconds, and 0 – 112.5 Mvar capacitive 
output for longer durations. The voltage is automatically monitored and the reaction of 
the SVC is also automatic when the voltage falls below a pre-specified level. The 
settings can be configured either by the local SVC control room or central network 
control room via SCADA [94]. This real-world example fully justifies SVC application 
in providing emergency reactive compensation for the purpose of reliability.  
An SVC can be mobile (or relocatable), but with a compromised degree of 
compensation. In another application by ABB [95], an SVC is configured to improve the 
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stability and transfer capability of the National Grid 400/275 kV transmission network in 
the UK. It can be controlled either by the local control room or remote control centre. 
Similar to an SVC, a STATCOM can provide instantaneous reactive support to the grid 
and is equivalent to a synchronous voltage source. By improving voltage stability 
through a STATCOM, transfer capacity can be significantly increased and power quality 
can be improved [96]. A STATCOM is applied as a replacement for conventional 
generation in Austin, Texas where the retirement of an old conventional generation unit 
necessitated a robust dynamic reactive compensation device [97]. In this application, the 
purpose of installing a STATCOM is to address voltage sags [97]. 
The investment cost per kvar of an SVC device itself is lower than that of a STATCOM. 
According to [98], an SVC costs US$ 40/kvar and a STATCOM costs US$50/kvar. 
However, SVC has its own disadvantages:  
1) It is not as robust as a STATCOM because its control capability falls only within a 
limited voltage range. Beyond the range, its performance becomes largely compromised 
or the device becomes non-functional. The performance of a STATCOM, on the other 
hand, is not impaired by low voltage [93]. 
2) For comparable voltage and compensation levels, an SVC may be physically larger 
than a STATCOM (because of the limited information available, this description may 
not be universal).  
An SVC (40 Mvar inductive to 70 Mvar capacitive) connected to a 115 kV network has a 
layout of  [99], whereas a STATCOM (80 Mvar inductive to 110 
Mvar capacitive) connected to a 138 kV network occupies an area of 
, approximately 75% less than that occupied by the former [97]. 
In countries where obtaining land permission is costly, the larger physical area that an 
SVC occupies and possibly significantly higher land costs incurred from it require 
consideration in economic assessment. 
21505 m  (43 m 35 m)×
2375 m  (25 m 15 m)×
Typical series compensation devices include fixed series compensation, TCSC, and 
SSSC [100]. The first device is potentially a cost-effective way to improve the transfer 
capacity and stability of a long bulk transmission corridor.   
An example of actual application is the installation of a series capacitor in the 230 kV 
transmission network of Hydro-Quebec by ABB [101]. By enhancing stability, this 
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series capacitor increases the transmission capacity of a critical corridor that carries 
hydro power from several hydro plants to the load centre. It has cost advantages over the 
traditional reinforcement scenario of building a new parallel 230 kV power line. The 
series capacitor can be controlled either by the local control room or central control room 
via the remote terminal unit (RTU), which is part of the SCADA system [101].  
TCSC provides increased controllability compared with fixed series compensation. It can 
rapidly change the inserted reactance and provide effective damping on inter-area 
electromechanical oscillations [102]. However, because of the high capital cost of TCSC, 
combining TCSC with fixed series compensation for transient stability enhancement is 
often a more cost effective option.  
One of the most important applications of TCSC for reliability is post-contingency 
loadability control [19]. The degree of TCSC compensation can rapidly increase to help 
the system survive a contingency, but remains at a low compensation level or is dormant 
under normal circumstances.   
A theoretical SSSC model is proposed in [103]. It injects a voltage source in series to the 
power line. The injected voltage stays in quadrature with line current given that SSSC 
has no active power source. SSSC can either be capacitive or inductive depending on the 
magnitude of the injected voltage. Its diagram is shown in Figure 
7.1.
 
Figure 7.1: the single line diagram of SSSC [103]. 
 
Under a proper control mode, SSSC can be superior over impedance-based series 
compensation [103]. Two control schemes are proposed in [103]. One is the Reactance 
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Emulation Scheme in which SSSC serves as an additional series reactor or a series 
capacitor that regulates the power flow through the line. The other scheme is the 
Quadrature Voltage Control Scheme in which SSSC serves as a quadrature voltage 
source for the direct purpose of tackling voltage drop. However, SSSC is a fairly new 
technology and has not yet been widely applied in industry. The reliability of its 
technical performance in actual applications and its economic viability remain uncertain.  
Previously mentioned FACTS devices provide either shunt or series compensation, 
whereas UPFC provides both. It can provide full dynamic control over voltage and line 
impedance [104]. UPFC is essentially a combination of SSSC and STATCOM with 
independent control over different types of parameters [105]. It is a theoretical FACTS 
device that has not been applied in industry thus far.  
Apart from the applications of FACTS devices mentioned above, more applications are 
summarised from published papers: 
1) the application of an SVC for local and remote disturbances in San Francisco Bay area 
transmission system [106];  
2) the application of an SVC to increase transmission capacity and enhance voltage 
stability [107]; 
3) joint application of SVC and STATCOM as a dynamic VAR Compensator for 
supporting voltage and improving system stability [108]; 
4) substitution of an SVC for synchronous condensers at Pacific Gas & Electric 
Company (PG&E, San Francisco) because of the cost advantage offered by the former 
[109];  
5) the application of FACTS devices (shunt compensators) on a 500 kV transmission 
system in Vietnam. A continuation load flow method has been proposed to determine the 
best location and type of FACTS devices [2]; 
6) the application of FACTS devices for generation cost reduction [110]. An economic 
viability study is performed on whether the savings in generation costs outweigh the 
costs of FACTS devices after the allocation of FACTS using a genetic algorithm [110]; 
and 
7) the application of distributed FACTS (D-FACTS) devices as a substitute for ordinary 
FACTS devices. D-FACTS is expected to be less expensive, mobile, and flexible in 
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terms of degree of compensation [111]. It is a novel idea but still remains at the 
theoretical level.  
A number of papers focus on the allocation of FACTS devices.  
A genetic algorithm is applied in identifying the location, operating point, and number of 
FACTS devices simultaneously in [112].  The optimal location and settings of shunt 
compensators (FACTS devices) for large power systems with wind farms are determined 
through sensitivity analysis and optimal power flow, respectively [113]. 
 
7.2 Wide-area Control of FACTS 
The full potential of FACTS can only be exploited through coordinated control. 
Coordination can either be system wide or regional, depending on system size. The 
ideal scenario is to coordinate FACTS devices on a system-wide level, in which the set 
point of each device is optimised for a global target. Given prohibitive system size, 
however, the system-wide coordination of FACTS may be impractical [114]. Instead, it 
is suggested that the control area be limited to where the FACTS devices have 
considerable effect on the control objective. The effect of FACTS devices is 
investigated through sensitivity analysis in [115]. Different FACTS devices correspond 
to varied control areas, where each area has its own control objective. These areas may 
overlap and the control objectives may be contradictory. This requires a multi-area 
control algorithm for coordinating the FACTS devices with overlapping areas of 
influence and different control objectives [115].   
An approach for decentralised control of a power flow controller (PFC) based on a 
multi-agent system is proposed in [116]. The controlling agents installed at each PFC 
evaluates system state based on the information received from local measurement 
devices, and generates local control scenarios using a weighing function to avoid 
conflicting effects on the system level.     
The importance of coordinated FACTS control in avoiding negative mutual influences 
in the network is emphasised in [114]. The paper proposes a supervisory controller 
based on optimal power flow with different control objectives. These objectives include 
minimising transmission losses, keeping load below a threshold, maintaining voltage 
within a safe limit, etc. By comparing the scenario with FACTS under coordinated 
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control and the base scenario without FACTS, the paper demonstrates the advantages of 
the former in resolving congestion, improving voltage profile, and reducing line losses. 
The wide area control of a dynamic power flow controller (DPFC) is proposed in [117]; 
comparing it with the uncoordinated control of phase shifting transformers demonstrates 
the advantages of the former. The DPFC is able to address emergency situations 
because of its fast responsiveness; it responds automatically to sudden changes in power 
systems and therefore increases the transfer capacity of branches.   
For small test systems such as the RBTS and RTS, dividing the system into different 
control zones to reduce the computational time required is unnecessary. The system-
wide coordination of FACTS devices is therefore performed by calling a single 
optimisation algorithm to minimise total cost of load curtailment under contingencies.  
 
7.3 Methodology 
 
Three types of FACTS devices are modelled in this chapter: SVC, TCSC, and 
STATCOM. Their state space models are presented in this chapter. The FACTS devices 
are controlled by the central control room and are therefore subject to CCF, i.e., the 
failure of the central control unit. The state space models of FACTS devices and the 
central control unit are incorporated into CMCS, which is the reliability assessment 
approach. The CMCS algorithm and the optimisation algorithm are also presented in 
this chapter.  
 
7.3.1 Modelling of SVC 
 
The single line diagram of an SVC in Figure 7.2 shows a thyristor-controlled capacitor 
(TCC), thyristor-controlled reactor (TCR), and fixed capacitor as a harmonic filter [61].     
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Figure 7.2: the single line diagram of SVC [61]. 
 
The following assumptions are adopted when creating the state space model of the SVC 
[88, 118]:  
1) If any branch of TCC or TCR fails, the failed branch is bypassed, whereas other 
branches continue to operate normally.  
2) If all TCC and TCR branches are down, SVC is bypassed. 
For a typical SVC (Figure 7.3), the four-state model is presented in [88].  
 
Figure 7.3: original four-state model of SVC [88]. 
 
The above-mentioned model is slightly altered in this project based on the assumption 
that the failure of the RTU results in the outage of the SVC. This corresponds to a direct 
transition route between the ‘SVC normal’ state and ‘SVC completely down’ state. The 
altered state space model is shown in Figure 7.4.   
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Figure 7.4: the altered four-state model of SVC. 
 
In this project, an approximation is made, that is, the active power loss is disregarded. 
The SVC can continuously and rapidly absorb or generate reactive power within the 
range determined by the number and individual parameters of the TCC and TCR [93]. In 
power flow analysis, an SVC can be seen as an adjustable reactance, whose equivalent 
circuit is shown in Figure 7.5 [93]. 
 
Figure 7.5: the SVC model in power flow study [93]. 
 
The current drawn from the bus is therefore [93] 
SVC SVCj kI B V=         (7.1) 
The reactive power injected at bus k is [93] 
2
SVCk kQ V B= −         (7.2) 
The capacitive status of the SVC corresponds to a positive injection of reactive power 
into the bus, whereas an inductive one corresponds to a withdrawal of reactive power 
from the bus. In the iterative process, power injection into an SVC bus is iteratively 
corrected using (7.2). 
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An alternative SVC model in power flow studies is the firing angle model, where firing 
angle  of the TCR is regarded as a state variable. The reactive power injected into the 
bus in the firing angle model is given by [93] 
α
2
{ [2(π-α) sin(2α)]}
π
k C
k L
C L
V XQ X
X X
−= − +     (7.3) 
In this model, power injection into an SVC bus is iteratively updated using (7.3). 
The firing angle model focuses more on the detailed mechanism of an SVC, whereas the 
adjustable reactance model regards the SVC as a black box. The adjustable reactance 
model is adopted because the internal mechanism is of no concern to this research.  
 
7.3.2 Modelling of STATCOM 
 
STATCOM provides reactive compensation independently from the bus voltage within 
its range [93]. 
A typical STATCOM is designed with redundancy in a conservative manner. The 50 
MVA STATCOM prototype is adopted in this project [119]. The core of the 
STATCOM, i.e., the main circuit, is configured in a cascading multilevel structure, 
which is modelled by a series system in reliability studies. To compensate for the 
weakness in this series system, a redundant design is adopted in which each phase 
consists of 10 identical voltage source inverters (VSI); A phase is operational when no 
less than 8 VSI are working normally. However, the failure of any phase results in the 
outage of the entire STATCOM. The structure of the STATCOM three-phase main 
circuit is depicted in Figure 7.6. 
 
Figure 7.6: the structure of STATCOM three-phase main circuit [119]. 
 
The probability of each phase in normal condition is equal to the probability that the 
number of working components is greater than or equal to n (n=8 in this scenario). It 
Chapter 7: Reliability with FACTS and control system 
- 155 - 
corresponds to an 8-out-of-10: G model. The mean time between failures (MTBF) and 
reliability (R) for each phase are therefore [119] 
1 1MTBF=
λ
n
i k i=
∑        (7.4) 
( )( , ) n n i ni
i k
iR k n p q −
=
= ∑        (7.5) 
The probability that at least components are up at time t  is therefore [119]: m
1( ,..., ) 1 1
μ λ
[ (
λ μ λ μ
j j
r j j j j
r nn
i i
r m i i I j j ri i i i
P
= ⊆ = = +
= + +∑ ∑ ∏ ∏ )]     (7.6) 
where and  for the 8-out-of-10: G model. 8m = 10n =
The failure of any phase results in the failure of the STATCOM main circuit that consists 
of three phases. Assuming that the phases are independent of each other [119], the series 
reliability model is applicable: 
       (7.7) SMTBF =MTBF/3
where subscript s denotes the system, i.e., the main circuit of the STATCOM. 
The probability that the STATCOM main circuit is up is therefore 
3
SP P=         (7.8) 
where subscript s denotes the system, i.e., the main circuit of the STATCOM. 
 
In CMCS, each of the 30 identical VSI (numbered 1 to 30) is simulated based on the 
basic two-state model comprising an ‘up’ and ‘down’ state. Phase A consists of VSI Nos. 
1 to 10; phase B consists of VSI Nos. 11 to 20; and phase C consists of VSI Nos. 21 to 
30. A phase is down if the failures of more than two (>2) VSI coincide. The outage of 
any phase results in the outage of the STATCOM.     
The m-out-of-n: G model is applicable when knowledge regarding the failure rate of 
each individual VSI and level of redundancy is available. However, the failure rate of an 
individual VSI may be unavailable. This project uses a hypothetical VSI failure rate and 
simulates the failure of each VSI. 
A circuit equivalent to the STATCOM is shown in Figure 7.7 [120]. The core is the 
equivalent voltage source. 
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Figure 7.7: Equivalent circuit of STATCOM. 
 
The formulae for calculating active and reactive power are given by [120]: 
2 [ cos(θ θ ) sin(θ θ )]k k vR k vR vR k vR vR k vRP V G V V G B= + − + −   (7.9) 
  (7.10) 2 [ sin(θ θ ) cos(θ θ )]k k vR k vR vR k vR vR k vRQ V B V V G B= − + − − −
 
A STATCOM without a DC source can be simplified as a reactive power source 
because in steady-state operations, the active power exchange between the STATCOM 
and the network is negligible [121, 122]. In this case, the STATCOM is modelled by a 
reactive power source independent of the bus voltage.  
 
7.3.3 Modelling of TCSC 
 
TCSC has been applied to regulating branch flows, limiting short-circuit currents, 
mitigating sub-synchronous resonance, improving transient stability, etc [90]. TCSC 
can continuously change line impedance within a time frame down to milliseconds. Its 
single line diagram is shown in Figure 7.8 [123]. 
 
Figure 7.8: Single line diagram of TCSC [123]. 
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Two reliability models are presented for TCSC. One has three possible states: the 
normal state in which TCSC has full functionality; the bypassed state in which TCSC 
fails and is subsequently isolated from the line without affecting the operation of the 
line; and the emergency state in which TCSC fails followed by the malfunction of the 
bypass breaker, thereby causing the protection relay to trip the line [118].   
The other model is a simplified two-state model, which assumes that TCSC is always 
isolated from the line when TCSC fails. The difference of this model from the three-
state representation is that the emergency state is disregarded. In this project, we adopt 
the latter given that practical data are unavailable.  
In power flow studies, TCSC is modelled as a variable series reactance to control 
branch power flow to a specific value [93]. This model is shown in Figure 7.9 [93]. 
 
Figure 7.9: the variable series reactance model of TCSC. 
 
The equations of active and reactive powers injected at bus k are given below [93]: 
sin( )k k m km k mP V V B θ θ= −       (7.11) 
     (7.12) 2 cos( )k k kk k m km k mQ V B V V B θ θ= − − −
where  
TCSC
1
kk mmB B X
= = −         (7.13) 
TCSC
1
km mkB B X
= =        (7.14)  
 
7.3.4 Modelling of the Central Control Unit 
 
FACTS devices are subject to CCF, which is either the central control unit failure only or 
a combination of central control unit failure and communication system failure, 
depending on the control system configuration.  
Chapter 7: Reliability with FACTS and control system 
- 158 - 
The three types of configurations introduced in Chapter 3 are the ‘party line’ 
configuration, ‘star’ configuration, and ‘mixed party line and star’ configuration. A 
simplified ‘party line’ configuration is employed as the control system model in this 
chapter for the following reasons: 
1) Using a configuration model beyond that justifiable by practical data is an 
unreasonable approach. In other words, the level of model complexity should 
correspond to data availability. 
2) For a modern control system that uses radio or other types of wireless 
communication, the reliability of communication depends on the reliability of the 
radio terminals at both the central control room and local devices. The reliability 
of a central radio terminal can be integrated with that of a central control unit, 
whereas the reliability of the local radio terminal (or RTU) can be combined with 
that of the local devices. In this case, the communication system is ‘absorbed’.    
The failure rates of FACTS devices obtained from historical records are divided into the 
failure rate of the independent failure and that of the CCF using the beta factor method.  
Take the SVC as an example. , , and  are denoted as the observed failure rates 
(Figure 7.4). These failures include independent failures and CCF. 
1λ 2λ 3λ
1iλ , , and  are the failure rates of the independent failures;  is the failure rate of 
CCF. The following relationships can be derived: 
2iλ 3iλ Cλ
1i 1λ λ=         (7.15) 
2i 2 1λ λ (1 β )= −        (7.16) 
3i 3 2λ λ (1 β )= −        (7.17) 
2 1 3 2λ 2λ β λ βC = +        (7.18) 
 
Chapter 7: Reliability with FACTS and control system 
- 159 - 
 
Figure 7.10: State space model of SVC considering independent failures only. 
 
The state space model of the central control unit is shown in Figure 7.11.   
 
Figure 7.11: State space model of CCF. 
 
7.3.5 Chronological Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
CMCS is adopted as the reliability assessment method. The flowchart of CMCS is 
shown in Figure 7.12. 
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Figure 7.12: CMCS algorithm. 
 
The optimisation algorithm for minimising total cost of load curtailment is given below: 
        (7.19) min CCDF( )CurLP
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subject to 
 
     (7.20) SVC TCSC    ( , , , )
Cur inj
Gi Li Li iP P P P V X Xθ− + =
        (7.21) STATCOM SVC TCSC( , , , ) 
Cur inj
Gi Li Li i iQ Q Q Q Q V X Xθ− + + =
                                                                      (7.22)   maxij ijS S<
                                                 (7.23) min maxi i iV V V< <
0 CurLiP P< <    Li                                                       (7.24)  
 
Cur
Li Li Li
Cur
Li Li Li
P P P
Q Q Q
− =−                                                  (7.25)    
                                                  (7.26) min maxSVC SVC SVCX X X< <
         (7.27) min maxSTATCOM STATCOM STATCOMi iQ Q Q≤ ≤ i
           (7.28) min maxTCSC TCSC TCSCX X X≤ ≤
where 
,Li LiP Q      Active and reactive load at bus i; 
,Gi GiP Q      Active and reactive generation at bus i; 
,Cur CurLi LiP Q   Active and reactive load curtailment at bus i; 
,inj inji iP Q     Active and reactive power injection at bus i; 
min max
SVC SVC SVC, ,X X X         Equivalent reactance of SVC and its lower and upper limit; 
   Load flows at branch ij; ijS
,i iV θ                  Voltage magnitude and angle at bus i;    
min max
STATCOM STATCOM STATCOM, ,Q Q Q  Reactive power output, the lower limit of the reactive 
power output and the upper limit of the reactive power output of STATCOM, 
respectively; and 
min max
TCSC TCSC TCSC, ,X X X      Equivalent reactance, the lower limit of the equivalent 
reactance and the upper limit of the equivalent reactance of TCSC. 
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7.4 Case Study 
 
Before the test case is presented, providing the definitions of the terms used in the 
context of this project is necessary.  
1) The control system (or the FACTS control system): the system that consists of a 
central control unit and communication channels. This system is used to control the 
FACTS devices. 
2) The reference scenario: the scenario with no system reinforcement of any kind, i.e., 
the ‘doing nothing at all’ scenario. 
3) The reference case: the reference scenario in year 1.  
4) System reinforcement: the installation of either FACTS devices or new power 
lines/transformers. 
5) Traditional reinforcement scenario: the installation of new power lines. 
 
RTS is applied as the test case [124]. All relevant data are given in Appendix C. 
Annualised loads have been used in the simulation, which is sufficient when different 
scenarios are compared in terms of their reliability and cost benefits [11]. In the present 
study, the simplified ‘party-line’ structure is adopted as the FACTS control system 
structure based on the assumption that all communications are conducted via radio. The 
central control unit failure is therefore the CCF of all the FACTS devices. The 
behaviours of the FACTS device, central control unit, and transmission branches are 
simulated. The failure of the generation units is not considered in the case study because 
1) the focus is on network reliability, that is, the reliability of passing the electrical 
energy from generation units to load buses; and 
2) power lines are generally more reliable than generation units. Considering the 
generation unit failure is likely to mask network reliability, which is the primary 
concern of this study.  
A key assumption regarding the scenarios with FACTS devices is that these devices 
react under contingency only. They remain on standby when the power system is 
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working under normal conditions. In other words, FACTS devices serve only a reliability 
purpose by providing corrective control under contingencies. 
A simplified system planning is conducted to determine the reinforcement scenarios: 
candidate scenarios include all scenarios that have an SVC at a PQ bus. Preliminary 
reliability assessment up to the first order is performed where only one element fails at a 
time. The scenario with the lowest EENS is found, i.e. SVC installed at bus 3. Given the 
fixed SVC location, all scenarios with one TCSC is studied through first-order reliability 
assessment, and the one with the lowest EENS is found to be a TCSC between bus 3 and 
bus 24. The same planning methodology has found that a duplicated element between 
bus 3 and bus 24 provides the most reliability benefit.  
Therefore, six scenarios are defined as follows: 
1) the reference scenario; 
2) SVC at bus 3; 
3) TCSC connecting between bus 3 and bus 24 to the low voltage terminals of the 
transformer; 
4) STATCOM at bus 3; 
5) SVC at bus 3 and TCSC connecting between bus 3 and bus 24 to the low voltage 
terminals of the transformer; and 
6) a duplicated element between bus 3 and bus 24. 
The annual load growth rate is 2.5% and the simulation covers years 1 to 6.  
The EENS results are shown in Figure 7.13: 
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Figure 7.13: EENS results for RTS. 
 
In this case, LINWRI is defined in as having only one component index, i.e., EENS: 
ref
EENSLINWRI=
EENS
       (7.29) 
The reference case is scenario 1 in year 1.  
The LINWRI results are shown in Figure 7.14. 
 
Figure 7.14: LINWRI results for RTS. 
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In any given year, power system reliability is at its worst under the reference scenario 
(i.e., scenario 1). Both corrective control represented by scenarios 2–5 and traditional 
reinforcement represented by scenario 6 can slow down the deterioration of system 
reliability in the context of load growth compared with the reference scenario. In any 
given year, scenario 3 (i.e., TCSC installed between bus 3 and bus 24) provides the least 
reliability improvement compared with scenarios 2, 4, and 5. In most years, the 
traditional reinforcement plan represented by scenario 6 provides higher reliability 
improvement than does scenario 3. Scenarios 2, 4, and 5 provide almost the same level 
of reliability improvement to the system. 
No consistent ranking is observed in the six scenarios for all years. For example, the 
LINWRI ranking for years 1 and 6 follows the order 
1,1 3,1 6,1 4,1 5,1 2,1LINWRI LINWRI LINWRI LINWRI LINWRI LINWRI< < < ≈ ≈   
1,6 3,6 6,6 2,6 5,6 4,6LINWRI LINWRI LINWRI LINWRI LINWRI LINWRI≈ < < < <  
x,x ywhere subscript  in ,LINWRIx y  denotes scenario  in year  (e.g., is 
LINWRI result for scenario 4 in year 1). A scenario that provides the highest reliability 
improvement to the system in a certain year may not do so in another year.  
y 4,1LINWRI
The investment for each reinforcement scenario, except scenario 1, is assumed to be paid 
off in five equal yearly installments at the end of each year. The investment cost is 
converted to a present value by 
1 (1 )      (£)
niIC In
i
−− +=        (7.30) 
            investment cost IC
             installment In
i                discount rate 
n               number of payments 
Given that all scenarios have the same generation dispatch throughout the simulation 
period, the generation operational costs are the same and therefore disregarded when 
performing economic comparisons. The O&M cost refers to the extra O&M cost 
resulting from system reinforcement. For a scenario with FACTS devices, the O&M cost 
refers to the cost resulting from the O&M of corrective control devices. For the scenario 
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with a duplicated element, the O&M cost refers to that of the extra element. Therefore, 
the O&M cost for scenario 1 is 0. Similarly, the present value of O&M cost is given by 
1 (1 )      (£)
m
annual
iOC O
i
−− +=       (7.31) 
              present value of O&M cost OC
annualO           annual O&M cost 
m                  economic life 
The present value of the risk-associated cost is given by 
1 (1 )      (£)
m
annual
iR R
i
−− +=        (7.32)  
R               present value of risk-associated cost 
annualR          annual risk-associated cost 
m                time span considered 
The annual risk-associated cost is calculated from load curtailment using the customer 
damage function (CDF). In this test case, the CDF is assigned a constant value, 
CDF=£100 /MWh. Therefore, . EENS  CDFannualR = ×
The discount rate is assumed to be 5% and the economic life for each FACTS device and 
the extra line is 25 years. Economic analysis is then performed.  
The cost structure is depicted in Figure 7.15: 
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Figure 7.15: the costs for all scenarios. 
 
The O&M costs are given in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: O&M costs for RTS 
Scenario No. O&M cost per year (£) Present value of the 
O&M cost (£) 
2 50,000.00 704,697.23 
3 50,000.00 704,697.23 
4 50,000.00 704,697.23 
5 75,000.00 1,057,045.84 
6 50,000.00 704,697.23 
 
The investment costs are provided in  
 
Table 7.2: 
 
Table 7.2: Investment costs for RTS 
Scenario No. Investment cost per year Present value of the 
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(£) investment cost (£) 
2 400,000.00 1,731,790.67 
3 500,000.00 2,164,738.34 
4 600,000.00 2,597,686.00 
5 800,000.00 3,463,581.34 
6 2,000,000.00 8,658,953.34 
 
The risk-associated costs for RTS are shown in Table 7.3: 
Table 7.3: Risk-associated costs for RTS 
Scenario No. Risk-associated cost per 
year (£) 
Present value of the risk-
associated cost (£) 
1 7,450,862.50 105,012,043.04 
2 2,057,961.79 29,004,798.40 
3 6,877,945.32 96,937,379.93 
4 1,892,526.26 26,673,156.53 
5 1,928,533.11 27,180,638.61 
6 2,361,502.82 33,282,889.56 
 
As in the previous test case, the O&M and investment costs for scenario 1 is zero. By 
investing in a corrective control system or an additional branch, the risk-associated cost 
tends to drop with the increase in investment and O&M costs. The IBSR indicates 
whether the system reliability improvement outweighs the increase in investment and 
O&M costs. It is calculated on a present value basis.   
As is introduced in Chapter 4,   
b aEIC -EICIBSR
ISRI
=        (7.33) 
a a b b
0 0
IC OC IC OCISRI      (£)
(1 ) (1 )
ma mb
t t t t
t t
t ti i= =
+ += −+ +∑ ∑     (7.34) 
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The IBSR result is shown in Figure 7.16. 
 
Figure 7.16: IBSR results for RTS. 
 
The calculation of the IBSR requires a ‘departure status’, i.e., the pre-reinforced system 
status. In Figure 7.16, the ‘departure status’ on which the incremental reinforcement is 
built is the reference scenario; that is, all the reinforcement scenarios (scenarios 2 – 6) 
are considered ‘incremental’ to the reference scenario. Under this circumstance, each 
reinforcement scenario is regarded as a one-off construction in which the IBSR is 
calculated based on the cost data of the reference (pre-reinforcement status) and 
reinforcement scenarios. However, a reinforcement scenario may well be achieved 
through multiple stages in which every step is an individual project. In other words, the 
reinforcement scenario is the result of an accumulative process. Therefore, the IBSR for 
each individual project can be calculated.     
Scenario 5 is investigated under these two circumstances. Figure 7.17 shows the 
difference between the above-mentioned circumstances.  
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Figure 7.17: one-off reinforcement and accumulative reinforcement. 
 
For a ‘one-off construction’,  
0
0
EIC EICIBSR
ISRI
−= 2        (7.35) 
02
2
2 2 0
0 0
2 2
0
IC OC IC OCISRI
(1 ) (1 )
IC OC              (£)
(1 )
mm
t t t
t t
t t
m
t t
t
t
i i
i
= =
=
+ += −+ +
+= +
∑ ∑
∑
0t
     (7.36) 
where the subscripts of , , and  denote the stage numbers (Figure 7.17).  IC OC EIC
0IBSR  is the IBSR for project 0.  
0IBSR 17.22=The IBSR result is shown in Figure 7.16. . 
This result has clear physical meaning. Of each £ of the reinforcement scenario 
incremental cost (comprising investment and O&M costs), the reliability benefit is 
£17.22. The incremental benefit in terms of system reliability clearly outweighs the 
incremental cost by a considerable margin.    
For ‘an accumulative process of reinforcement’, the IBSR for each project is calculated 
as follows:  
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0
1
1
EIC EICIBSR
ISRI
−= 1        (7.37) 
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1 1
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0
IC OCISRI      (£)
(1 )
m
t t
t
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+= +∑       (7.38) 
1
2
2
EIC EICIBSR =
ICCI
2−        (7.39) 
2 1
2 2 1 1
2
0 0
IC OC IC OCISRI      (£)
(1 ) (1 )
m m
t t t t
t t
t ti i= =
+ += −+ +∑ ∑    (7.40) 
where the subscripts of  and  denote the project numbers (Figure 7.17). IBSR ISRI
The results are given below. 
1IBSR 31.20= 2IBSR 0.875= and . 
Project 1 provides a reliability benefit that significantly outweighs the incremental 
investment and O&M cost, whereas project 2 fails to deliver a reliability benefit that 
outweighs the latter. The IBSR ranking therefore follows the order 
. This result is consistent with that shown in 1 0IBSR IBSR IBSR> > 2 Figure 7.14. 
System reliability at stage 2 (under scenario 5) is only slightly higher than that at stage 1. 
The slight improvement in reliability fails to justify the investment in project 2.  
1IBSR  is greater than  because  0IBSR
1) the negligible difference in reliability between states 2 and 1; and  
2) the significantly lower investment and operation cost presented by project 1.  
If no benefit or cost other than the reliability benefit, investment cost, and O&M cost is 
considered, project 2 is economically infeasible. However, the conclusion may differ if 
possible benefits in other aspects are taken into account (e.g., the benefit in reduction of 
line losses and externalities, etc.).  
The two-step reinforcement can also be to first install a TCSC between bus 3 and bus 24, 
and then install an SVC at bus 3, where the former provides negligible reliability benefit 
and the latter provides significant reliability improvement. The calculation is not 
repeated in this research because the same explanation as above applies with the only 
difference that  and  are swapped in the ranking. 1IBSR 2IBSR
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This test case shows that the implementation of FACTS devices slows down the 
deterioration of system reliability in the context of load growth. Such an effect is 
quantified and compared for different scenarios. In this particular case, the 
implementation of FACTS devices improves system reliability more than does the 
traditional reinforcement scenario of installing a duplicated element.   
 
The failure of the central control unit as CCF results in the outage of all FACTS 
devices. The effect of CCF on system reliability is investigated through sensitivity 
analysis. Scenario 5 is the scenario in which more than one FACTS device is deployed 
in the system and is therefore selected for the analysis. The EENS and LINWRI results 
are studied under different failure rates of CCF . The results are shown in Figure 
7.18 and Figure 7.19.  
CCFλ
 
 
Figure 7.18: Effect of the control system failure rate on EENS results. 
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Figure 7.19: Effect of the control system failure rate on LINWRI results. 
 
CCFλ CCFλ 1 occ/year≤ ranges from 0 to 1 occ/year. When (the failure rate of 1 occ/year 
is greater than that of a branch or a FACTS device), it has a negligible effect on the 
EENS and LINWRI results. Take the LINWRI results as an example. The difference in 
LINWRI results for any two different values of   (CCFλ CCFλ 1 occ/year≤ ) is no more 
than 5%. This phenomenon is attributed to two factors:  
1) The failure of FACTS devices does not lead to load curtailment. However, the failure 
of branches alone or the coinciding failure of branches and FACTS devices may lead to 
load curtailment.  
2) The average duration of CCF in a year is no more than 30 hours 
(1 ) or 0.34% of a year (8760 h). The short annual average duration 
makes coincidence with the failure of a branch highly unlikely. Therefore, the 
conclusion is that a reasonably reliable FACTS central control unit with a failure rate of 
the same order as that of a branch has negligible effect on system reliability.     
 occ/year 30 h/occ×
 
7.5 Conclusion 
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The following conclusions are drawn from the study on RTS:  
1) Although the corrective control and traditional reinforcement scenarios slow down 
the deterioration of reliability over years of load growth, this reduction does not 
necessarily translate to a consistent ranking of all the scenarios in terms of reliability in 
all the years. Load level has an effect on the ranking.   
2) For RTS, traditional reinforcement does not provide higher reliability improvement 
than most corrective control scenarios. However, this conclusion is not general but 
depends on individual network.  
3) The traditional reinforcement scenario has a lower IBSR value than most corrective 
control scenarios. This means that most corrective control scenarios are economically 
preferable over traditional reinforcement scenarios.  
4) The IBSR indicates whether a candidate scenario is worth investing in under the 
condition that no benefit or cost other than reliability benefit, investment cost, and 
O&M cost is considered. However, if other benefits such as the reduction in line losses 
are taken into account, along with the benefit in reliability, the IBSR no longer serves as 
an indicator but remains an indispensable index that quantifies the reliability benefit.   
5) The IBSR value depends on the ‘departure status’, i.e., the pre-reinforced status. A 
system reinforcement process can either be a lump project (one-off construction) or 
several small projects (accumulative construction). The IBSR results for each small 
project and those for the lump project are calculated; they indicate whether the 
incremental reliability benefit outweighs the incremental costs (whether IBSR>1). 
Given that a lump project consists of project A and project B in chronological order, 
and that project A has a higher IBSR value than the lump project, this means project B 
has the lowest IBSR value, or is the least cost-effective among the three. 
6) A sensitivity analysis is performed by varying the failure rate of the FACTS control 
system. The maximum failure rate is approximately twice or three times the failure rate 
of a branch. Within this range, the FACTS control system has a negligible effect on 
system reliability.   
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Summary 
 
This chapter focuses on the reliability assessment of power systems that incorporate ES. 
The motivation for implementing ES into power systems and relevant technologies are 
reviewed. The battery energy storage (BES) is modelled, and their effects on system 
reliability are studied through a test case. 
 
8.1 Background 
A traditional idea is that electricity cannot be stored in large quantities; therefore, 
generation and load are balanced at any moment. However, this concept is being 
challenged by the improvements in ES technology, as well as by the growing 
application of ES. 
The purposes of implementing ES differ from case to case. In general, they are 
summarised as follows: 
1) ES replaces some of the costly peak generation units for tackling peak demand, e.g., 
peak shifting [125]. 
2) Generally, ES has a higher ramp rate than do conventional generation units. 
Therefore, it can serve as a substitute for spinning reserves [126, 127]. 
3) ES can be installed at the weak point of a power system to help the system ride 
through a fault of a relatively short duration [126].   
4) ES can be applied to improve power quality and system stability [126, 127].  
5) Installing an ES device at a load centre may serve as a cost-effective alternative to 
investing in a new power line [126].   
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6) With the increasing penetration of intermittent generation, there is a need for ES to 
smooth the output of these generation units for economic and reliability reasons [128]. 
ES may be required in a wind farm for compliance with the grid code of providing 
emergency support (e.g., to absorb excess wind energy when needed). ES can also 
improve the ‘dispatchability’ (the storage lending itself to dispatch, as in conventional 
generation) of intermittent generation.   
 
 
8.2 ES Applications 
 
A few published articles focus on the integration of ES into intermittent generation.  
Different control strategies are proposed for the application of ES in a wind farm [36]. 
These strategies dictate the condition at which ES charges/discharges. The strategy is 
that ES stores energy when excess wind supply is generated and discharges energy 
when wind generation is low. The reliability assessment of the generation system shows 
that system reliability improves after the implementation of ES in the wind farm. 
In previous studies, ES is integrated into wind generation and photovoltaic generation to 
smooth the fluctuating output [129, 130]. The contribution of these types of generation 
(with ES) to generation adequacy is highly dependent on their location. The 
contribution can be significant when the site is rich in wind resources and solar 
radiation. To maintain the same reliability level, a larger capacity of intermittent 
generation is needed than that required in conventional generation to compensate for the 
uncertainty of the former [129]. However, neither paper considers the network. 
The effect of ES on the reliability of a composite system (HLII) with wind generation is 
studied in [19]. The rated capacity of ES has a significant effect on system reliability 
[19]. The limitation, however, is that the reliability of the ES device and its control 
system is not considered.  
Hydrogen energy storage can be used to smooth the output of a wind power system 
[131]. A wide-area energy management system with large-scale ES is used to smooth 
the output of intermittent generation, whose penetration rapidly increases [132]. Several 
options of utility-scale ES technologies are investigated based on a number of criteria 
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such as the ability to frequently change output, range of output, ramp rate, duration 
under rated power output, cost, and technology maturity, etc [132]. 
A number of ES technologies and configurations have been studied for a wind farm in 
[133]. The objective is to reduce the fluctuations in wind generation output. A flywheel, 
BES, and superconducting magnetic energy storage (SMES) are selected. The study 
asserts that both configurations—the aggregated and distributed configurations— 
effectively suppress wind output fluctuations [133].   
A combination of wind, fuel cell (FC), and UCAP systems for sustained power 
generation at varying wind speeds is introduced in [134], in which the dynamic model 
of the hybrid power is proposed. The FC supplies the required load when wind 
generation is insufficient, while UCAP further supplies power for a short period when 
FC reaches its rated power. The configuration demonstrates a stable output under highly 
fluctuating wind speed and load. This feature makes this type of generation a promising 
candidate for power supply at non-interconnected remote areas.  
A combination of wind turbine, battery, and UCAP is used to produce predictable 
power output for a given time interval in [135]. The battery can serve as backup to the 
generation during temporary wind deficiencies for an interval of up to 10 minutes, while 
UCAP manages transient peak power to protect the battery.    
Apart from being applied in intermittent generation, ES can also be integrated into 
FACTS devices for more robust and flexible control than FACTS alone. Battery storage 
(BS) is integrated into a STATCOM to improve dynamic stability and to increase 
transmission capability [136]. The independent control of active and reactive powers 
renders a STATCOM/BES improved capability to damp oscillations as well as perform 
dynamic power flow control [76, 136, 137]. An integrated design of UCAP with a 
voltage source converter is proposed in [138]. Its function includes power quality 
enhancement, voltage and frequency stabilisation, and power transfer capacity 
enhancement. Similarly, a combined STATCOM and super capacitor energy storage 
system (SCESS) for application in wind farms is proposed in [102]. The purpose is to 
stabilise wind generation output. The control function for a STATCOM/SCESS is 
decoupled into reactive and active power control. Results show that the combined 
device can stabilise both the wind output and grid voltage.   
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8.3 ES technologies 
 
This section reviews various ES technologies including BES, pumped hydro storage, 
compressed air energy storage (CAES), flywheel storage, SMES, and supercapacitor 
energy storage [139]. 
The following criteria are used in classifying ES technologies [140]:  
1) physically fixed or mobile type of application; 
2) discharge duration: short-term storage (<1 min), medium-term storage (from a 
few minutes to a couple of hours), and long-term storage (from hours to 
months); and 
3) maximum discharge power. 
In this project, ES technologies are assigned into different categories according to their 
discharge durations. The main characteristics of each type of ES are its storage capacity, 
power output, discharge duration, number of cycles, efficiency, self-discharge, and 
technological maturity, etc [140]. 
A typical BES includes lead acid, lithium, nickel cadmium, sodium-sulphur, vanadium 
redox, and zinc bromine batteries. Their performance levels are summarised in Table 
8.1 [48, 94]. 
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Table 8.1: Summary of various types of BES 
 Lead acid Sodium-
sulphur 
Lithium Zinc bromine 
Maximum power  Multiple tens 
of MW 
MW level Tens of kW Hundreds of kW 
Energy density 
(Wh/kg) 
35 to 50 150 to 240 150 to 200 34–54 
Power density 
(W/kg) 
75 to 300 90 to 230 200 to 315 20 to 60 
Cycle life 500 to 1,500 2,500 1,000 to 
10,000+ 
>2000 
Charge/discharge 
Energy 
Efficiency  
80%  90%≤  95%  70%  
Storage duration Medium term: 
hour level 
Medium 
term: a few 
hours 
Medium term: a 
few hours 
Medium term: 
a couple of hours 
Annotations 1) Lead is not 
environment 
friendly 
2) Limited 
cycle life 
3) Widely 
applied in 
utilities  
Operate at a 
temperature 
of 300 to 
350  °C  
1) Limited 
maximum 
power 
2) Immature for 
utility 
application. 
In the first stage of 
commercialisation.
 
Vanadium redox is a promising type of BES for application in the grid because 
1) compared with the poisonous lead acid battery, it is environment friendly [95]; 
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2) it produces a MW-level power that is sufficient for grid application; and 
3) it has a longer life cycle and higher efficiency than does the lead acid battery.  
However, as a relatively new technology compared with the widely commercialised lead 
acid battery, whether vanadium redox is technically mature enough for large-scale 
industrial application and whether it is economically viable remain concerns for this 
technology.   
Apart from BES, pumped hydro storage is another traditional type of ES normally used for 
load balancing. It pumps the water to a higher reservoir during off-peak periods and later 
releases it through generation turbines during peak periods. The maximum power it 
produces (at least hundreds of MW) and the maximum energy it stores are considerably 
greater than those of most types of ES [96].  However, it requires 1) a geographically 
suitable site characterised by water-rich resources and levelled terrain; and 2) an investment 
of up to billions of US dollars, including the costs of land, tunnels, generation facilities, and 
labour [96].  
Compressed Air Energy Storage (CAES) is another form of ES. It compresses air at high 
pressure in an airtight underground cavern or aquifer during off-peak hours and de-
pressurises the air, which is then heated and slowly released through a generation turbine to 
generate electricity when required [48]. CAES has the following advantages [97]: 
1) It can supply a substantial amount of power of up to hundreds of MW.  
2) The start-up time is around 10 minutes, faster than a conventional peak plant with a 
combustion turbine. 
However, the feasibility of CAES depends on geographical conditions. A large 
underground cavern is required, which limits CAES application.   
A flywheel converts electrical energy to kinetic energy when charged, and vice versa when 
discharged. It is used as short-term storage with a significantly larger number of life cycles 
compared with a BES. This project does not include flywheel storage because the analysis 
is conducted on the steady-state model of power systems requiring at least medium-term 
storage with a discharge duration of up to several hours. 
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SMES stores magnetic energy through superconducting coils under very low temperature 
maintained by liquid helium [139]. It exhibits a high efficiency of up to 90% and provides 
fast response down to microseconds. However, because of the technical barrier to SMES 
(i.e., the cooling requirement), this technology is still in the laboratory testing stage. One of 
the ongoing research directions is to identify a material that becomes superconductive at a 
relatively ‘high’ temperature (up to a hundred Kelvin) [139].  
Another type of ES is the supercapacitor also called UCAP or electric double layer 
capacitor. Its capacitance is much greater than that of traditional capacitors (reaching up to 
400 F for a standard UCAP) [58, 59]. The pros and cons of UCAP are summarised in Table 
8.2. 
 
 
Table 8.2: Summary of the pros and cons of UCAP. 
Advantages Disadvantages 
1) A large number of life circles, up to 
millions of times 
2) Fast charge and discharge, completed 
in seconds 
3) High efficiency 
4) Environment friendly 
5) High power density, 
approximately  
1) Low energy density, <15 Wh/kg 
2) Subject to self-discharge 
4,000 W/kg
 
Given its low energy density and high-power density feature, UCAP is applied as a short-
term power booster.  
A summary of different types of ES technologies is provided in Table 8.3.
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Table 8.3: Summary of different types of ES technologies 
Storage Technology Battery Pumped hydro Fly wheel 
Maximum energy 
stored < 200 MWh < 24000 MWh < 100 kWh 
Power output level < 30 MW < 2000 MW < 100 kW 
Discharge duration  
at maximum power 1 – 8 hours 12 hours Minutes to 1 hour 
Response time 30 ms 30 ms 5 ms 
AC to AC efficiency 60%–80 % 70%–80 % 80%– 85 % 
Economic life 2–10 yrs 40 yrs 20 yrs 
Technological maturity 
In industrial
application 
 In industrial
application 
 Envisioned for industrial 
application 
 
Storage Technology CAES SMES UCAP 
Maximum energy 
stored 400 – 7200 MWh 0.6 kWh N/A 
Power output level 100–300 MW 200 kW N/A 
Discharge duration at 
maximum power 4–24 hours Several seconds Several seconds 
Response time 3–15 mins 5 ms 5 ms 
AC to AC efficiency 85% 90% 90% 
Economic life 30 yrs 40 yrs 40 yrs 
Technological maturity 
In industrial 
application In laboratory state 
Envisioned for 
industrial 
application 
* N/A - No currently available data.  
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Extended from the original version in [126]. 
 
8.4 Configuration of an ES device 
 
A typical ES device comprises three parts: the central storage, power transformation system 
(PTS), and charge-discharge control system (CDCS) [125]. 
The central storage is the storage vessel (e.g., the battery bank, a reservoir, etc.).  
The PTS serves as the power interface between the central storage and power system. It 
performs AC/DC conversion and voltage magnitude transformation.  
The CDCS performs necessary control functions for ES.  
A general structure for ES is shown in Figure 8.1 [125]. 
 
 
Figure 8.1: General structure of ES. 
 
From a comprehensive literature survey, the author finds that relatively few studies have 
been devoted to power system reliability (considering the network) in which ES devices are 
incorporated into the system. In this chapter, the state space models of a BES and that of a 
BES integrated with a STATCOM are developed and applied to the reliability assessment 
process, along with the control system failure. The new reliability indices proposed in 
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previous chapters are applied to express the reliability and incremental benefit of system 
reinforcement. 
 This chapter looks into the following questions:     
1) How much reliability improvement ES devices bring to the power system? 
2) Is the implementation of ES economically preferable over the traditional reinforcement 
scenario? 
 
 
 
8.5 Physical and State Space Models of BES 
The state space model for the BES is derived. A BES consists of multiple banks, and it can 
operate at a derated state (partial failure state). However, the failures of all the banks, or the 
failure of either the power interface (PI) or the CDCS causes BES failure. Therefore, a 
combined parallel-series block diagram is applied to the BES, as shown in Figure 8.2. 
 
Figure 8.2: Block diagram of BES. 
 
For a multi-bank BES, the BES can reside in any one of these states: the normal state, 
derated states, and outage state. In this paper, it is assumed that only one derated state exists 
for BES, which has only two banks. The number of derated states does not affect the 
fundamental idea of the state space model.  
The full state space model of BES is derived based on the following assumptions: 
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1) All repair jobs restore the full functionality of the BES. There is no ‘partial repair’, in 
which some of its components remain inoperative.  
2) When both banks are down, the BES is disconnected and no further outage develops.  
3) When the PI or CDCS is down, the BES is disconnected and no further outage develops. 
The full state space model is shown in Figure 8.3. 
 
Figure 8.3: Full state space model of a BES with two banks. 
 
The abbreviations in Figure 8.3 are explained as follows: 
B1: Bank 1; 
B2: Bank 2; 
U: Up; 
D: Down. 
BES can be integrated with a STATCOM. The combined STATCOM/BES can 
independently output real and reactive power [136]. Furthermore, the combination 
improves oscillation damping. Its block diagram is shown in Figure 8.4 [141]. 
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Figure 8.4: Block diagram of STATCOM/BES [141]. 
 
A STATCOM/BES consists of a self-contained BES, PI between STATCOM and BES (a 
DC–DC converter), STATCOM (VSI), and coupling transformer [141]. The failure of 
either the PI or BES results in the BES being disconnected and the device running as a pure 
STATCOM. The failure of the STATCOM induces the failure of the entire 
STATCOM/BES. The state space of the STATCOM/BES is shown in Figure 8.5 (all the 
abbreviations are the same as those in Figure 8.3). Such a state space model inherits all the 
assumptions on which the BES model is based. The full list of assumptions is given below. 
1)  All repair jobs restore the full functionality of the STATCOM/BES. In other words, 
there is no ‘partial repair’, in which some of the components remain inoperative.     
2) The outage of both of the banks, CDCS, or the PI causes the BES to be 
disconnected. Under this circumstance, the device runs as a pure STATCOM.  
3) When the STATCOM is down, the STATCOM/BES becomes inoperative and no 
further component outage occurs. 
The full state space model of the STATCOM/BES is depicted in Figure 8.5. 
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Figure 8.5: State space model of STATCOM/BES. 
 
The above-mentioned state space model can be further simplified into four states: 
1) The BES and STATCOM are both working normally, corresponding to state 1 in 
Figure 8.5. 
2) The BES is in the derated state and STATCOM is in the normal state, 
corresponding to states 3 and 4 in Figure 8.5. 
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3) The BES is completely down and the STATCOM is in the normal state, 
corresponding to states 5, 6, 11–15 in Figure 8.5. 
4) The STATCOM is down resulting in the outage of the STATCOM/BES, 
corresponding to all states except those mentioned in 1) – 3). 
The four-state model is shown in Figure 8.6. 
 
Figure 8.6: Simplified state space model of STATCOM/BES. 
 
The state space corresponds to a Markov process. The transitional probability matrix is 
derived as  
1 2 5 2 1 5
2 2 4 6 6
1 1
5 5
1 (λ +λ λ ) λ λ
μ 1 (μ λ λ ) λ λ
μ 0 1 (μ λ ) λ
μ 0 0 1 μ
TransP
t t t
t t t
t t
t t
=
− + Δ Δ Δ Δ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥Δ − + + Δ Δ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥Δ − +⎢ ⎥Δ −⎣ ⎦
4
3 3
λ t
t
t
Δ
Δ Δ
Δ
 (8.1)  
where  is a very small time interval.  tΔ
The matrix multiplication method has been used in assessing the probabilities of residing in 
each of the four states [12]. The probability of existing in state i is denoted as   and the 
device is initially assumed to be in state 1. The steady-state probability vector is therefore 
iP
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         (8.2) 1 2 3 4
[ ]
   [1 0 0 0] nTrans
P P P P P
P
=
=
where subscript n is a sufficiently large number. 
In this project, the STATCOM/BES runs as a spinning reserve that remains on standby 
during normal conditions; it provides real and reactive power output when a fault occurs in 
the system. The real and reactive power output of the STATCOM/BES at any moment is 
determined through the following procedures:  
1) If the stored energy is depleted, the real power output is zero. However, the reactive 
power output from the STATCOM component is determined by an optimisation 
algorithm to minimise the cost of load curtailment. 
2) If there is stored energy, the real and reactive power output are controlled by the 
central control unit. An optimisation algorithm for minimising the cost of load 
curtailment is then called. However, the real power output should be lower than the 
maximum power output level. The reactive power output is bounded by the output 
limit of the STATCOM.  
Immediately after the system returns to normal status, the STATCOM/BES begins charging 
itself until it reaches full energy.   
The AC optimisation model is given below  
        (8.3) min CCDF( )CurLP
subject to 
 
      (8.4)     ( , )Cur injGi Li Li ESSi iP P P P P V θ− + + =
STATCOM ( , )
Cur inj
Gi Li Li i iQ Q Q Q Q V θ− + + =      (8.5)      
                                                                        (8.6) maxij ijS S<
                                                 (8.7) min maxi i iV V V< <
0 CurLiP P< <    Li                                                       (8.8) 
 
Cur
Li Li Li
Cur
Li Li Li
P P P
Q Q Q
− =−                                                  (8.9)    
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i
            (8.10) max0 ESSi ESSP P< <
          (8.11) min maxSTATCOM STATCOM STATCOMi iQ Q Q≤ ≤
where 
,Li LiP Q     Active and reactive load at bus i; 
,Gi GiP Q     Active and reactive generation at bus i; 
,Cur CurLi LiP Q  Active and reactive load curtailment at bus i; 
,inj inji iP Q    Active and reactive power injection at bus i; 
  Load flows at branch ij; ijS
,i iV θ                 Voltage magnitude and angle at bus i;    
ESSiP ,  The active power output of BES and its upper limit.  
max
ESSP
min max
STATCOM STATCOM STATCOM, ,Q Q Q  The reactive power output, the lower limit of the reactive 
power output and the upper limit of the reactive power output of the STATCOM, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
8.6 Case Study 
Two test systems are investigated in this chapter. These are the 6-bus RBTS and 24-bus 
Modified Reliability Test System (MRTS).  
 
8.6.1 RBTS 
 
The first test system is the RBTS, whose topology is provided in [142]. 
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The bus voltage constraint and branch transfer capacity limit are taken into account. Power 
line failures, STATCOM/BES failures, and central control unit failure are considered. The 
failure of generation units is not considered in the case study for the following reasons: 
1) the focus is on network reliability; that is, the reliability of passing the electrical 
energy from generation units to load buses; and 
2) power lines are generally more reliable than generation units. Considering the 
generation unit failure may mask network risk, which is the primary concern of this 
study. 
All relevant data are given in Appendix D. The central control unit failure results in the 
outage of all STATCOM/BES devices. STATCOM/BES devices provide active and reactive 
power support under contingencies and remains on standby under normal conditions. The 
charging and discharging efficiencies of the BES are both 90%. The dynamic behaviours of 
BES are not considered. 
Hourly loads over a year are discretised into 10 levels. Multiple load levels are used in this 
test case because these are necessary for the modelling of wind generation. The loads of all 
the buses are assumed to be fully correlated. The annual load growth rate is assumed to be 
2.5% and the simulation covers up to 10 years from the base case at year 1.   
LINWRI in this particular test case is defined as follows: 
ref ref
EENS AAODLINWRI 0.8 0.2
EENS AAOD
= +      (8.12) 
 
The location of the STATCOM/BES is decided by enumeration.  
1) First, a number of candidate cases are defined by placing a STATCOM/BES at 
different PQ buses for different cases. For the RBTS, the number of candidate cases 
is 4 because this is the number of PQ buses in this system. 
2) The reliability of each candidate case is assessed by state enumeration up to the first 
order considering only power line failures.  
3) The candidate case with the highest reliability is selected.  
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Therefore, four scenarios are defined as follows:  
1) the base scenario, i.e., the ‘doing nothing at all’ scenario; 
2) a STATCOM/BES located at bus 6; 
3) a wind farm with a STATCOM/BES located at bus 6; and,  
4) the scenario with a duplicated branch connecting buses 5 and 6.  
At this stage, the central control unit is assumed to be 100% reliable for scenarios 2 and 3. 
The hourly wind speed profile over a year is plotted in Figure 8.7. 
 
Figure 8.7: the wind speed hourly profile over a year. 
 
The output of each wind turbine is the function of wind speed as given below: 
rated
0                   
K b           
( ) P            
0                    
c
c
r f
f
v v
v v v
p v v v v
v v
≤⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪+ ≤ ≤⎪ ⎪= ⎨ ≤ ≤⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪≥⎩ ⎭
rv ⎬
W
      (8.13) 
where  , , , 5 m/scv = 15 m/srv = 25 m/sfv = ratedP 20 k= , 
K Prated /( )r cv v= −        
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b K cv= −and . 
The number of wind turbines is , and the array coefficient is 64N = 0.6α = . Therefore, the 
output of the wind farm is 
( )P N p vα= i           (8.14) 
 
The EENS results from CMCS for the four scenarios are shown in Figure 8.8. 
 
Figure 8.8: EENS results for the four scenarios. 
 
The results for annual average outage duration (AAOD) are illustrated in Figure 8.9. 
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Figure 8.9: AAOD results for the four scenarios. 
  
The LINWRI results are shown in Figure 8.10. 
 
Figure 8.10: LINWRI results for the four scenarios. 
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Figure 8.8, Figure 8.9, and Figure 8.10 clearly show the improvement in reliability brought 
about by the STATCOM/BES and traditional reinforcement compared with the reference 
scenario. According to Figure 8.8, scenario 1 has the highest EENS (a negative contribution 
to overall reliability) and scenario 4 has the lowest EENS in any given year. However, no 
consistent ranking is observed between scenarios 2 and 3. They exhibit almost the same 
level of EENS before year 8 with a difference of less than 5%. In years 9 and 10, scenario 2 
has a lower EENS than does scenario 3.  
A similar phenomenon can be observed from the LINWRI results in Figure 8.10. Scenario 
1 exhibits the lowest LINWRI value (poorest overall reliability), whereas scenario 4 has the 
highest at any given year. Scenarios 2 and 3 show mid-level values, which do not reflect a 
consistent ranking.  
The AAOD results for scenarios 1 and 4 do not increase monotonically over years but are 
rather capped at a certain level, whereas those for scenarios 2 and 3 are lower than that of 
scenario 1 but higher than that of scenario 4 in any given year. The reason for this ‘capped’ 
phenomenon is that AAOD is defined as the average number of hours in a year when load 
is curtailed. A fault in the system does not always lead to load curtailment, whereas load 
curtailment always confirms the existence of a fault (at least one power line/transformer is 
down) in the system. Therefore, the theoretical maximum value of AAOD is the total 
number of hours in a year when a fault occurs in the system. However, AAOD is generally 
much lower than the theoretical maximum value because of the ability of the system to ride 
through the fault without load curtailment. The number of hours with faults in a year is 
determined by the failure rate of network components rather than the load level, and does 
not rise with load growth. Therefore, AAOD is capped at this value.       
In this case, the unacceptable level of system reliability is defined as LINWRI 0.4= − , 
corresponding to the reliability level in year 5 under scenario 1. This is the level at which 
traditional network reinforcement should be immediately applied. The effect of 
transmission investment deferral is therefore directly obtained from Figure 8.10; the 
deferrals under scenarios 2 and 3 are both 3 years. In other words, scenarios 2 and 3 delay 
the system from dropping to the unacceptable reliability level by 3 years. This result is 
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based on an annual load growth rate of 2.5%. The deferral can be more significant under a 
more conservative estimation of the load growth rate.  
An economic analysis is conducted in the same manner as that introduced in Chapter 7.  
The investment cost for each scenario, except scenario 1, is assumed to be paid off in five 
equal yearly installments. The investment cost is converted to a present value by 
1 (1 )      (£)
niIC In
i
−− +=         (8.15) 
            investment cost IC
             installment In
i                discount rate 
n               number of payments 
Similarly, the present value of O&M cost is given by 
1 (1 )       (£)
m
annual
iOC O
i
−− +=        (8.16) 
  
              present value of operation cost OC
annualO           annual operation cost 
m                  economic life 
The present value of the risk-associated cost is given by 
1 (1 )       (£)
m
annual
iR R
i
−− +=         (8.17) 
  
R               present value of risk-associated cost 
annualR          annual risk associated cost 
m                the maximum number of years considered in the simulation 
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The annual risk-associated cost is calculated from load curtailment using the customer 
damage function (CDF). In this test case, the CDF is defined as the function of outage 
duration (CDF is in £/MW; t  is in hours):  
10,000  1
CDF ( )      
6,000 1
t
f t
t
≤⎧⎪= = ⎨⎪ >⎩
           (8.18) 
Therefore, the risk-associated cost in year  is j LOL   CDF( )j i
i
iR t=∑ i , where LOL 
denotes load curtailment. Subscript  denotes the ith loss of load in year . i j
The annual risk-associated cost is given by  
1       (£/year)
N
j
j
annual
R
R
N
==
∑
        (8.19) 
where  is the total number of years simulated.  N
The discount rate is assumed to be 5% and the economic life for each FACTS device or the 
extra line is 25 years. 
According to [143], the investment cost of a 230kV power line ranges from $ 0.3m to 
$1.6m/mile. For a power line with a length of 100 miles, it is reasonable to assume an 
investment consisting of 10 equal instalments where each instalment is £30m.  
According to [144], the investment cost for BES ranges from $0.17 to $1.50/Wh. For a BES 
with a maximum energy of 40MWh, the investment cost therefore falls in the range of $ 
6.8m to $ 60m. This project assumes a STATCOM/BES investment consisting of 10 equal 
instalments with each having a value of £7m.  
The investment costs are given in Table 8.4. 
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Table 8.4: Investment costs for RBTS 
Scenario No. Value of each instalment (£k) Present value of investment cost 
(£k) 
1 0 0 
2 7,000 54,052.14 
3 10,000 77,217.35 
4 30,000 231,652.05 
 
According to [3], the O&M cost is assumed to be a fixed percentage of investment cost. In 
this project, the O&M cost of a reinforcement scenario is assumed to be between 0.1% to 
2% of the investment cost (present values).  
The O&M costs are presented in Table 8.5. 
Table 8.5: O&M costs of for RBTS 
Scenario No. Annual O&M cost 
(£k) 
Present value of O&M cost (£k) 
1 0 0 
2 60 845.64 
3 100 1,409.39 
4 20 281.88 
 
The risk-associated costs are presented in Table 8.6. The annual risk-associated cost is 
calculated from the reliability assessment algorithm.  
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Table 8.6: Risk-associated costs for RBTS 
Scenario No. Annual risk-associated cost 
(£k) 
Present value of risk-associated cost 
(£k) 
1 1,447.47 20,400.53 
2 982.32 13,844.73 
3 878.54 12,382.07 
4 544.24 7,670.54 
 
The cost structure is shown in Figure 8.11. 
 
Figure 8.11: Cost structure for RBTS. 
 
The IBSR results are plotted in Figure 8.12. 
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Figure 8.12: IBSR results for RBTS. 
 
According to the cost structure, the investment cost takes up the largest proportion (>70%) 
of total cost, followed by risk-associated and O&M costs for scenarios 2, 3, and 4. The 
O&M cost for each scenario is negligible in the long term within the economic life of the 
reinforcement scenario. 
That IBSR is lower under scenario 3 than under scenario 2 is a reasonable result. According 
to Figure 8.10, the reliability improvement brought about by the wind farm (i.e., that from 
scenarios 2 to 3) is negligible. Such reliability improvement fails to justify the extra 
investment (42.6% more from scenario 2) in the wind farm.  
The lowest IBSR value of scenario 4 confirms that although the traditional reinforcement 
scenario provides the highest improvement in system reliability in this test case, the 
prohibitive amount of investment cost fails to provide a comparable reliability benefit.   
In this case, the IBSR results for all the reinforcement scenarios indicate that investment 
cost outweighs the reliability benefit, i.e., the reduction in risk-associated cost. This result is 
consistent with the trend of total cost. The ranking of total cost in increasing order is 
scenario 1, 2, 3, and 4.  
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On the basis of the IBSR results, the conclusion can be drawn that none of the 
reinforcement scenarios is economically worthwhile given that the only benefit considered 
is reliability benefit. A discussion of this conclusion is presented. 
1) The number of load levels and average load as input data have significant effects on 
system reliability. In the test case in Chapter 7, a single peak load level is used, and the 
IBSR results exceed 1 for some of the reinforcement scenarios. However, in this test case, 
multiple load levels are used in which the peak load occurs for no more than 5% of the total 
hours in a year. The lower average load level and shorter duration of peak load result in a 
system that is less likely to suffer from load losses. Given that the system is already highly 
reliable under multiple load levels, the reliability improvement brought by the system 
reinforcement scenarios is not as significant.    
2) The only benefit considered in this research is the reliability benefit. Other types of 
benefits, such as the benefit of transmission investment deferral, benefit from incentive 
policies, and externalities, are not considered. The IBSR corresponds only to the reliability 
benefit.  
The effect of the central control unit failure on system reliability is investigated as follows. 
Scenario 2 with different levels of central control unit reliability is studied. The failure rate 
of the central control unit is denoted as .  Cλ
i) Scenario 2 with , i.e., the perfectly reliable case; Cλ 0 occ/year=
ii) Scenario 2 with ;  Cλ 0.2 occ/year=
iii) Scenario 2 with ;  Cλ 0.6 occ/year=
iv) Scenario 2 with . Cλ 5 occ/year=
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Figure 8.13: EENS for RBTS with STATCOM/BES. 
 
 
Figure 8.14: AAOD for RBTS with STATCOM/BES. 
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Figure 8.15: LINWRI results for RBTS with STATCOM/BES and control system of 
different reliability levels. 
 
According to Figure 8.14, scenario 2 with a fully reliable control system shows a trend of 
greater AAOD than that with failure rate of 0.2 occ/year. However, it does not prove a 
systematic feature of the control system. A detailed explanation is given below: 
1) Due to the stochastic nature of Monte Carlo, it is impossible for results from 
different times of simulations to be exactly the same. From the practice of 
simulations, the author has found that results are tolerable if they fall within a band 
of ± 5%. This band of ± 5% means that the maximum difference of two results of 
the same scenario of the same year could be up to 10%.   
2) Reliability assessment based on Monte Carlo consists of two steps: the first is 
sequential sampling; the second is state analysis. Once a sequence of system 
behaviours is sampled in the first step, it is used for all years. Therefore, this may 
result in the same ‘trend’ for all years which should not be interpreted as a 
systematic feature of the control system. Rather, it results from the calculation 
procedure. 
3) In the simulation, some variables exhibit a higher level of convergence whereas 
others do not. For example, EENS results from different times of simulations fall 
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into a slightly narrower band than AAOD results, showing a higher level of 
convergence than the latter. As a composite index, LINWRI results show a medium 
level of convergence among EENS and AAOD.    
4) Conducting the simulation for multiple times and calculating the average result are 
likely to enhance accuracy but at the cost of increased computational burden, if all 
given parameters were accurate, which is hardly the case in reality. The author 
concludes that the bottleneck to accuracy is the error in prediction of future load 
level, rather than the stochastic nature of MCS. Therefore, in practice, it is rather 
meaningless to improve the accuracy of non-bottleneck while leaving the bottleneck 
unrelieved. 
 
The effect of control system failure on system reliability is negligible when the failure rate 
of the central control unit is no greater than 0.6 occ/year. The slight variation in system 
reliability caused by different  values is shadowed by the stochastic nature of CMCS.  Cλ
To demonstrate the effect, a theoretical (unrealistic) high failure rate (i.e., 5 occ/year) is 
proposed, under which the change in EENS from the ‘perfectly reliable case’ is between 
3% (occurring in year 5) to 11% (occurring in year 1), and the change in AAOD from the 
‘perfectly reliable case’ is between 8% (occurring in year 4) to 12% (occurring in year 1). 
A significantly unreliable central control unit compromises the effect of transmission 
investment deferral, i.e., reduces the years of transmission investment deferral. For the 
‘perfectly reliable case’, system reliability diminishes to the unacceptable level in year 9, 
corresponding to a deferral of more than 3 years (Figure 8.10). For case iv where 
, system reliability diminishes to the unacceptable level in year 8, indicating 
that the transmission investment deferral is reduced to 3 years.  
Cλ 5 occ/year=
From this case study, the control system failure does not have a significant effect on system 
reliability if its reliability is comparable to that of the power line.   
 
8.6.2 Modified Reliability Test System (MRTS) 
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The Modified IEEE 24 bus Reliability Test System (MRTS-24) is used as another test case 
[145]. Relevant data are provided in Appendix E.  
The bus voltage constraint and branch transfer capacity limit are taken into account. The 
power line failures, STATCOM/BES failure, and central control unit failure are considered. 
The central control unit failure causes the outage of all the STATCOM/BES devices. The 
STATCOM/BES provides active and reactive power support under contingencies, but 
remains on standby under normal conditions. The charging and discharging efficiencies of 
the BES are both 90%. The dynamic behaviours of BES are not considered. 
The load profile is the same as that in the RBTS. The loads of all the buses are assumed to 
be fully correlated. The annual load growth rate is assumed to be 2.5% and the simulation 
covers up to 10 years from the base case at year 1.  
Four scenarios are defined for this test case: 
1) no corrective control; 
2) a STATCOM/BES at bus 3; 
3) a STATCOM/BES at buses 3 and 9; and 
4) a duplicated element between bus 3 and bus 24. 
LINWRI is defined in the same manner as in the RBTS case. 
The EENS results are shown in Figure 8.16. 
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Figure 8.16:  EENS results for MRTS. 
 
The AAOD results are illustrated in Figure 8.17. 
 
Figure 8.17: AAOD results for MRTS. 
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The LINWRI results are shown in Figure 8.18. 
 
Figure 8.18: LINWRI results for MRTS. 
 
The reliability improvement brought forth by scenarios 2 and 3 is clearly observable, 
although not as significant as that by scenario 4 (i.e., the traditional reinforcement 
scenario). By relieving the stress in the bottleneck, the duplicated element between buses 3 
and 24 can significantly improve system reliability. 
At any given year, the ranking of all the scenarios with respect to system reliability in 
decreasing order is scenario 4, 3, 2, and 1.  
The unacceptable level of system reliability is defined at . Given this level, 
the effect of transmission investment deferral is imperceptible under scenarios 2 and 3, 
which reflect deferrals by 1 and 2 years, respectively. This confirms that a 2.5% annual 
load growth is sufficiently large to cause rapid degradation in system reliability over years 
(Figure 8.18). The reinforcement scenarios that implement the STATCOM/BES in this test 
case enable limited capability in counterbalancing the effect of continued load growth.  
LINWRI 0.5= −
The discount rate is assumed to be 5% and the economic life for each STATCOM/BES 
device or the extra line is 25 years. 
The investment costs are given in Table 8.7. 
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Table 8.7: Investment costs for MRTS 
Scenario No. Value of each instalment (£k) Present value of investment cost (£) 
1 0 0 
2 7,000 54,052.14 
3 14,000 108,104.29 
4 30,000 231,652.05 
 
 
The O&M costs are presented in Table 8.8. 
Table 8.8: O&M costs for MRTS 
Scenario No. Annual O&M cost 
(£k) 
Present value of O&M cost (£k) 
1 0 0 
2 60 845.64 
3 120 1,691.27 
4 20 281.88 
 
The risk-associated costs are presented in Table 8.9. 
Table 8.9: Risk-associated costs for MRTS 
Scenario No. Annual risk-associated cost 
(£k) 
Present value of risk-associated cost 
(£k) 
1 8,242.94 116,175.52 
2 5,792.63 81,641.07 
3 5,080.63 71,606.18 
4 2,640.57 37,215.98 
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The cost structure is given in Figure 8.19. 
 
Figure 8.19: Cost structure for MRTS. 
 
The IBSR results are presented in Figure 8.20. 
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Figure 8.20: IBSR results for MRTS. 
 
The O&M cost is negligible throughout the economic life of the reinforcement scenario. In 
scenario 2, the risk-associated cost is greater than the investment cost, whereas the opposite 
holds true for scenarios 3 and 4.   
The IBSR results show a similar trend to that observed in the RBTS case. The extra 
investment in scenario 3 over scenario 2 outweighs the reliability benefits. Compared with 
scenario 2, scenario 3 incurs an extra investment cost of £54.05 M, which brings a 
reduction in risk-associated cost of £10.04 M. This results in scenario 3 having a higher 
total cost and a lower IBSR value than scenario 2. Despite providing the highest reliability 
improvement, scenario 4 has the lowest IBSR value because of its prohibitive investment 
cost. The IBSR results indicate that none of the reinforcement scenarios provide a 
reliability benefit that outweighs the investment cost. 
The effect of the central control unit failure on system reliability is investigated as follows. 
Scenario 3 with different levels of central control unit reliability is considered. The failure 
rate of the central control unit is denoted as .  Cλ
i) Scenario 3 with   Cλ 0.2 occ/year=
ii) Scenario 3 with   Cλ 0.6 occ/year=
iii) Scenario 3 with  Cλ 1 occ/year=
The EENS, AAOD, and LINWRI results are shown in Figure 8.21, Figure 8.22 and Figure 
8.23, respectively.  
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Figure 8.21. EENS results for sensitivity analysis of MRTS. 
 
Figure 8.22: AAOD results for sensitivity analysis of MRTS. 
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Figure 8.23: LINWRI results for sensitivity analysis of MRTS. 
 
The effect of the central control unit failure on system reliability is imperceptible. In any 
given year, the difference in EENS ranges from 1% to 4%. The difference in AAOD ranges 
from 1.7% to 4.7%. Such differences fail to verify a credible ranking because of the 
stochastic nature of CMCS. The reason for this negligible effect is that the short annual 
average duration (less than 16 hours per year) of the central control unit failure makes 
coincidence with the failure of a branch highly unlikely. 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
 
Both test cases have shown the effect of load growth on power system reliability. A 
compounded load growth at a rate of 2.5% causes considerable degradation of system 
reliability over a decade. The quantitative results of system reliability over years are highly 
dependent on the estimated rate of load growth because of the compounding effect in the 
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long term. To obtain a more accurate and realistic load growth rate, tremendous effort is 
required in surveying, data filtering, and modelling.   
The improvement in power system reliability brought about by the STATCOM/BES and 
traditional reinforcement has been demonstrated in both cases. In each case, 
STATCOM/BES implementation causes a transmission investment deferral of no more 
than five years, which is not significant given the load growth rate of 2.5%. The effect of 
duplicating a network element at a critical (often stressed) corridor on system reliability is 
also demonstrated. In both test cases, the traditional reinforcement scenario provides the 
highest improvement to system reliability among all the candidate reinforcement scenarios.   
Compared with the study in Chapter 7, the number of load levels used in the simulation has 
a significant effect on system reliability and IBSR. Using multiple load levels rather than a 
single peak load level may result in a considerably higher system reliability level and a 
lower reliability improvement by the reinforcement scenarios.  
An economic assessment has been carried out on both test systems in which three types of 
costs are considered, i.e., the investment, O&M, and risk-associated costs. These costs are 
converted to present values. The IBSR index indicates whether a reinforcement scenario 
brings reliability benefit that outweighs the investment and O&M costs and the extent of 
such outweighing. In both test systems, all the reinforcement scenarios have an IBSR value 
below 1. The investment and O&M costs of these scenarios outweigh the reliability benefit. 
Although the traditional reinforcement scenarios provide the highest improvement in 
system reliability over the study period in the two test systems, they correspond to the 
lowest IBSR results. When no benefits other than the reliability benefit are considered, they 
are the least favourable scenarios in terms of cost benefit. However, the IBSR quantifies 
reliability benefit only. Other benefits, such as transmission investment deferral, incentive 
policies, externalities, etc., may have to be assessed depending on assumption.   
The effect of the central control unit failure on system reliability is generally negligible 
when its failure rate is comparable to that of the line. Its negative effect on power system 
reliability is revealed given an incredibly large failure rate.   
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Summary 
This chapter gives an overview of the project followed by a summary of contributions and 
achievements of this research. Then future work is suggested. 
 
 
 
 
9.1 Key Conclusions 
This research has studied the impact of corrective control on power system reliability and 
whether corrective control is economically favourable over preventive control considering 
risk-associated cost. The three means of corrective control considered in this research are 
FACTS, DR and ES. AM on the distribution level is a joint application of SVC and ES. 
The following conclusions have been drawn from the research:  
• AM increases the maximum capacity of wind generation that can be connected to 
the network. The extent of this increase depends on the configuration of AM: a key 
function is the wind generation output control (WGOC), without which the ability 
to accommodate wind generation is largely compromised. The reliability of AM 
also affects this ability: poor AM reliability compromises this ability.   
• System reliability can be improved by implementing AM, especially when AM is 
configured with WGOC. This impact is affected by wind generation capacity as 
well: the reliability improvement is greater when the wind generation capacity 
connected to the system is higher. Poorer AM reliability corresponds to less 
reliability improvement for the power system. When there is a large penetration of 
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intermittent generation, power system reliability becomes highly sensitive to the 
reliability of AM system, and ensuring the reliability of AM is critical.  
• A ‘win-win’ situation can be expected for DNO and the owner of the wind 
generation under AM scenario, given that the wind generation capacity is within 
an appropriate range determined by the individual test case. DNO charges wind 
generation owners for initial connection and for providing AM services, whereas the 
owner of wind generation earns a revenue from selling electricity. When the wind 
generation capacity falls below the ‘win-win’ range, it is not possible for DNO to 
recover the investment of AM. On the other hand, the maximum capacity of wind 
generation is limited by either the system reliability constraint or the cost barrier the 
wind generation owner faces, whichever is lower. In this test case, the system 
reliability constraint is the bottleneck.  
• Traditional reinforcement scenario may not be a cost-effective option for DNO 
since it incurs a prohibitive investment cost. The case study in this project has 
proved some of the AM scenarios to be more cost-effective than traditional 
reinforcement scenario. Two factors that affect the cost-effectiveness of AM 
scenarios are the configuration of AM and the reliability of AM control system. AM 
is unlikely to generate a profit for DNO, if it is configured without WGOC. The 
poorer reliability of AM control system also reduces the net benefit for DNO. This 
effect is more significant when the wind generation capacity is higher. In general, a 
relatively reliable AM system configured with WGOC function, controlling an 
adequate capacity of wind generation, is likely to generate a profit for DNO.   
• DR slows down the degradation of system reliability in the context of continued 
load growth. For the test case presented in chapter 5, such improvement is greater 
when the load level is higher. A greater implementation level of DR brings a greater 
improvement in system reliability. However, the marginal reliability benefit finally 
decreases.  
• Not every reliability index deteriorates with growing load level, e.g., MAIFI. 
MAIFI is insensitive to load growth, but is determined by the network topology.    
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• Emergency Interruptible Load Programme (EILP) reduces the Expected 
Interruption Cost. However, it does not have a noticeable impact on SAIFI, SAIDI 
and LINWRI, because, rather than completely avoid load shedding, EILP only 
reduces the amount the load shedding under emergencies. 
• Corrective control scenarios utilising FACTS or ES devices and traditional 
reinforcement scenarios exhibit their effect in slowing down the deterioration of 
reliability over years of load growth. The reliability improvement fails to justify the 
prohibitive investment cost for traditional reinforcement scenarios. Some corrective 
control scenarios are more cost-effective than traditional reinforcement scenarios. 
The impact of load growth on system reliability should not be underestimated. A 
compounded load growth rate of 2.5% leads to a significant degradation in system 
reliability over five years. In other words, system reliability is highly sensitive to the 
load growth rate in the long term, because of the compounding effect. Therefore, 
improving the accuracy of the load growth estimation is critical for a realistic long-
term reliability and economic assessment.  
• The number of load levels considered in the test case has a significant impact on 
system reliability and IBSR. Given the same test case or two test cases with 
comparable size, a single peak load level is likely to result in a considerably lower 
system reliability level, a greater impact of reinforcement scenarios on system 
reliability and a higher IBSR value than multiple load levels.  
• IBSR quantifies a key aspect of benefit namely, the benefit in reliability brought 
by incremental investment in system reinforcement. It is defined as the incremental 
benefit in reliability over incremental investment and O&M cost. IBSR value 
depends on the ‘departure status’, i.e., the pre-reinforced status. A system 
reinforcement process can be either a lump project (one-off construction) or an 
accumulative process consisting of several small projects. The IBSR results for each 
small projects and the lump project have been calculated separately. Given that a 
lump project consists of project A and project B in chronological order, and that 
project A has a higher IBSR value than the lump project, this means project B has 
the lowest IBSR value, or is the least cost-effective among the three. 
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• The impact of control system failure on system reliability is generally negligible 
when its failure rate is comparable to that of the power line, i.e., normally no more 
than 1 occ/year. Its negative impact on system reliability is revealed given an 
incredibly large failure rate.  
 
9.2 Achievement and Contributions 
In the context of the research objectives set out Chapter 1 and reiterated in section 9.1, this 
work has made significant methodological and conceptual contributions to reliability 
assessment of power systems under post contingency corrective control. The main 
achievements and contributions are summarised below. 
9.2.1 An in-depth and wide ranging literature review of reliability 
assessment of power systems 
A comprehensive critical review has been undertaken as summarised below: 
• Chapter 2 reviewed the basic concept of power system reliability, the underlying 
assumptions, the division of power systems, classic methodologies for reliability 
assessment, and nonlinear optimisation methodologies; 
• The benefits and challenges associated with DG, the need for a fundamentally new 
solution to address the challenge of increasing penetration of DG, i.e., AM, and the 
features of AM were reviewed in Chapter 5; 
• The benefits and cost of DR, two categories of DR programmes and three basic load 
models of DR were summarised in Chapter 6;   
• Chapter 7 summarised the development of power electronics technology and its 
impact on FACTS devices, real examples of FACTS applications, and wide area 
control of FACTS devices; 
• The benefits and applications of ES devices, a comparison of different types of ES 
technologies, and a general ES configuration were reviewed in Chapter 8. 
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9.2.2 Development of New Reliability Indices 
Existing reliability indices have the drawback of being ‘partial-sighted’ and ‘non-
representative’, i.e., each of the existing indices quantifies only one aspect of system 
reliability and may not represent overall system reliability. Furthermore, indices that 
quantify the benefit of corrective control in system reliability were lacking. There was also 
a need for an index that identifies voluntary energy curtailment from total energy 
curtailment under emergencies.  In response to the gaps mentioned above, a couple of new 
reliability indices have been proposed in this thesis. They are Linear Weighed Reliability 
Index (LINWRI), Demand Response Incremental Cost Benefit (DRICB), Incremental 
Benefit of Corrective Control (IBCC), Incremental Benefit of System Reinforcement 
(IBSR), and Voluntary Energy Curtailment Level (VECL).  
By assigning weighting factors to indices of different aspects, LINWRI represents the 
overall system reliability.  The ways in which LINWRI can be interpreted are:   
1) Given a future year and the same current status, the comparison of different 
scenarios with regard to their LINWRI values shows the reliability ranking of these 
scenarios and the reliability zone to which each scenario belongs. 
2) Given a certain LINWRI level in the future, LINWRI results show the number of 
years it takes for the system reliability under each scenario to degrade to that level. 
A larger number of years correspond to a higher reliability improvement the 
scenario brings to the system. 
A reliability bar has also been proposed as a visualisation of LINWRI. Each candidate 
scenario under each year was projected on the reliability bar consisting of three reliability 
zones, i.e., the reliability improvement zone, moderate degradation zone, and significant 
degradation zone. The two boundaries that separate the three zones are the reference point 
and the unacceptable point. The reference point is normally defined as the reliability level 
under the ‘doing nothing at all’ scenario in the current year. The unacceptable point is 
defined as where network investments in branches and other relative facilities should be 
immediately put into practice. Arbitrariness often exists when defining the unacceptable 
point.   
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DRICB has been proposed in the context of DR.  DRICB represents the incremental 
monetary benefit in system reliability when one more unit of DR (expressed in MWh/year) 
is implemented. It is an indispensable index when determining the economic viability of 
DR.  
IBCC and IBSR are defined in a similar way as DRICB: they all quantify incremental 
benefits in reliability, although in different contexts. IBCC focuses on the incremental 
benefit in reliability from incremental implementation of corrective control, whereas IBSR 
focuses on incremental benefit in reliability from incremental implementation of system 
reinforcement. IBCC can be regarded as a subset of IBSR.  In this project, the benefit in 
reliability is converted to a monetary value. The incremental implementation of system 
reinforcement is also on a monetary basis: it is defined as the incremental investment and 
O&M costs arising from the reinforcement scenario. IBSR is crucial in determining the 
economic viability of the system reinforcement scenario.  
Load curtailments on a voluntary basis and those by force incur different costs to the 
network operator as well as to the society as a whole. Ideally, all load curtailments should 
be conducted according to prearranged contracts on a voluntary basis. However, this is not 
true in reality. Therefore, there was a need for an index that tells one from the other. 
Voluntary Energy Curtailment Level (VECL) quantifies annual voluntary energy 
curtailment as a percentage of annual total energy curtailment under emergencies. The 
voluntary energy curtailed in this project is the energy curtailed through EILP in which the 
participation is on a voluntary basis. Therefore, VECL represents the implementation level 
of EILP. A greater VECL value indicates a higher implementation level of EILP.  
 
9.2.3 Modelling of Control System Reliability 
 
Although widely applied in previous publications, the assumption that components are 
independent of each other requires justification. Improper application of this assumption 
may lead to an overly-optimistic reliability result. Previous work did not consider the 
possibility of control system failure in power system reliability study.    
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In this project, the assumption of independence does not apply to FACTS and ES devices. 
The model of the control system has been proposed. FACTS devices are subject to common 
cause failure (CCF), i.e., the failure of the control system. Given that the communication is 
conducted via radio, the control system is modelled as a simplified ‘party-line’ model 
where the communication system failure is integrated into the failure of the central control 
unit. The beta factor method has been applied in separating the CCF portion from that of 
the independent failure.   
 
9.2.4 Development of State Space Models of BES and STATCOM/BES 
 
Creating the state space models of BES and STATCOM/BES is necessary before 
implementing these devices into the reliability assessment methodology. This is where 
previous work left a gap. Therefore, the state space models of BES and STATCOM/BES 
have been derived in this project.  
The state space model of BES is based on a double-bank battery with a power interface (PI) 
and a Charge-Discharge Control System (CDCS). It is valid based on the following 
assumptions:  
• All repair jobs restores full functionality of the BES. In other words, there is no 
‘partial repair’ that leaves any component still inoperative.  
• When both banks are out of service, BES is disconnected, and no further outage will 
develop.  
• When the PI or the CDCS is down, BES is disconnected, and no further outage will 
develop. 
The state space model of STATCOM/BES considers the failure of the following 
component: the two banks of the battery, the STATCOM, the CDCS, and the PI between 
the battery and the STATCOM. Both the full state space models and the simplified ones are 
derived based on the same list of assumptions: 
• All repair jobs restore full functionality of the STATCOM/BES.     
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• The outage of both banks, the PI or the CDCS causes the BES being disconnected. 
Under this circumstance, the whole device runs as a pure STATCOM.  
• When the STATCOM is down, the STATCOM/BES becomes inoperative, and no 
further component outage will occur. 
 
9.2.5 Incorporating Risk-Associated Cost into the Economic Assessment of 
AM 
 
The original formula that calculates the net benefit for the DNO fails to recognise the risk-
associated cost, which is a key element in the economic analysis [56]. In this project, the 
formula has been updated and applied to a distribution network with wind generation under 
AM.  The original version considers wind generation connection charge, O&M charges for 
providing AM services, and investment cost of AM [56]. In this project, the risk-associated 
cost, as an output of the reliability assessment algorithm, is incorporated into the formula. 
In this way, a comprehensive picture of the benefits and costs of AM can be obtained.   
 
9.2.6 Incorporating Corrective Control into Reliability Assessment 
Methodology 
Three means of corrective control, i.e., FACTS, DR and ES have been incorporated into 
reliability assessment methodology.  
The reliability behaviour of SVC was modelled by a four-state model. The m-out-of-n: G 
model has been adopted as the reliability model of STATCOM. TCSC was simply 
modelled by the two-state model where the interaction with power lines is ignored due to 
the lack of practical information. These state space models along with the control system 
failure have been incorporated into CMCS.  
Three DR models were summarised in Chapter 6: the load shifting model, the load 
reduction model and the Emergency Interruptible Load Programme (EILP) model. The load 
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shifting model curtails electricity demand during peak hours and replaces it at off-peak 
hours, whereas the load reduction model reduces electricity demand at peak hours without 
making it up later. The EILP model considers the type of DR programmes where large 
industrial customers cut their demand upon request from the DNO under emergency 
circumstances. These DR models have been incorporated into the reliability assessment 
algorithm.  
The BES and STATCOM/BES models proposed in Chapter 8 have also been implemented 
in CMCS when performing reliability assessment of the power system. 
 
9.3 Suggestions for Future Work 
Although this project has made innovations and bridged a number of gaps in the field of 
power system reliability in a corrective control paradigm, it is by no means an exhaustive 
exploration of this continuously changing field but a step into it. There is still a vast space 
for future work including possible improvements based on this research and parallel 
projects. Some of them are suggested below: 
1) A more rigorous system planning process prior to reliability assessment is 
suggested. 
One of the limitations of this research is that it is on system reliability only, rather than 
on combined system planning and reliability study. Determining the locations of 
FACTS devices, ES devices and new branches for a candidate scenario is a system 
planning task which is beyond the scope of this project. System planning itself is a vast 
topic where numerous techniques have been applied, e.g., the multi-objective Genetic 
Algorithm. This project does not guarantee that the candidate scenarios are optimally 
planned. Instead, only preliminary planning by enumeration is conducted. The value of 
this project will be further improved if it is conducted on a system that has undergone a 
more rigorous planning process.    
2) A nonlinear optimisation toolbox with higher efficiency, a higher chance of 
finding the global optimum and the ability to model nonlinear constraints is yet to 
be developed. 
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One of the limitations of this project stems from the non-perfect nonlinear optimisation 
tool box. As is mentioned in chapter 2, the nonlinear optimisation toolbox, i.e., 
‘fmincon’ does not guarantee a global optimum for all circumstances. This may affect 
the system analysis results. Justifications for ‘fmincon’ have been made in Chapter 2 
regarding its overall performance considering efficiency, accuracy and the ability of 
processing nonlinear constraints: it is not perfect but is suitable for this project. 
However, the project can be further improved if a superior nonlinear optimisation 
toolbox is developed. Compared with ‘fmincon’, a superior toolbox is expected to 
exhibit higher efficiency, a higher chance of finding the global optimum as well as the 
ability to take nonlinear constraints into account. However, the development of a 
superior nonlinear optimisation toolbox is a challenging and time-consuming 
mathematical task.   
3) DR models can be upgraded. 
The DR models can be upgraded in order to take into account a more complex market 
condition. The signal that triggers DR programmes, whether a price signal or a signal 
dictated by the contract, can be modelled in a more practical way if real data are 
provided. It is expected that the upgraded DR models can be readily implemented into 
existing reliability assessment methodology and system analysis algorithm.  
4) The control system model can be upgraded. 
This project has recognised the correlation among the failures of FACTS devices as a 
single CCF, i.e., the failure of central control unit. In reality, the correlation between 
different FACTS devices may be more complicated: there may be multiple CCF events 
determined by the structure of the control system, e.g., a multilevel control system. The 
model of the control system can be upgraded if there were knowledge of the real 
structure of the control system. 
5) A practical test case will enhance the value of this project. 
The practical value of this project will be further demonstrated if the methodology is 
applied to the UK transmission network model, apart from being tested on RTS and 
RBTS.  
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6) Transient analysis can serve as a supplement to the reliability assessment process. 
Steady-state inadequacy (either a shortage in generation capacity caused by the outage 
of generation units or a shortage in network capacity caused by branch outage) is only 
one type of problems that may lead to load curtailment. Transient instability is another 
type of the same importance. Despite a couple of existing papers [9, 146], reliability 
considering transient stability issues is a field that still requires much research effort. 
Further exploration can add value to this project: transient stability evaluations can be 
performed. The model of the control system and the new indices proposed in this 
project can be applied in transient stability assessments.    
7) The state space models of ES devices need to be validated against actual operation 
data.  
A detailed knowledge of the operation strategy and the characteristics of ES devices is 
required for the development of sufficiently accurate state space models of ES devices. 
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Table A1: Input data for the 16 bus network [65]. 
Branch (bus 
to bus) 
Section 
Resistance 
(p.u) 
Section 
Reactance 
(p.u) 
End bus real 
load (MW) 
End bus 
reactive load 
(MVar)  
1-2 0.01 0.01 N/A N/A 
1-3 0.01 0.01 N/A N/A 
1-4 0.2 0.3 2.0 1.6 
4-5 0.2 0.3 3.0 1.5 
4-6 0.2 0.3 2.0 0.8 
6-7 0.2 0.3 1.5 0.2 
2-8 0.2 0.3 4.0 2.7 
8-9 0.2 0.3 5.0 3.0 
8-10 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.9 
9-11 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.1 
9-12 0.2 0.3 4.5 2.0 
3-13 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.9 
13-14 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.7 
13-15 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.9 
15-16 0.2 0.3 2.1 1.0 
* The load data are for the base case. 
APPENDIX A: Input Data for the 16-Bus Test Network  
- 228 - 
 
Table A2: The load profile for a typical winter day and a typical summer day 
Hour Load in a typical winter day (per 
unit) 
Load in a typical summer day (per unit) 
1 0.6 0.2 
2 0.3 0.2 
3 0.3 0.2 
4 0.3 0.2 
5 0.3 0.3 
6 0.3 0.3 
7 0.3 0.2 
8 0.3 0.3 
9 0.4 0.5 
10 0.5 0.6 
11 0.6 0.5 
12 0.5 0.6 
13 0.5 0.7 
14 0.6 0.5 
15 0.6 0.5 
16 0.6 0.7 
17 0.8 0.9 
18 1 0.9 
19 1 1 
20 0.9 0.9 
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21 0.9 0.7 
22 0.9 0.5 
23 0.9 0.3 
24 0.8 0.2 
The load for the base case is scaled down to 1. 
All loads are assumed to be fully correlated. 
The typical summer day repeats itself from hour 2161 to 6552 (inclusive) in a year. 
The typical winter day repeats itself from hour 1 to 2160 and from hour 6553 to 8760. 
Table A3: BES characteristics 
Bus No. Maximum Energy 
(MWh) 
Maximum power 
output (MW) 
Charge rate (MW) 
12 0.5 0.2 0.1 
 
Table A4: SVC characteristics 
Bus No.  Maximum Var injection into the 
bus (Var) 
Maximum Var absorption from 
the bus (Var) 
7 1.0 1.0 
 
The hourly wind profile over a year is included in the CD attached to this thesis. 
Table A5: the reliability data of SVC, BES and the central control unit 
Device or system Failure rate (occ/year) Mean Time To Repair 
(MTTR: occ/year) 
SVC 2 20 
BES 2 20 
Central control unit 2 20 
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Based on above parameters and formulae, the numerical results are given in Table A6. 
Risk associated cost needs to be corrected. 
 
Table A6: results for economic analysis of the test case 
Scenario No. 1 1 1 2 2 
Wind capacity 
(MW) 
2.0 4.0 6.0 2.0 4.0 
Connection 
charge (£k) 
100.00 200.00 300.00 100.00 200.00 
AM service 
charge (£k) 
NA NA NA 482.952 965.905 
Risk associated 
cost (£k) 
1,513.252 1,513.252 1,513.252 1,417.496 1,417.496 
AM investment 
(£k) 
NA NA NA 2000.00 2000.00 
Net benefit for 
DNO (£k) 
-
1,413.252 
-1,313.252 -1,213.252 -2,834.543 -2,251.591 
Scenario No. 2 3 3 3 3 
Wind capacity 
(MW) 
6.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 
Connection 
charge (£k) 
300.00 100.00 200.00 300.00 400.00 
AM service 
charge (£k) 
1,448.857 482.952 965.905 1,448.857 1,931.00 
Risk associated 1,417.496 1,417.496 1,417.496 1,417.496 1,417.496 
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cost (£k) 
AM investment 
(£k) 
2000.00 2000.00 2000.00 2000.00 2000.00 
Net benefit for 
DNO (£k) 
-
1,668.638
-2,834.543 -2,251.591 -1,668.638 -1,086.495 
Scenario No. 3 3 3 3 3 
Wind capacity 
(MW) 
10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 
Connection 
charge (£k) 
500.00 600.00 700.00 800.00 900.00 
AM service 
charge (£k) 
2,403.482 2,848.293 3,268.921 3,666.427 4,046.634 
Risk associated 
cost (£k) 
1,417.496 1,417.496 1,417.496 1,417.496 1,417.496 
AM investment 
(£k) 
2000.00 2000.00 2000.00 2000.00 2000.00 
Net benefit for 
DNO (£k) 
-514.013 30.798 551.426 1,048.931 1,529.138 
Scenario No. 3 4 4 4 4 
Wind capacity 
(MW) 
20.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 
Connection 
charge (£k) 
1,000.00 100.00 200.00 300.00 400.00 
AM service 
charge (£k) 
4,400.204 482.952 965.905 1,448.857 1,930.746 
Risk associated 1,417.496 1,430.228 1,430.583 1,432.246 1,434.033 
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cost (£k) 
AM investment 
(£k) 
2000.00 2000.00 2000.00 2000.00 2000.00 
Net benefit for 
DNO (£k) 
1,982.708 -2,847.276 -2,264.678 -1,683.389 -1,103.287 
Scenario No. 4 4 4 4 4 
Wind capacity 
(MW) 
10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 
Connection 
charge (£k) 
500.00 600.00 700.00 800.00 900.00 
AM service 
charge (£k) 
2,403.262 2,848.107 3,268.671 3,666.195 4,046.402 
Risk associated 
cost (£k) 
1,478.875 1,503.130 1,584.399 1,613.898 1,773.325 
AM investment 
(£k) 
2000.00 2000.00 2000.00 2000.00 2000.00 
Net benefit for 
DNO (£k) 
-575.612 -55.012 384.272 852.298 1,173.077 
Note: All charges/costs are in present value. 
NA: not applicable. 
Results of benefits for the wind generation owner are in the CD attached to this thesis. 
Table A7: reliability results and economic analysis results under TRS 
Wind capacity 
(MW) 
EENS (MWh/year) EENS reduction 
compared to the 
base case  
Net benefit for 
DNO (£) 
2 45.93 14.45% -464,728 
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4 45.93 14.45% -364,728 
6 45.93 14.45% -264,728 
8* 80.37 8.8% -213,267 
*This case has unacceptable reliability. 
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The branch data and the base load data for year 1 are the same as in Appendix A. 
The load profile is included in the CD attached to this thesis. 
The Composite Customer Damage Function (CCDF) is given in Table B1 [145]:  
Table B1: the CCDF for the test case used in Chapter 6 
Composite customer damage cost (£/MW)  Bus No. 
OD = 1 min OD = 20 min OD = 1h OD = 4h OD=8h 
4 1,625 3,868 9,085 25,160 55,810 
5 381 2,969 8,552 31,320 83,010 
6 1 93 482 4,914 15,690 
7 1 93 482 4,914 15,690 
8 1,625 3,868 9,085 25,160 55,810 
9 381 2,969 8,552 31,320 83,010 
10 1 93 482 4,914 15,690 
11 1 93 482 4,914 15,690 
12 1 93 482 4,914 15,690 
13 1,625 3,868 9,085 25,160 55,810 
14 381 2,969 8,552 31,320 83,010 
15 1 93 482 4,914 15,690 
16 1 93 482 4,914 15,690 
*OD stands for outage duration. 
APPENDIX B: Input Data for the 16-Bus Test Network  
- 236 - 
CCDF for each bus is expressed by a piecewise function connecting the data points given in 
Table B1. 
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Data for IEEE 24-bus Reliability Test System (RTS) [7]: 
Table C1: bus data for RTS 
Bus No. Bus type PL (MW) QL 
(MVar) 
PGmax 
(MW) 
Qmin 
(MVar) 
Qmax 
(MVar) 
1 PV 119.21 24.28 211.93 -110.38 132.46 
2 PV 107.07 22.08 211.93 -110.38 132.46 
3 PQ 198.69 40.84 0 0 0 
4 PQ 81.68 16.56 0 0 0 
5 PQ 78.37 15.45 0 0 0 
6 PQ 150.11 28.70 0 0 0 
7 PV 137.98 27.60 264.92 0 198.69 
8 PQ 188.75 38.63 0 0 0 
9 PQ 193.17 39.74 0 0 0 
10 PQ 215.24 44.15 0 0 0 
11 PQ 0 0 0 0 0 
12 PQ 0 0 0 0 0 
13 Slack 292.51 59.61 2207.63 -551.91 551.91 
14 PV 214.14 43.05 2.21 -220.76 331.14 
15 PV 349.91 70.64 237.32 -220.76 331.14 
16 PV 110.38 22.08 171.09 -220.76 331.14 
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17 PQ 0 0 0 0 0 
18 PV 367.57 75.06 442.15 -220.76 331.14 
19 PQ 199.79 40.84 0 0 0 
20 PQ 141.29 28.70 0 0 0 
21 PV 0 0 441.53 -110.38 220.76 
22 PV 0 0 331.14 -110.38 220.76 
23 PV 0 0 728.52 -110.38 220.76 
24 PQ 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table C2: line data for RTS 
Bus-bus R (p.u) X (p.u) B (p.u) Transfer 
limit 
(MVA) 
Failure rate 
(occ/year) 
Repair 
time (h) 
1-2 0.003 0.014 0.461 193 0.24 16 
1-3 0.055 0.211 0.057 208 0.51 10 
1-5 0.022 0.085 0.023 208 0.33 10 
2-4 0.033 0.127 0.034 208 0.39 10 
2-6 0.05 0.192 0.052 208 0.48 10 
3-9 0.031 0.119 0.032 208 0.38 10 
3-24 0.002 0.084 0 400 0.02 768 
4-9 0.027 0.104 0.028 208 0.36 10 
5-10 0.023 0.088 0.024 208 0.34 10 
6-10 0.014 0.061 0.459 175 0.33 35 
7-8 0.016 0.061 0.017 208 0.3 10 
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8-9 0.043 0.165 0.045 208 0.44 10 
8-10 0.043 0.165 0.045 208 0.44 10 
9-11 0.002 0.084 0 510 0.02 768 
9-12 0.002 0.084 0 400 0.02 768 
10-11 0.002 0.084 0 400 0.02 768 
10-12 0.002 0.084 0 400 0.02 768 
11-13 0.006 0.048 0.1 600 0.4 11 
11-14 0.005 0.042 0.088 600 0.39 11 
12-13 0.006 0.048 0.1 600 0.4 11 
12-23 0.012 0.097 0.203 600 0.52 11 
13-23 0.011 0.087 0.182 600 0.49 11 
14-16 0.005 0.059 0.082 600 0.38 11 
15-16 0.002 0.017 0.036 600 0.33 11 
15-21 0.006 0.049 0.103 600 0.41 11 
15-21 0.006 0.049 0.103 600 0.41 11 
15-24 0.007 0.052 0.109 600 0.41 11 
16-17 0.003 0.026 0.055 600 0.35 11 
16-19 0.003 0.023 0.049 600 0.34 11 
17-18 0.002 0.014 0.03 600 0.32 11 
17-22 0.014 0.105 0.221 600 0.54 11 
18-21 0.003 0.026 0.055 600 0.35 11 
18-21 0.003 0.026 0.055 600 0.35 11 
19-20 0.005 0.04 0.083 600 0.38 11 
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19-20 0.005 0.04 0.083 600 0.38 11 
20-23 0.003 0.022 0.046 600 0.34 11 
20-23 0.003 0.022 0.046 600 0.34 11 
21-22 0.009 0.068 0.142 600 0.45 11 
 
Table C3: STATCOM data for RTS 
Bus Inductance Q 
(MVar) 
Capacitance Q 
(MVar) 
3 -100 100 
 
The STATCOM has three phases with each phase consisting of 10 VSIs. For any phase if 
more than 2 VSIs fail at the same time, the phase is down and the STATCOM is down.    
The failure rate and the repair time of VSI independent failure is 5 occ/year and 20 hours, 
respectively.  
 
Table C4: TCSC data for RTS 
Line sending 
bus 
Line receiving 
bus 
X min (Ω) X max (Ω) Failure 
rate 
(occ/year)*
Repair 
time (h) 
** 
3 24 -13.27 13.27 0.2 20 
*Failure rate corresponds to self-originated (independent) failure. 
** Repair time corresponds to the duration for repairing an independent failure.  
Table C5: SVC data for RTS 
Bus Inductance Q 
(MVar) 
Capacitance Q 
(MVar) 
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3 -112.5 112.5 
The reliability data for SVC is shown in the state space model below where all data 
correspond to independent failure of the SVC: 
 
Figure C1: reliability data of SVC. 
 
Table C6: the reliability data for the central control unit in RTS 
Failure rate (occ/year) Repair rate (occ/year) 
0.2 438 
 
Economic assessment data: 
The discount rate is 5%. The economic life for all reinforcement scenarios is 25 years.  
The input data for economic assessment is given in Table C7 where the risk-associated cost 
is the output of reliability assessment.  
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Table C7: the input data for economic assessment 
Scenario No. Risk associated 
cost (£/yr) 
Investment 
mortgage per 
payment (£/yr) 
Mortgage 
duration (yr) 
O&M cost of the 
reinforcement 
scenario (£/yr) 
1 7,450,862.50 0.00 0 0.00 
2 2,057,961.72 400,000.00 5 50,000.00 
3 6,877,945.31 500,000.00 5 50,000.00 
4 1,892,526.00 600,000.00 5 50,000.00 
5 1,928,533.10 800,000.00 5 75,000.00 
6 2,361,502.80 2,000,000.00 5 50,000.00 
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Data for RBTS [142]:  
Table D1: bus data for RBTS 
Bus 
No. 
Bus type PL (MW) QL 
(MVar)
PGmax 
(MW) 
Qmin (MVar) Qmax 
(MVar) 
1 Slack 0 0 124.45 -41.86 59.96 
2 PV 22.62 4.52 101.82 -48.65 84.85 
3 PQ 96.16 19.23 0 0 0 
4 PQ 45.25 9.05 0 0 0 
5 PQ 22.62 4.52 0 0 0 
6 PQ 22.62 4.52 0 0 0 
 
Table D2: line data for RBTS 
Bus-bus R (p.u) X (p.u) B (p.u) Transfer 
limit 
(MVA) 
Failure 
rate 
(occ/year) 
Repair 
time (h) 
1-3 0.0342 0.180 0.0212 85 0.24 16 
2-4 0.1140 0.600      0.0704 71 0.24 16 
1-2 0.0912 0.480 0.0564 71 0.24 16 
3-4 0.0228 0.120 0.0142 71 0.24 16 
3-5 0.0028 0.120 0.0142 71 0.24 16 
1-3 0.0342 0.180 0.0212 85 0.24 16 
APPENDIX D: Input Data for RBTS 
- 244 - 
2-4 0.1140 0.600      0.0704 71 0.24 16 
4-5 0.0228 0.120 0.0142 71 0.24 16 
5-6 0.0028 0.120 0.0142 71 0.24 16 
 
Table D3: STATCOM/BES data for RBTS 
Bus Inductance Q 
(MVar) 
Capacitance Q 
(MVar) 
Max Energy 
in BES 
(MWh) 
Max active 
power output 
(MW) 
6 -10 10 40 20 
The reliability data for STATCOM/BES is given in the figure below:  
 
Figure D1: reliability data of STATCOM/BES. 
 
Table D4: the reliability data for the central control unit in RBTS 
Failure rate (occ/year) Repair rate (occ/year) 
0.2 547.5 
All loads are assumed to be fully correlated. The hourly load profile over a year is given in 
[7]. The hourly load levels are discretised into 10 steps as follows: 
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Table D5: discretisation of the load profile 
Original load level (per unit) Discretised load level 
<0.1 0.05 
[0.1,0.2) 0.15 
[0.2,0.3) 0.25 
[0.3,0.4) 0.35 
[0.4,0.5) 0.45 
[0.5,0.6) 0.55 
[0.6,0.7) 0.65 
[0.7,0.8) 0.75 
[0.8,0.9) 0.85 
[0.9,1) 0.95 
 
The hourly wind profile over a year is stored in the CD attached to this thesis.  
Table D6: data for economic analysis in RBTS 
Sccenario No. Mortgage per 
year (£k) 
Mortgage 
duration (yrs) 
Economic Life O&M cost per 
year (£k) 
2 7,000 10 25 60 
3 10,000 10 25 100 
4 30,000 10 25 20 
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The data for MRTS [145] : 
Table E1: Bus Data for MRTS 
Bus 
No. 
Bus 
type 
PL (MW) QL 
(MVar) 
PGmax 
(MW) 
Qmin (MVar) Qmax (MVar) 
1 PV 108 22 192 -100 120 
2 PV 97 20 192 -100 120 
3 PQ 180 37 0 0 0 
4 PQ 74 15 0 0 0 
5 PQ 71 14 0 0 0 
6 PQ 136 26 0 0 0 
7 PV 125 25 240 0 180 
8 PQ 171 35 0 0 0 
9 PQ 175 36 0 0 0 
10 PQ 195 40 0 0 0 
11 PQ 0 0 0 0 0 
12 PQ 0 0 0 0 0 
13 Slack 265 54 2000 -500 500 
14 PV 194 39 2 -200 300 
15 PV 317 64 215 -200 300 
16 PV 100 20 155 -200 300 
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17 PQ 0 0 0 0 0 
18 PV 333 68 400.57 -200 300 
19 PQ 181 37 0 0 0 
20 PQ 128 26 0 0 0 
21 PV 0 0 400 -100 200 
22 PV 0 0 300 -100 200 
23 PV 0 0 660 -100 200 
24 PQ 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table E2: line data for MRTS 
Bus-bus R (p.u) X (p.u) B (p.u) Transfer 
limit 
(MVA) 
Failure rate 
(occ/year) 
Repair 
time (h) 
1-2 0.003 0.014 0.461 193 0.24 16 
1-5 0.022 0.085 0.023 208 0.33 10 
2-4 0.033 0.127 0.034 208 0.39 10 
2-6 0.05 0.192 0.052 208 0.48 10 
3-9 0.031 0.119 0.032 208 0.38 10 
3-24 0.002 0.084 0 400 0.02 768 
4-9 0.027 0.104 0.028 208 0.36 10 
5-10 0.023 0.088 0.024 208 0.34 10 
6-10 0.014 0.061 0.459 175 0.33 35 
7-8 0.016 0.061 0.017 208 0.3 10 
8-9 0.043 0.165 0.045 208 0.44 10 
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8-10 0.043 0.165 0.045 208 0.44 10 
9-12 0.002 0.084 0 400 0.02 768 
10-11 0.002 0.084 0 400 0.02 768 
10-12 0.002 0.084 0 400 0.02 768 
11-14 0.005 0.042 0.088 600 0.39 11 
12-13 0.006 0.048 0.1 600 0.4 11 
12-23 0.012 0.097 0.203 600 0.52 11 
13-23 0.011 0.087 0.182 600 0.49 11 
14-16 0.005 0.059 0.082 600 0.38 11 
15-16 0.002 0.017 0.036 600 0.33 11 
15-21 0.006 0.049 0.103 600 0.41 11 
15-21 0.006 0.049 0.103 600 0.41 11 
15-24 0.007 0.052 0.109 600 0.41 11 
16-17 0.003 0.026 0.055 600 0.35 11 
16-19 0.003 0.023 0.049 600 0.34 11 
17-18 0.002 0.014 0.03 600 0.32 11 
17-22 0.014 0.105 0.221 600 0.54 11 
18-21 0.003 0.026 0.055 600 0.35 11 
19-20 0.005 0.04 0.083 600 0.38 11 
20-23 0.003 0.022 0.046 600 0.34 11 
21-22 0.009 0.068 0.142 600 0.45 11 
 
All loads are assumed to be fully correlated. The hourly load profile over a year is given in 
[7]. The loads are discretised in the same way as introduced in Appendix D. 
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The hourly wind profile over a year is stored in the CD attached to this thesis.  
 
Table E3: STATCOM/BES data for MRTS 
Bus Inductance Q 
(MVar) 
Capacitance Q 
(MVar) 
Max Energy 
in BES 
(MWh) 
Max active 
power output 
(MW) 
6 -10 10 40 20 
The reliability data for STATCOM/BES in MRTS is the same as introduced in Appendix D. 
 
Table E4: the reliability data for the central control unit in MRTS 
Failure rate (occ/year) Repair rate (occ/year) 
0.2 547.5 
 
Table E5: input data for economic analysis in MRTS 
Sccenario No. Mortgage per 
year (£k) 
Mortgage 
duration (yrs) 
Economic Life O&M cost per 
year (£k) 
2 7,000 10 25 60 
3 14,000 10 25 120 
4 30,000 10 25 20 
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